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Hanging on my office door is a Dilbert cartoon which perfectly
captures the condition of a great deal of contemporary discourse
about applied ethics:
DOGBERT: ED= AD .OR 63E!E PLANNING TO SO, GIVEN ALL-MlAT, I5
FOCUS OUR ARISING ri OKAY FOR tETOG)EKWEJOURPRODUCT5 ON TH)DUT PAKEr STEAL OFFICESUPPLIES?
ARE KILLING PEOPLE, IN OOP. UPRAN A E4.A I
BUT(XRE CLAIMING
THE AST _. ARE rD HAVE7o
0.
The humor in the cartoon' resides in-part in the conflation of
"ethics" in the business world with the prohibition of petty corruption,
and the inattention to moral issues of greater import. It simply never
occurred to Dogbert's client-or to Dogbert, in his exalted role as
"ethics advisor"-to question the moral blameworthiness of the com-
pany's behavior.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University. This Article was
written in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of the
Science of Law in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University. For helpful comments
and suggestions, I am grateful to Kent Greenawalt, Stephen Kalish, Andrew W.
McThenia, Jr., Stephen Pepper, William Sage, Thomas Shaffer, William Simon, Peter
Strauss, and Barry Sullivan. These acknowledgments should not be taken to imply
agreement with my arguments. (In fact, it is probably safe to say that all of these
reviewers continue to disagree with one or another aspect of this Article.)
1 Reprinted with permission from United Feature Syndicate, Inc.
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A similar confusion reigns in the study of the professional moral-
ity of lawyers. Anyone who has spent much time around practicing
lawyers knows that many of them regard legal ethics as little more
than the study of a lawyer-promulgated disciplinary code, which may
or may not be enforced against them by overworked bar association
officials. 2 The dominant view in the organized bar has long been that
ethical self-regulation should aim to do no more than produce lawyers
who are "professionally... no rottener than the generality of people
acting, so to speak, as amateurs. '3 Proponents of this view argue that
the misconduct of lawyers is no different in principle from a com-
pany's unfair trade practices, a manufacturer's sales of a product with-
out adequate warnings, or the use of commodity forward straddles to
shelter income from taxation. In all of these situations, legislatures,
agencies, and courts apply legal rules to punish improper conduct or
channel the activities of the marketplace into socially beneficial prac-
tices. The legal profession is a highly regulated industry, controlled
by state bar associations, courts, and legislatures. It therefore seems to
make perfect sense to theorize about regulation of the legal industry
in the same way we think of applying legal rules to telecommunica-
tions companies or real estate brokers. Indeed, the activity of regulat-
ing lawyers' behavior has spawned a complex "law of lawyering," which
comprises the bulk of what is taught in law school professional respon-
sibility courses.4
Opposing this view of professional responsibility as legal regula-
tion is the call for "returning values to legal ethics."5 Readers of the
2 See Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules ?, 59 TEx. L. REV.
639, 674 nn.184-85 (1981); Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and
Commitment in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 183 (1996);
William H. Simon, The Trouble With Legal Ethics, 41J. LEGAL EDUC. 65 (1991); Jack B.
Weinstein, On the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 457 (1972). None of
these commentators endorse what they take to be the practicing bar's ideal.
3 Edward A. Dauer & Arthur A. Left, Correspondence: The Lanyer as Friend, 86 YALE
L.J. 573, 582 (1977).
4 See Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical
View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243 (1985); David B. Wilkins, Who Should
Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992).
5 A note on terminology: Some commentators draw a distinction between "pro-
fessional responsibility," which they understand to refer to the formal rules regulating
the practice of law, and "legal ethics," which consists of reflection on the moral di-
mension of lawyering. See, e.g., RicHARD A. ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, LEGAL
ETHICS IN THE PRAcriCE OF LAW 1-2 (1995); Charles W. Wolfram, Legal Ethics and the
Restatement Process-The Sometimes-Uncomfortable Fit, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 13, 13 (1993)
("Considerations of 'legal ethics,' for example, are concerned with personal ethics
... ."). I do not make this distinction because I believe it obscures important ques-
tions concerning the status of non-legal considerations, such as moral principles, in
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academic literature are familiar with a burgeoning genre-the "pro-
fession in crisis"jeremiad. Members of every segment of the legal pro-
fession-practicing lawyers, 6 judges, 7 and law professors 8-excoriate
the failing ideals of their fellows. Countless bar leaders and judges
have donned the mantle of preachers, ascending to their pulpits to
proclaim boldly that lawyers should become better human beings:
Unless the bar is uniformly imbued with that spirit of honesty and
decency and unless it is inspired to insist upon the exercise of the
highest ideals in the day-to-day practice of law, then no disciplinary
system can be effective and no code of professional conduct will be
anything more than a hypocritical farce. 9
Former United States Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark-while
reluctantly acknowledging that honesty and integrity are values that
develop through a long process of socialization, responding to influ-
ences by family, church, schools, and others-insisted that law schools
should "shoulder alone and shoulder well"'10 the burden of teaching
virtue in the face of failure by other institutions." He recommended,
among other measures, more speeches: "[We must also provide ex-
hortation and instruction by the leaders of the bar to inspire accept-
ance of high ethical standards."' 2 A modem preacher, D.C. Circuit
legal decision making. Throughout this Article, I will use the two terms
interchangeably.
6 See, e.g., SOL M. LINowrrz & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION (1994);
John C. Buchanan, The Demise of Legal Professionalism: Accepting Responsibility and Imple-
menting Change, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 563 (1994);JeromeJ. Shestack, PuttingJustice in the
Justice System: With Professionalism Movement Well Under Way, It Is Time for Lauyers to Ad-
dressJustice Issues, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 3, 1998, at Cl.
7 See, e.g., RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LAxWYm%, COURTS, AND PROFESSIONALISM (1989);
Marvin E. Aspen, Let UsBe "Officers of the Court, "83 A.B.A.J. 94, 94 (1997); Warren E.
Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 63 FOPS)HAm L. REV. 949 (1995); Harry T. Ed-
wards, The GrowingDisjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 34, 66-74 (1992).
8 See, e.g., ANTHoNY T. KRoNMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993); Carl T. Bogus, The
Death of an Honorable Profession, 71 IND. L.J. 911 (1996); PatrickJ. Schiltz, LegalEthics in
Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice
Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705 (1998).
9 Tom C. Clark, Teaching Professional Ethics, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249, 252
(1975).
10 Id. at 253.
11 See id.
12 Id. at 259; cf. Paul T. Hayden, Sinners in the Hands of an Angry Professor: Caution-
ary Thoughts on Teaching Moral Lessons in the Professional Responsibility Course, 21 LEGAL
STUD. F. 257, 260 (1997) (stating that when encountering this sort of rhetoric, one
"cannot help but think of the classroom as a kind of sanctuary, with the professor at
the pulpit and the students in the pews").
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Judge Harry Edwards, has made proposals only slightly less homiletic:
lawyers in private practice should be more public-spirited and should
"abandon their indifference to the ends being pursued by their cli-
ents."'1 3 It is interesting to contrast these proposals with the response
to dysfunctional behavior in other industries: no one talks about "ex-
horting" Microsoft not to include web browsers with its operating sys-
tem-if the marketing arrangement violates antitrust laws, legal
sanctions may be appropriate, but no observer suggests that giving Bill
Gates a stem talking to is a potential solution to anticompetitive
behavior.
All this sermonizing is premised on the existence and teachability
of norms of legal ethics that transcend positive law and upon which
there is agreement. Religious preachers can appeal to a sacred text or
revealed truth to ground their claims that their parishioners ought or
ought not to do something. But preaching to lawyers in a pluralistic
society is a different matter altogether, and the success of secular
preaching by bar association leaders and judges depends on locating
the authority for moral propositions. When careful attention is not
given to this foundational task, the resulting arguments have a marked
tendency to sound moralistic and ripe for debunking. Critics are fond
of pointing out that professionals' actions are never as public-spirited
as their rhetoric; that the rules of self-regulation they impose on them-
selves are either self-serving or, if they have any teeth, inevitably
under-enforced; and that the independence of professionals is often
compromised by their cozy alliances with powerful clients. 14 Further-
more, appeals to shared values inevitably provoke the question of
whether these values are really shared across class, racial, ethnic, and
gender boundaries, or whether they are merely the values of the dom-
inant class, dressed in spuriously universal garb. 15 (Of course, even
13 Harry T. Edwards, A Lawyer's Duty to Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1148, 1160 (1990).
14 See RicHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERs 35-39 (1989); Robert W. Gordon &
William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAwYERS'
PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 215, 230 (Robert L.
Nelson et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter IDEALS/PRACTICES]; Gillers, supra note 4;
Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665 (1994).
15 See, e.g., Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar
Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657, 693-703 (1994); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character
as a Professional Credentia4 94 YALE LJ. 491 (1985). These critiques in legal ethics are a
special case of broader arguments made in political theory. Critics claim that pur-
portedly universally applicable moral values may in some cases actually be the particu-
lar norms of a distinct religious, gender, national, or ethnic group, or at least that
opportunity for cultural identification is necessary for the individual's development of
a robust system of beliefs and moral norms. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL
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within these subcommunities there may be substantial disagreement
on moral questions.) Thus, a certain amount of analytical ground-
work must be laid before lawyers may be criticized for their lack of
professionalism. This foundation need not be a fully-realized system
of moral philosophy or jurisprudence, but some care should be taken
to specify exactly what it means to act according to the highest dictates
of the profession. It is one thing to speak out in favor of ethics for
lawyers-like apple pie and motherhood, who can be against it?-but
another matter entirely to defend a substantive conception of profes-
sional morality that provides specific guidance for practicing lawyers
making decisions with ramifications in the moral realm. Lawyers and
academics who call for returning values to legal ethics ought to be
expected to specify whose values they seek to infuse into the practice
of lawyering, how those values are to be ascertained and applied, and
what to do in cases in which these values conflict. Without a com-
monly known and readily accessible foundation for propositions of
legal ethics, the enterprise becomes little more than intraprofessional
mudslinging or, worse, the exercise of arbitrary power by courts and
disciplinary agencies.
I certainly do not intend to demean the study of moral values as
part of professional responsibility education. As the quotations above
illustrate, however, a certain amount of rigor has been lacking in
some of the literature on professional responsibility.16 The task of this
Article, therefore, is to outline an approach to the study of profes-
sional values that provides an adequate theoretical grounding for fur-
ther inquiry into the morality of lawyers' conduct. The argument
proceeds in four parts. Section II reviews and criticizes the assump-
tions about professional responsibility that prevail among most prac-
ticing lawyers. The principal contention in this Section is that lawyers'
THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMRIcAN LAW 49-78 (1990); Anne Phil-
lips, Democracy andDifference: Some Problems forFeminist Theory, in TrE RIGHTS OF MINOR-
rir CULTURES (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995). One must not automatically assume that
proponents of multiculturalism are necessarily asserting moral claims that hold only
for a particular cultural group, however. As Jeremy Waldron has emphasized, many
of these moral arguments may actually be universal claims, maintaining that all socie-
ties should be organized along similar lines. SeeJeremy Waldron, Particular Values and
Critical Morality, in LIBERAL RIGHTS 168-202 (1993).
16 Others have had a similar reaction to this debate. See, e.g., Eliot Friedson, Pro-
fessionalism as Model and Ideology, in IDEALS/PRACncEs, supra note 14, at 215; Rob At-
kinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEx. L. REV. 259
(1995); Timothy P. Terrell &James H. Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism," 41 EM-
ORY L.J. 403, 419 (1992) (arguing that "professionalism" is reduced either to eti-
quette-returning telephone calls and being pleasant-without any moral content, or
else defined as providing pro bono services).
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understanding of legal ethics is, jurisprudentially speaking, decades
behind their conception of the law as it applies to everyone else. Law-
yers are accustomed to thinking ofjudicial decisions as the product of
a complex interaction between legal rules and the underlying princi-
ples of political morality that justify the system of law. At the same
time, however, they conceptualize the application of the law to them-
selves as something devoid of creative normative judgment and inter-
pretive flexibility. But as Karl Llewellyn recognized decades ago, the
same rhetorical weapons that lawyers apply to cases and statutes on
their clients' behalf may also be trained on the sources of their own
ethical obligations:
Within the law, I say, therefore, rules guide, but they do not control
decision. There is no precedent the judge may not at his need
either file down to razor thinness or expand into a bludgeon. Why
should you expect the ethics of the game to be different from the game itself?
17
Professional self-regulation is inevitably an exercise in jurispru-
dence or applied moral philosophy. Thus, the next step in the argu-
ment is to uncover the moral principles that are implicated by the
practice of lawyering.
Many legal ethicists have sought to understand these moral prin-
ciples as essentially personal values-that is, norms that do not depend
upon a theory of legal or political institutions for their intelligibility.
For example, a noteworthy recent trend in academic writing has been
to consider the role of religious beliefs or other personal ethical com-
mitments in the professional life of lawyers.18 Although much of this
work is insightful, personal moral beliefs have limited application to
the professional setting in a world of marked religious and moral di-
versity and disagreement. In a morally pluralistic society, it is highly
likely that lawyers and clients will disagree on the morality of either
the client's goals or the tactics to be used to achieve those ends. This
is not to suggest that moral values are nothing more than subjective
tastes, whims, or preferences of individuals; I am not assuming the
subjectivity of morality here. However, whether or not moral values
are objective, the fact remains that we disagree about them inces-
santly, at both the theoretical and the practical levels. One response
to disagreement in society has been to set up political and legal insti-
17 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 150 (1960) (emphasis added).
18 See, e.g., Thomas D. Eisele, From "Moral Stupidity" to Professional Responsibility, 21
LEGAL STUD. F. 193 (1997); Leslie Griffin, The Relevance of Religion to a Layer's Work:
Legal Ethics, 66 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1253 (1998); see also Bruce A. Green, The Role of
Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19 (1997) (pro-
viding a critical overview of personal-values arguments).
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tutions-legislatures, administrative agencies, courts, mediators, law-
yers, and so on-which are empowered to resolve contested moral
issues. The existence of this political apparatus itself generates moral
pressures on agents, by subjecting them to demands that would not
exist in the absence of the institutional framework, and these conflicts
create much of what forms the subject matter of academic legal ethics
scholarship. Thus, as I argue in Section HI, a potentially productive
approach to handling ethical dilemmas in lawyering is to turn to the
values of the legal profession that derive from the social function of
lawyers and from the traditions and practices of the legal profession. 19
Section IV is devoted to establishing a critical taxonomy of the
foundational moral principles of the legal profession: loyalty, justice,
and care. A theme running through this section is that professional
values are inescapably pluraL Many defenders of a specific conception
of ethics start with one value-loyalty to one's client, promotion of
social justice, fidelity to a set of legal norms, or most recently, inter-
personal considerations such as care, mercy, and connectedness-and
seek to establish the primacy of that value in a lawyer's moral analysis.
Arguments of this sort can be quite sophisticated. For example, a fre-
quently encountered contention is that social justice and partiality to
one's client are not incompatible, because justice, in the long run,
requires lawyers who will represent their clients' interests zealously.
Of course, opposing arguments can be constructed: maintaining, for
example, that a client is entitled only to a measure of loyalty that is
compatible with social justice, and no more. What many of these ar-
guments have in common is evaluative monism: the belief that a single
value may be specified which can serve as a polestar for any lawyer's
deliberation about her ethical responsibilities. On a monistic ac-
count, what appear to be competing values must be understood as
instantiations of the single relevant value-as in the argument that
loyalty to one's client is required by considerations of justice. I con-
tend, contrary to monism, that professional values cannot always be
19 Other authors have defined "public values" in a similar manner. See, e.g., KENT
GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995) (distinguishing
grounds for political decisions which are accessible to other citizens, regardless of
their religious or other comprehensive views, from those grounds which are not acces-
sible to all); KENT GREENAvALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 49-76,
144-62 (1988); Amy GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
68 (1996) (stating that public values are those which are "essential to democratic
citizenship"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutoy Interpretation, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1007, 1008 (1989) (defining "public values" as "legal norms and principles
that form fundamental underlying precepts for our polity-background norms that
contribute to and result from the moral development of our political community").
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reduced to a single foundational norm. Instead, legal ethics must be
understood as a discipline which accepts the existence of plural, some-
times conflicting values in reasoning. Section V, accordingly, evalu-
ates some of the traditions of practical reasoning which have been
developed to accommodate plural values. The aim of this discussion
is to suggest a more satisfying account of how ethically conscientious
lawyers can work within a domain of plural values, by understanding
traditions of practical reasoning that emphasize the interrelated val-
ues of sound judgment, character, and virtue over calculation.
II. THE REGULATORY MODEL
The job of the lawyer . .. is not to approve or disapprove of the
character of his or her client, the cause for which the client seeks
the lawyer's assistance, or the avenues provided by the law to
achieve that which the client wants to accomplish. The lawyer's task
is, instead, to provide that competence which the client lacks and
the lawyer, as professional, possesses. In this way, the lawyer as pro-
fessional comes to inhabit a simplified universe which is strikingly
amoral-which regards as morally irrelevant any number of factors
which nonprofessional citizens might take to be important, if not
decisive, in their everyday lives.
20
Professional responsibility, on this account, is a technocratic
value. It emphasizes skill and competence, but also stresses moral dis-
tance between lawyer and client. The two primary components of this
conception are neutrality and partisanship: the lawyer should advo-
cate her client's interests up to the limits of the law, regardless of her
own moral judgments about her client's ends.21 This conception of
professional responsibility operates to excuse lawyers from some of
the demands of ordinary morality that would require a nonprofes-
sional to behave differently. With this excuse, however, comes an obli-
gation of fidelity to one's client: "[P]rofessionalism means that a
lawyer should . . . zealously and competently use all lawful means to
20 Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. Rrs. 1,
8 (1975); see also Alan Gewirth, Professional Ethics: The Separatist Thesis, 96 ETHICS 282
(1986); Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv.
63 (1980). Wasserstrom, Gewirth, and Postema do not endorse this model; they se-
verely criticize it.
21 See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 50-92 (1988) (criticizing this "standard
conception" of lawyers' ethics); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACrICE OF JUSTICE (1998);
David Luban, Freedom and Constraint in Legal Ethics: Some Mid-Course Corrections to Law-
yers and Justice, 49 MD. L. REv. 424 (1990).
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protect and advance the client's lawful interests."22 (We can already
see how much pressure this conception puts on the specification of
the limits of the law, and the demand that legal reasoning be in some
sense objective.)
We can refer to this minimalistic conception of legal ethics as the
regulatory model. The regulatory model does not claim that there is
no such thing as legal ethics, but that the set of moral obligations of
lawyers qua lawyers is exhausted by the law of lawyering.23 It bears
emphasizing that this thin conception of normativity is a moral and
jurisprudential position; it is not the absence of values, but the asser-
tion of a cluster of normative propositions about the role and duties
of lawyers.2 4 The foundational moral principle of the regulatory
model is that the lawyer should defer to her client's instructions and
seek to carry them out through any lawful means. Legal ethics on the
regulatory model, therefore, places a great deal of weight on the justi-
fication of the system of legal rules that constrain the behavior of law-
yers. Once this foundational criterion has been satisfied, however,
legal ethics becomes simply the exposition and interpretation of an
elaborate body of disciplinary codes and other positive legal rules gov-
erning the practice of law. As long as the legal system is itself morally
22 Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalism in the American Adversary System, 41 EMORY
LJ. 467, 470 (1992) (emphasis added).
23 The law of lawyering encompasses much more than the disciplinary rules that
are promulgated by state courts and administered through state bar associations. It
includes agency law, criminal law (particularly regarding liability for complicity), tort
law (especially pertaining to fraud and malpractice), and procedural law (such as the
rules governing litigation conduct, discovery sanctions, frivolous motions, and the
like). See Cramton & Koniak, supra note 2, at 170. For thoughtful analysis of the
interaction between bar-promulgated disciplinary rules and law developed by courts
and legislatures, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Client Fraud: They Still Don't
Get It, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 701 (1993), Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar
and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389 (1992), and David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate
Lawyers2, 105 HARv. L. REv. 799 (1992). The law of lawyering is in the process of
being restated by the American Law Institute, which is nearing completion of the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers.
24 Cf CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETIcs § 2.7.1, at 68 (1986).
A lawyer in practice might persist and assert that, whatever has been happen-
ing on university campuses, he or she does not feel the need to think of
ethics in law practice. That kind of lawyer may assert, for example,... that
'my only job is to do whatever is legal and in the best interests of protecting
my client's legal rights . . . .' [B]ut, of course, such assertions state pro-
foundly ethical norms. They may not be defensible norms, but they clearly
are morally prescriptive because the lawyer making the assertion means to
tell us that any other position would be wrongful in some strong sense.
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justified, a lawyer is justified in taking any necessary actions in pursuit
of her client's objectives, provided her actions do not violate a legal
rule.
By and large, law school professional responsibility courses have
perpetuated the regulatory model. The law of lawyering has mostly
swallowed up what could potentially be a more explicitly values-cen-
tered professional responsibility education, so that students' exposure
to legal ethics consists primarily of exegesis of the disciplinary codes
and other legal texts. 25 Thomas Shaffer, a leading legal ethicist of a
theological bent, explains this orientation as resulting from the inabil-
ity of American academics to talk about morality, for fear of implicat-
ing religious beliefs. Thus, talk about moral questions is immediately
translated into the language of legal rights and duties, with which
legal academics and law students do not experience discomfort.
26
One might also blame the Multistate Professional Responsibility
Exam, which emphasizes rote application of generic rules.
27
Whatever its genesis, this approach has influenced many professional
responsibility courses in law schools, which concentrate heavily on
cases, statutes, and disciplinary rules. For example, one casebook
takes a very strong stand in this direction: "[W]e treat the rules of
ethics as merely a subset of legal rules .... Although most of our law
is morally based, the term ethics implies the antithesis of law. Ethical
rules focus on individual and voluntary moral responses, not legally
mandated duties."
28
25 See, e.g., MICHAELJ. KELLY, LEGAL ETHics AND LEGAL EDUCATION 23 (1980) ("To
an important extent the term 'ethics' is a misnomer, for the subject ...is much
different in scope from ethics in any traditional sense of the term."); Thomas L. Shaf-
fer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963, 963 (1987) ("Most of
what American lawyers and law teachers call legal ethics is not ethics. Most of what is
called legal ethics is similar to rules made by administrative agencies.").
26 See Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics in the Law Office, 71 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 605, 606-07 (1996); see also Cramton & Koniak, supra note 2, at 190-91
(stating that law faculties might be unwilling to discuss virtue with candidates who
wish to teach legal ethics because "the line across the personal [would be] crossed in a
way that makes many of us feel especially vulnerable").
27 Cf Marianne M. Jennings, The Model Rules and the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity Have Absolutely Nothing to Do with Ethics: The Wally Cleaver Proposition as an Alternative,
1996 Wis. L. REV. 1223.
28 L. RAY PATTERSON & THOMAS B. METZLOFF, LEGAL ETHICs: THE LAW OF PROFEs-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 3 (1989). I do not mean to suggest that a rigorous exposure to
disciplinary rules, cases, and statutes is a bad thing for students in a professional re-
sponsibility course. Keeping out of trouble is a legitimate end for lawyers, and there is
no reason why the law of professional self-regulation should not get as much attention
in law school as the regulation of other industries. My concern here is with the atti-
tude that complying with disciplinary rules is a sufficient condition of ethical conduct.
[VOL. 75:1
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Of course, the regulatory model has been subjected to sustained
criticism. These critiques question the scope, utility, and jurispruden-
tial status of authoritative rules of professional conduct. Ultimately,
they show that the regulatory model is an incorrect description of the
practice of legal ethics.
(1) The rules do not cover the waterfront. One frequently-noted ob-
jection to the regulatory model is that there are numerous moral prin-
ciples governing professional conduct that are not expressed as a legal
rule. The disciplinary codes do not claim to regulate lawyers' morality
in a comprehensive manner. The older Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility states that "[e]ach lawyer must find within his own con-
science the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his
actions should rise above minimum standards. '29 Given the structure
of the Model Code, this proviso is hardly surprising, since the Model Code
established a two-tiered structure of legally enforceable Disciplinary
Rules, drafted to resemble a penal code, and aspirational Ethical Con-
siderations to guide lawyers in achieving moral excellence in their
profession a 0 But even the legalistic Model Rules do not claim to oc-
cupy the whole field of ethical deliberation. Some rules expressly
build in an element of discretion, such as the provision which empow-
ers a lawyer to withdraw from representation if "a client insists upon
pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant,"31 or the rule
which permits lawyers to charge only reasonable fees.3 2 In addition to
the rules which by their terms leave room for moral deliberation, the
drafters of the disciplinary rules correctly note that in addition to sub-
stantive and procedural law, "a lawyer is also guided by personal con-
science and the approbation of professional peers. '33 The appeal to
conscience and other sources of moral duties is occasionally reflected
in the structure of a lawyer's legal obligations. The forthcoming Re-
statement vests the lawyer with discretion either to disclose or to
29 MODEL CODE OF PRoFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1997).
30 This discussion of the evolution, or devolution, of the disciplinary rules is
taken from David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark
Times, 9 GEo.J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 42-58 (1995).
31 MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.16(b) (3) (1998) (emphasis
added).
32 Id. Rule 1.5.
33 Id. Preamble 6. Abel argues that the legitmation function of disciplinary
rules depends on their claim to resolve all the ethical dilemmas of lawyers. See Abel,
supra note 2, at 686. However, he wavers on whether the rules actually claim to oc-
cupy the field of ethical deliberation. See id. at 644 ("The Model Rules, however,
ignore large and significant areas of professional conduct"); id. at 670 ("[T] he rules
[implicitly] offer an exhaustive statement of the ethical dilemmas of lawyers, or at
least address the most important ones. .. ").
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choose not to disclose confidential information learned from a client,
publication of which would prevent death or serious bodily harm to a
person. 34 The commentary to this section states that the decision
whether to disclose is entirely discretionary with the lawyer, and the
lawyer cannot be disciplined or found civilly liable for disclosing or
refusing to disclose the confidential information.
Some critics of the regulatory model have pointed out that it ig-
nores the aspirational dimension of professional ethics.35 They con-
tend that disciplinary sanctions should be established to enforce
minimal duties, and exhortation and inspiration should be employed
to encourage lawyers to live up to the supererogatory ideals of the
profession:
As we consider the Whole range of moral issues, we may conve-
niently imagine a kind of scale or yardstick which begins at the bot-
tom with the most obvious demands of social living and extends
upward to the highest reaches of human aspiration. Somewhere
along this scale there is an invisible pointer that marks the dividing
line where the pressure of duty leaves off and the challenge of excel-
lence begins. The whole field of moral argument is dominated by a
great undeclared war over the location of this pointer.
3 6
In legal ethics, Lon Fuller's "great undeclared war"3 7 can be un-
derstood in terms of a debate over the location of a boundary line, so
that duties and aspirations can be identified correctly and assigned to
their respective domains.
Even if the role of extralegal considerations is not confined to
aspirational or supererogatory norms, there is no doubt that signifi-
cant moral questions are left unresolved by the law of lawyering. If a
particular stratagem is legally permissible, it nevertheless may be mor-
ally problematic. For example, in the Dalkon Shield product liability
litigation, lawyers were defending a manufacturer of medical devices
34 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 117A & cmt. g
(Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1998).
35 See, e.g., CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON LAWYER
CONDUCT AND PROFESsIONALISM: REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON LAWYER CON-
DUCT AND PROFEsSIONALiSM 2 (1998) (visited Sep. 7, 1999) <http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us /
Natlplan.html> ("Professionalism is a much broader concept than legal ethics.
[P]rofessionalism includes not only civility among members of the bench and bar, but
also competence, integrity, respect for the rule of law,... and conduct by members of
the legal profession that exceeds the minimum ethical requirements.") (copy on file
with author); James E. Moliterno, Lawyer Creeds and Moral Seismography, 32 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 781 (1997) (relating history of aspirational professionalism creeds).
36 LON L. FULLER, THE MORALIrY OF LAW 9-10 (1964).
37 Id.
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which had developed an intrauterine contraceptive.38 The device was
poorly designed and caused thousands of injuries to users, including
stillbirths, hysterectomies, sterility, and even death. The manufac-
turer was besieged by both groundless and meritorious claims. In
general, its practice was to settle the valid claims for a fair amount, but
to contest vigorously the doubtful cases. Additionally, the manufac-
turer reasoned that aggressive questioning of women about their sex-
ual practices would naturally motivate many of the claimants to settle
early, for comparatively small sums. Thus, in cases it judged to be
without merit, the manufacturer directed the defense lawyers to probe
the sexual histories of the women maintaining the claims in the claim-
ants' depositions.
3 9
In this case, the law of lawyering does not answer the moral ques-
ton faced by the company's lawyers: Should they probe the women's
sexual practices in order to intimidate the plaintiffs and coerce a
favorable settlement? The judge supervising pretrial litigation in the
consolidated action had allowed inquiry into claimants' sexual history,
as long as the questions were "reasonably [likely] to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence." 40 (Another procedural rule generally
prohibits lawyers from asking questions in depositions "in such man-
ner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent,"
'41
but the judge reasoned that in a case such as this one, some embar-
rassment and annoyance was inevitable and perhaps even justified, be-
cause the deponent's sexual behavior may be relevant to the amount
of damages the defendant must pay.) There is at least a colorable
38 See In re A.H. Robins Co., 575 F. Supp. 718 (D. Kan. 1983). This litigation is
chronicled in MORTON MiN-z, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE
DALKON SHIELD (1985). A problem for discussion in legal ethics courses, which is
based on the same litigation, can be found in DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD 669 (2d ed. 1998).
39 A similar example has been debated exhaustively in the legal ethics literature:
May a criminal defense lawyer vigorously, even brutally, cross-examine a rape victim to
make her appear less credible and to support the defendant's claim that the sexual
encounter was consensual, even when the lawyer believes the client to be guilty? See
John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where You Find Them: A Response to Professor
Subin's Position on the Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission, " 1 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 339
(1987); Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission": Reflections on the
"Right" to Present a False Case, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmIcs 125 (1987); see also Robert P.
Lawry, Cross-Examining the Truthful Witness: The Ideal Within the Central Moral Tradition
of Lauyering, 100 DICK. L. REv. 563 (1996); Murray L. Schwartz, On Making the True
Look False and the False Look True, 41 Sw. L.J. 1135 (1988); Harry I. Subin, Is This Lie
Necessary? Further Reflections on the Right to Present a False Defense, 1 GEo.J. LEeAL ETmIcs
689 (1988).
40 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
41 FED. R. Cv. P. 30(d) (3) (emphasis added).
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argument that embarrassing questioning of the claimants in the case
is legally permitted, but it is fatuous to assert that a moral analysis of
the lawyers' behavior must stop with the conclusion that no legal rule
was violated. An inquiry into the ethical status of lawyers' behavior
must take into account more than simply whether or not rules are
followed.
One might cynically respond that this criticism of the regulatory
model is primarily a public-relations ploy, and indeed a great deal of
the call for "returning values to legal ethics" seems driven by the need
to convince the public that lawyers do not deserve ridicule and
scorn.42 Some academic critics have noted that ethical self-regulation
performs the function of bolstering the public image of the profes-
sion, which in turn permits the profession to continue to enjoy rela-
tive freedom from intrusive oversight by legislatures and
administrative agencies.43 Nonprofessionals are less likely to demand
stringent regulation of an occupation if they feel that the members of
that occupational group are doing a satisfactory job policing them-
selves.44 To some extent, the project has been successful. The relative
42 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1997) ("[I] t
is the desire for the respect and confidence ... of the society which he serves that
should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical
conduct."); Diana Huffman, Ethics Review Needed to Polish Public Image of Bar, LEGAL
TIMES, Jan. 31, 1983, at 9. Many reforms, such as the prohibition on direct-mail solici-
tation of accident victims, have been motivated by the bar's anxiety about the public's
perception of lawyers. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995)
(upholding such a regulation). The American Inns of Court movement has similarly
been inspired by the felt need to "promot[e a national commitment to civility, ethics,
advocacy skills, and professionalism in the practice of law, [and] communicat[e]
these ideals to the nation and the world." American Inns of Court, Mission Statement,
(visited Aug. 14, 1998) <http://w.innsofcourt.org/about/mission.htm> (copy on
file with author). According to Robert Post, however, such reform proposals miss the
point. See Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass,
75 CAL. L. REv. 379 (1987). People hate lawyers because they expose the inherent
tension between autonomy and order in social life. "The lawyer is the public and
unavoidable embodiment of the tension we all experience between the desire for an
embracing and common community and the urge toward individual independence
and self-assertion .... . Id. at 389. No amount of image-polishing will change the
underlying reality that liberty and order, equality, and partiality, must always stand in
opposition, and that the uncomfortable accommodations we reach between the op-
posing values are mediated by lawyers in a liberal individualist society committed to
the rule of law.
43 See Cramton & Koniak, supra note 2, at 148, 151-52; Deborah L. Rhode, Why
the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689,
692-93 (1981).
44 The disciplinary rules frankly acknowledge their function of warding off exter-
nal regulation: "To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional
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paucity of statutes and regulations applicable to the legal profession is
striking in comparison with the comprehensive regulatory regimes
under which other industries, like pharmaceutical manufacturers and
airlines, must operate.
45
Rather than attribute cynicism to professional regulators, it is
enough to note that the regulatory model tends to perpetuate the
view of ethics typified by the Dilbert cartoon reprinted in the introduc-
tion. An undue identification of legal ethics with the law of lawyering
tends to concentrate the attention of law students and lawyers on the
technical compliance with rules, instead of on deeper moral ques-
tions, or perhaps fosters a Holmesian bad man interpretive attitude in
lawyers. 46 The Robins lawyers in the Dalkon Shield case, for instance,
may have been so caught up in exhaustively researching their legal
obligations and determining the most aggressive trial strategy they
could get away with that they left no time to ask the question, "Is this
something we ought to do?"
Similarly, by disabling moral criticism of lawyers' behavior, the
regulatory model impedes development of a normative standpoint
from which the existing framework of positive legal rules can be criti-
cized, reformed, strengthened, or abandoned. In other legal sub-dis-
ciplines, outside the domain of self-regulation, considerable energy is
calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps
maintain the legal profession's independence from government domination."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble 10 (1998).
45 An intriguing manifestation of this phenomenon is provided by the settlement
of a discovery dispute by DuPont and its law firm, Alston & Bird. Accused of conceal-
ing documents suggesting that a DuPont fungicide had been contaminated, DuPont
and the firm settled a criminal investigation by agreeing to pay $2.5 million each to
four Georgia law schools to endow a chair in professional ethics, $1 million to endow
an annual symposium on legal ethics, and $250,000 to the state bar's professionalism
commission. See Milo Geyelin, DuPont, Atlanta Law Firm Agree to Pay Nearly $11.3 Mil-
lion in Benlate Matter, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1999, at A18; Jonathan Ringel & Ann Wool-
ner, $11.25M Ends Charges Against DuPont, Atlanta Firm, FULTON COUNTY (GA.) DAILY
REPORT, Jan. 4, 1999 (visited Jan. 22, 1998) <http://wv.lawnewsnetwork.com/
stories/jan/e010499f.html> (copy on file with author).
46 Cf THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, TEACHERS MANUAL TO ACCOM-
PANY PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIIrT. PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 3 (6th ed. 1995) ("[W]e
are increasingly convinced that exclusive study of the Model Rules and Model Code
can produce lawyers with an ethical horizon at the lowest possible level."); Tanina
Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1273, 1277 (1998) ("[A] regulatory approach is inadequate because it overlooks
the centrality of internalized normative commitments in preserving the legal frame-
work."); Maura Strassberg, TakingEthics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal
Ethics, 80 IOwA L. REV. 901, 922 (1995) ("A positivist approach to legal ethics will lead
to a similar view of morality as irrelevant to legal ethics .... ").
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
expended to construct a theoretical justification for legal rules, and
critics defend or challenge existing doctrine on that basis. Consider,
as an illustration, the intellectual ferment in torts, antitrust, and ad-
ministrative law that has been created by the academic ascendency of
law and economics. This movement seeks to provide a justificatory
account of legal rules in terms of economic concepts like wealth max-
imization and reduction of transaction costs. It therefore arms critics
with a robust conceptual apparatus for evaluating extant legal doc-
trine. The strongest version of the regulatory model, however, would
block the legitimacy of any similar approach in legal ethics.
(2) Lawyers do not rely on rules when making decisions. A second
critique of the regulatory model is empirical. It is worth asking
whether the law of lawyering has much of an impact on most of the
ethical decisions made by lawyers in the ordinary course of their prac-
tice. Explaining lawyers' behavior with reference to disciplinary rules,
which by definition focus on pathological cases, may slant the analysis
of moral decision making toward situations which do not represent
the mainstream of the practice, "much like the description of human
nature that we might get from a homicide detective, or a description
of the game of bridge that thought it was centrally important to ex-
plain what happens when someone is dealt the wrong number of
cards. ' '47 Some anecdotal evidence suggests that lawyers do not con-
sider the disciplinary rules when making many difficult ethical
choices:
I had cause to refer to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct exactly
twice in eight years; I almost never heard any other lawyer refer to
them. Lawyers make decisions every day about what conduct is ethi-
cal and about whether they will behave ethically, but often the for-
mal rules have little to do with those decisions.
48
Surely competing anecdotes could be offered to show that lawyers
frequently do consult the law of lawyering. In my own practice experi-
ence, at every juncture where an ethical question arose, the first thing
any lawyer in the firm did was turn to the relevant section of the Model
Rules. In fact, I often found myself wondering whether the decisions
of lawyers on ethical matters was too tightly bound up with the disci-
47 Frederick Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Reasons, 85 MICH. L. REv. 847, 851
(1987).
48 Schiltz, supra note 8, at 713; see alsoAbel, supra note 2, at 668 ("[T]here is little
evidence that anyone pays attention to ethical rules beyond the small proportion of
lawyers who draft, discuss, and enact them."); Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr. et al., Teaching
LegalEthics: Exploring the Continuum, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 154 (1995) (stat-
ing that students in legal ethics courses tend to tune out discussions of disciplinary
cases because they consider the possibility of discipline remote).
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plinary rules, so that if a lawyer concluded that an action would not
violate the letter of the rules, she would automatically conclude that it
was ethically proper.
Very little empirical work has been done on the moral decision
making of lawyers, but the extant evidence does not offer unqualified
support either to the claim that lawyers hardly ever make reference to
disciplinary rules or to the claim that they tend to over-rely on rules
and cases in making moral judgments. One recent study found that
lawyers' ethical decision making practices varied on a case-by-case ba-
sis; in some instances, rules were central to the deliberation, while in
others the rules were not a factor.49 In another study reported by Ted
Schneyer, a sociologist concluded that small-town lawyers sometimes
reject cases that would harm the reputation of the lawyer, despite the
absence of any provision in the Model Code or Model Rules that allows
lawyers to turn down cases on this basis. 50 However, this study does
not purport to explain how lawyers decide other types of dilemmas-
conflict of interest questions, for example-in which the law of lawyer-
ing may be more central. Thus, one cannot say based on the available
evidence that the regulatory model describes the actual deliberation
practice of lawyers.
(3) The regulatory model is a jurisprudential dinosaur. Finally, and
most significantly for the purposes of my analysis, the argument for
the regulatory model is misguided at a theoretical level. Even where
the law of lawyering is applicable, the regulatory model assumes that
the legal rules may be applied mechanically, without resort to creative
normativejudgment. 51 In this way, it resembles ajurisprudential posi-
tion that has almost no adherents outside the realm of legal ethics-
the position that Ronald Dworkin calls conventionalism. 52 According
to the conventionalist thesis, a legal judgment is justified where it is
expressly determined by past political decisions, such as legislation or
49 See Susan Daicoff, (Oxymoron?) Ethical Decisionmaking by Attorneys: An Empirical
Study, 48 FLA. L. REV. 197 (1996). For an interview-based study of Australian lawyers,
which reports similarly ambiguous results, see Debra Lamb, Ethical Dilemmas: What
Australian Lawyers Say About Them, in LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL PRATIcE: CoNTFm'o-
RARY ISSUES 217 (Stephen Parker & Charles Sampford eds., 1995).
50 See Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984
Wis. L. REv. 1529, 1546-47.
51 See Simon, supra note 2, at 68-69.
52 See RONALD DWORKrN, LAW's EMPIRE 114-50 (1986). The canonical conven-
tionalist theory of law is positivism, in its various forms. See Ronald Dworkin, A Reply
by Ronald Dworkin, in RONALD DwoRKiN AND CONTEMPORARYJURISPRUDENCE 247 (Mar-
shall Cohen ed., 1983) (arguing that positivism or conventionalism holds that "it is
characteristic of a legal system that some more-or-less mechanical test provides neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for the truth of propositions about what the law is").
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precedential cases. Conventions specify which political acts, such as
utterances by judges and collective decisions by duly appointed legisla-
tors, count as "law" in a given society. Where no past political acts
determine the judgment, there is no law on that point and the judge
is free to make new law, with reference to "abstract justice," the public
interest, or some other forward-looking justification. 53 In future
cases, that judge's decision, although not grounded in law, will be-
come new law according to the conventions of the legal system.
A conventionalist theory of law fails for several reasons. First, the
theory's plausibility may be undermined from within, by controversy
in the very specification of the convention. Supreme Court Justices
disagree vehemently over whether legislative history should play any
role in statutory interpretation, for instance.54 Even if conventions
successfully pick out which texts ajudge ought to consider in elucidat-
ing the law, they cannot specify a single method of interpretation. 55
Supposing hypothetically that the conventions of American legal prac-
tice ruled out resort to legislative history in statutory interpretation,
some judges may nevertheless read a provision of the statute broadly,
others narrowly. There is no interpretive convention that tells judges
how to interpret conventionally specified materials.56 Conventional-
ism also fails to account for some features of the practice ofjudging.
As Dworkin points out, judges and lawyers do not behave as though
conventionalism were true.57 In hard cases, judges do not give up on
interpretation and make new law based on forward-looking, pragmatic
concerns. Instead, they work themselves up into knots trying to figure
out the "correct" reading of whatever past decisions can be found that
bear on the issue. 58 In light of our understanding of the practice of
judging, we should expect judges to have this attitude. As a matter of
our political morality, we believe judges ought to experience past polit-
ical decisions as a constraint on their interpretive creativity. Conven-
tionalism, if true, would undermine this attitude by encouraging
53 See DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 118 ("If convention is silent there is no
law. .. ").
54 See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511 (1993); Public Citizen v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 452-55 (1989).
55 See DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 122.
56 Karl Llewellyn famously listed pairs of canons of statutory construction, each
with its opposite, to illustrate the flexibility enjoyed by judges in interpretation. See
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
57 See DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 130-31.
58 See id. at 87. The arguments made by judges in actual cases "make sense only
on the assumption that the law judges have an obligation to enforce depends on the
'correct' reading [of legal texts] even when it is controversial what that is." Id. at 131.
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judges to see their role more as lawmakers than law-interpreters; how-
ever, the behavior of judges shows that conventionalism does not fit
well with observed facts about our legal system.
Conventionalism also fails to account for the occurrence of cases
in which a judge disregards the seemingly clear meaning of a legal
text and reaches the contrary result, even though the case, before the
decision, seemed like a paradigmatically "easy' one.59 Dworkin's fa-
vorite example, Riggs v. Palmer,60 should have been a straightforward
case under the New York statute of wills, but the court nevertheless
decided not to let the murdering heir inherit under the will. In Riggs,
the judges in the majority did not claim to disregard the law, engaging
in some kind of judicial civil disobedience in the name of a higher
moral principle. Instead, they referred to the purpose animating the
drafters of the statute: "[I] t never could have been their intention that
a donee who murdered the testator to make the will operative should
have any benefit under it."61 Thejudges also cited the venerable legal
principle that "[n] o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud,
or to take advantage of his own wrong."62 Thus, the court construed
the New York statute against a rich body of background legal norms,
which in this case varied the meaning from the literal words of the
statute. A decision for the murdering heir would have conflicted with
other aims of the legal system, thus the majority judges were justified
in interpreting the statute to deny inheritance to the heir in order to
preserve the integrity of the scheme of laws and the community's
moral principles. Dworkin stresses that this decision was not a lawless
act, but an interpretation of law, as a larger intellectual system.
63
59 See Schauer, supra note 47, at 855-56. Any easy case is one in which the legal
arguments are readily and uncontroversially resolved by a clear rule of law. See RON-
AL DWoRmN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977).
60 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). Riggs was referred to as "Elmer's Case" in Law's Em-
pire See DwoRm'N, supra note 52.
61 Riggs, 22 N.E. at 189.
62 Id. at 190.
63 See DwoRKrN, supra note 52, at 19-20. For a couple of more contemporary
examples, consider Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989), and Bob
Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). In Bob Jones University, the Court
held that a university that practiced racial discrimination was not eligible for a tax
exemption for educational institutions, despite there being no limitation of that ex-
ception in the Internal Revenue Code to institutions which followed a non-discrimina-
tion policy. See id. Was this a lawless decision? The answer is no if we accept a
Dworkinian view of law, in which the meaning of statutes must be harmonized with
background public values. The Court's analysis was decisively influenced by the "grav-
itational pull" of the principle that segregation and discrimination in education is
wrong and must not be encouraged by government policies. See Eskridge, supra note
19, at 1035-36. Interestingly, the Reagan administration resisted the ultimately suc-
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Dworkin's theory of law as integrity imagines judges as interpret-
ers of the overall legal order, whose task it is to discover "the scheme
of principles" that prior judicial decisions presupposed and stated.
64
This interpretive task demands fidelity to the past, but not only to past
judicial decisions and other conventionally specified political acts. Be-
cause an interpretation of law must be normative-that is, it must jus-
tify the authority of law-the judge must inquire into the principles
that undergird the statutes and cases and justify them in the political
order.65 These principles may be discovered by analyzing those values
presumed by, or reflected in, the institutions of the legal system.
66
cessful attempt by the IRS to deny the University's tax-exempt status, arguing that the
IRS did not have the discretion to vary the interpretation of the statutory language on
the basis of the public policy against racial discrimination. See Brief for the United
States at 12-13, reprinted in 136 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 114-15 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds.,
1984). As a result of the government's half-hearted support for the Fourth Circuit's
opinion denying the University's tax-exempt status, a private lawyer, William T. Cole-
man, Jr., was invited by the Court to intervene as amicus curiae in support of the IRS's
position. See Goldsboro Christian Sch. v. United States, 456 U.S. 922 (1982). The
government's highly formalistic position lost in the Supreme Court, where seven jus-
tices agreed that the statute must be interpreted in light of the public purpose it is
intended to serve and that the interpretation must not be contrary to public policy.
See Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 586. I am grateful to Barry Sullivan for pointing
out the curious history of the government's involvement in this case.
In Green, the plaintiff in a tort action argued that the past-crimes rule in the law
of evidence, FED. R. EvID. 609(a), which permits admission of evidence of prior
crimes committed by a witness except when the evidence would be unfairly prejudi-
cial "to the defendant," should also be applied to protect him from the admission of
unfairly prejudicial evidence. See Green, 490 U.S. at 504. The Court agreed, on the
basis of general principles such as the maxim that the parties' advantages in civil cases
should be distributed equally. Id. "No matter how plain the text of the Rule may be, we
cannot accept an interpretation that would deny a civil plaintiff the same right to
impeach an adversary's testimony that it grants to a civil defendant." Id. at 510 (em-
phasis added). Notably, Justice Scalia, ordinarily a stickler for plain language, wrote
separately to underscore his agreement with the Court's conclusion that an interpre-
tation of a rule must be preferred that is "most compatible with the surrounding body
of law into which the provision must be integrated." Id. at 528 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); see also SIMON, supra note 21, at 39.
64 DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 211.
65 See DWORKIN, supra note 59, at 67.
If a theory of law is to provide a basis for judicial duty, then the principles it
sets out must try to justiy the settled rules by identifying the political or
moral concerns and traditions of the community which, in the opinion of
the lawyer whose theory it is, do in fact support the rules.
Id.
66 Id. at 115-18; cf. Lon Fuller, The Form and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 353, 356-57, 375-81 (1978).
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Judging aims not only at discovering underlying moral values, but also
at elaborating a coherent system of political principles: "[P]ropositions
of law are true if they figure in or follow from the principles ofjustice,
fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best construc-
tive interpretation of the community's legal practice. '67 The princi-
ples of justice, fairness, and due process are contained and reflected
within legal texts, but the texts do not exhaust them. Instead, the
community's principles of political morality are part of the raw mate-
rial that the judge must work with in fashioning a decision on a legal
question. Thejudge "must choose between eligible interpretations by
asking which shows the community's structure of institutions and deci-
sions-its public standards as a whole-in a better light from the
standpoint of political morality. '68 There is no strict separation be-
tween politics, morality, and law for Dworkin. For example, the U.S.
Constitution should be understood as containing a general principle
that "political decisions and arrangements must display equal concern
for the fate of all,"' 69 even though that precise statement may not ap-
pear in the constitutional text or in any Supreme Court decision.
70
According to Dworkin, a decision based on this principle is not judi-
cial legislation, or imposition of the judge's subjective policy prefer-
ences; rather, it is interpretation of the law, as the term "law" is
properly understood.
71
Dworkin's position has profound implications for legal ethics. 72
His arguments challenge the regulatory model because they attack the
regulatory model's insistence that the client's values and legal rules
are all that a lawyer must grapple with to understand her professional
67 DwoRIN, supra note 52, at 225.
68 Id. at 256.
69 Id. at 381.
70 See id.
71 Rather than argue for his definition of law, Dworkin merely stipulates that law
is whatever we use to decide when application of collective force isjustified. See Philip
Soper, Dworkin's Domain, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1166, 1170 (1987) (reviewing DwoRKIN,
supra note 52). Some of his critics accordingly have faulted him for blurring the line
between law and politics, so that a politically favored result has the status of a legally
warranted judicial decision. See, e.g., George C. Christie, Dworkin's "Empire," 1987
DUKE LJ. 157, 183-85 (reviewing DwoRKm, supra note 52); Kent Greenawalt, Book
Review, 84J. PHIL. 284, 286 (1987) (reviewing DwoRKIN, supra note 52, and arguing
that the distinction between principles and policies is not as clear as Dworkin claims).
72 The legal ethicist to recognize this most clearly has been William Simon. The
outlines of my argument here owe a great deal to his recent work. The arguments in
this Article are also indebted substantially to a similar line of inquiry in clinical
bioethics, best exemplified by ToM L. BEAUCHAMP &JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES
OF BIOIEDicAL ETHIcs (4th ed. 1994).
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obligations. The regulatory model of legal ethics assumes that the be-
havior of lawyers is constrained by texts-rules of professional con-
duct, cases, and the like-whose meanings are readily determined and
fixed, and that lawyers are capable of a kind of morally neutral self-
regulation.73 Lawyers, on this account, may take any action on behalf
of their clients that does not violate the law, including the law gov-
erning professional responsibility. If, however, the law is a system not
only of legal conventions but also of public moral values, then a lawyer
cannot evaluate her duties under the law without an excursus into the
domain of values. Just as broader societal norms influenced the
judges' decisions in Riggs, Bob Jones University, and Green, an individual
lawyer seeking to understand the law governing her activities as a pro-
fessional must inquire into a similar set of public norms. Without this
grounding in political morality, the practice of lawyering will not be
normatively justified, and will therefore lack political legitimacy. 74 A
casebook classic will serve to illustrate this point.
In Spaulding v. Zimmerman,75 the defense lawyer in a personal in-
jury lawsuit learned that the plaintiff suffered from a potentially life-
threatening aorta aneurysm, but did not reveal this information to the
plaintiff or his lawyer in settlement negotiations. The case settled for
an amount far below what the case would have been worth if the plain-
tiff's lawyer had been informed of the plaintiff's true condition. Both
the trial court and the Minnesota Supreme Court agreed that the law-
yer had no obligation under the then-existing disciplinary rules to in-
form the plaintiff that he had an aneurysm and might die without
immediate surgery.76 Nevertheless, the trial court vacated the settle-
ment on the ground that the defendant's lawyer had a duty to the
court to disclose the plaintiffs condition when presenting the settle-
ment to the court for approval. In one prominent legal ethicist's
words, the court's decision required "remarkable argumentative acro-
batics"77 in its attempt to "smuggle common morality in through the
back door. ' 78 But the court's arguments are no more remarkable in
Spaulding than in Riggs, Bob Jones University, or Green: a decision
blindly respecting the literal language of legal texts-in Riggs to allow
the murdering heir to take under the will, and in Spaulding to allow
the defendant's lawyer to engineer a settlement without the plaintiff's
73 See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REv. 468 (1990).
74 Cf DWORIUN, supra note 59, at 205 ("The Government will not re-establish re-
spect for law without giving the law some claim to respect.").
75 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).
76 See id. at 709-10.
77 LUBAN, supra note 21, at 150.
78 Id.
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full awareness of the extent of his damages-would violate principles
found elsewhere in the complicated system called law. The defend-
ant's lawyer in Spaulding relied on the principle that a lawyer should
not provide helpful information to the opposing party, in the absence
of a clearly defined duty to disclose set forth in positive law. The
court, however, decided the case based on the principle that a lawyer
should not participate in a fraud on the court by preventing relevant
information from coming to the attention of the trier of fact. Implicit
in the court's reasoning is the argument that allowing lawyers to ele-
vate confidentiality over the protection of human life would render
the practice of lawyering so morally unappealing as to be normatively
illegitimate. 79
In legal ethics, lawyers play the role of judges in Dworkin's the-
ory, because they interpret and apply the law to themselves. Since
judging is inevitably bound up with principles of political morality, it
is impossible to understand the law governing lawyers without refer-
ence to the moral principles that undergird the practice of lawyering.
Thus, if Dworkin is right, it will not do for lawyers to proclaim that
they have fulfilled their ethical obligation by complying with the disci-
plinary rules because understanding what it means to comply with the
rules inevitably requires interpretation of the rules, and interpretation
depends on understanding the scheme of moral principles that un-
dergird the rules and the practice. Interpretation, on Dworkin's ac-
count, requires the interpreter to have in mind a conception of what
makes a practice good, whether the activity is creating a work of litera-
ture, interpreting the law, or serving as a lawyer: the dastardly Elmer
lost in Riggs because the majority ofjudges could not square recovery
for Elmer with their view of what constitutes a good regime of laws;
similarly, the trial judge in Spaulding vacated the settlement because,
in his view, a good lawyer would not have withheld the information
from the plaintiff.
79 Evidence of this principle's existence may be observed not only in judicial
opinions, but also in interpretation of disciplinary rules by state bar committees. See
Strassberg, supra note 46, at 941-43 (stating that informal ethics opinions of several
state bar associations reveal a principle valuing human life over nondisclosure); see
also State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976) (Holohon, J., concurring) (hold-
ing that a lawyer would not be disciplined for revealing a confidential communication
from his client that suggested that the client had committed a murder for which a
different person had been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment). In Macumber,
the Arizona State Bar Committee did not identify the basis for this exception to the
applicable disciplinary code, but it is probably fair to characterize their decision as
animated by the moral principle that a lawyer ought not to participate knowingly in
the conviction of an innocent person. See id.
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Simon, in his recent book, contends that contested questions of
legal ethics do not involve a neat dichotomy between legal rules and
moral norms. Instead, the principles that some legal ethicists have
relegated to the sphere of private morality should properly be under-
stood as relevant to the resolution of the public ethical issues
presented.80 In one of his hypotheticals, a welfare recipient who is
living rent-free in a relative's apartment comes to a lawyer for advice.8'
The lawyer knows that applicable regulations require her client to in-
clude as income the receipt of lodging at no cost. The additional in-
come will reduce the client's eligibility for benefits. The lawyer
wonders whether she should advise her client to make a nominal pay-
ment to the relative, so that her lodging will no longer be "at no cost."
Her personal moral belief is that it would be unjust for the state to cut
her client's benefits since they are barely adequate as it is.
For Simon, this situation does not present a choice for the lawyer
between her personal view of justice and the requirement of her role
as a lawyer. Rather, the question is whether her interpretation of the
law governing her own conduct, as the concept of "law" is properly
understood, allows her to effectively nullify the income reporting re-
quirement in the regulations.8 2 In a Dworkinian understanding of
law, that concept contains broad principles necessary for the justifica-
tion of the legal system-here, the scheme of regulation of lawyering.
In this case, the lawyer reasons that any legal norm, to be entitled to
respect, must not deny a person's basic material needs. The regula-
tion, if applied literally, would violate a moral principle "so fundamen-
tal that it amounts to a precondition of legal legitimacy."8 3 Since
80 See SIMON, supra note 21, at 17-18.
81 See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083,
1105-06 (1988).
82 See id. at 1116.
83 Id. In a review of Simon's book (which also employs this argument), David
Luban argues that the lawyer's argument would be pretty weak at best, and borders on
frivolous: American law is not especially hospitable to welfare rights and "cheerfully
tolerates the greatest income inequalities of any modem industrial society." David
Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873, 890 (1999) (book
review). Perhaps Simon is making a more Dworkinian argument, that the correct
interpretation of the law in this case is one that makes the law the best it can be, and
"the best it can be" here would require the law to recognize a right to receive a mini-
mally adequate income. (It is hard to tell from his reply to Luban, where he accuses
Luban of committing precisely the positivist/formalist error Simon has been arguing
against. See William H. Simon, The Legal and the Ethical in Legal Ethics: A Brief Rejoinder
to Comments on The Practice ofJustice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 991, 998-99 (1999).) Without an
argument of this sort, the lawyer in his example would indeed be appealing to extrale-
gal values and contemplating justified disobedience of the legal rules to avoid an un-
just outcome.
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treating the regulation as binding would lead to an interpretation of
law that would not be entitled to respect, the lawyer is justified in giv-
ing the regulation no weight. (Note that the question is not whether
the lawyer's personal moral decision would be entitled to respect by
others, even though the political judgment about the law's legitimacy
happens to coincide with the lawyer's own moral beliefs.) Most con-
temporary lawyers would accept as legitimate ajudge's decision which
refused to enforce the regulation on the ground that it undermined
the goals of the welfare system. According to Simon, his hypothetical
lawyer is entitled to use the same reasoning process when thinking
about her own obligations. Thus, the lawyer is acting within her role,
not superseding the demands of her role, by appealing to purely pri-
vate moral principles and by considering the extralegal moral princi-
ple that the law must not deprive a person of minimally adequate
resources.84
I think Luban is right to argue that not all attractive moral princi-
ples actually appear, in one form or another, in our legal system.
85
The law is not that good, and we certainly do not live in Utopia. Nev-
ertheless, Simon and Dworkin's insight is an important one, and
forms much of the foundation of my argument. Questions about what
lawyers ought to do are ultimately political ones. This does not mean
that morality has nothing to do with legal ethics, but it does mean that
moral principles must be fitted carefully into a particular political sys-
tem. It is not enough to argue that a good person should do such-
and-such, based on moral arguments that would apply to non-lawyer
agents. Instead, one must take an additional step and show how those
moral arguments are compatible with the legal institutions of which
the lawyer is a part. As we will see, personal or private ethical reasons
(in the sense of "moral principles that apply to all of us in virtue of
our shared personhood 86) do play a role in my account of legal eth-
ics. This role is limited, however, to the relatively small subset of cases
84 This argument of Simon's, which I largely accept, is the reason for my resist-
ance to the terminological distinction between "legal ethics," understood as discipli-
nary rules and other binding legal norms, and "professional responsibility" or
'professionalism" meaning aspirational, but unenforceable, principles. Cf CHIEFJUS-
TICES' REPORT, supra note 35, at 25 ("It is important for the public to understand the
disciplinary aspect of lawyer ethics and what encompasses 'ethics' and 'professional-
ism.'"). This Manichean distinction between legal ethics and professionalism implies
that principles of public morality are not relevant to interpreting the scope of one's
legal obligations, as defined by the disciplinary rules. Simon is absolutely warranted
in his insistence that the insights of recent work in general jurisprudence, particularly
on the nature of legal interpretation, should be applied to legal ethics.
85 Luban, supra note 83, at 887.
86 Id. at 882.
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in which public values conflict and the conflict is not resolved by the
moral traditions of the relevant community or, in cases of extreme
injustice, where conscientious objection or civil disobedience would
be justified. These personal moral values also warn when a system of
laws or political institutions is fundamentally and pervasively unjust, so
that an agent's role, understood functionally, would not guide the
agent's decisions in morally acceptable ways. (This latter case ob-
tained in the legal system of Nazi Germany.8 7) But aside from those
exceptional cases, in the ordinary run of legal practice within a basi-
cally just society, the lawyer's personal values play a smaller role than
the principles of political morality upon which the legal order is
founded.
III. PERSONAL VALUES AS A WELLSPRING OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Many theorists have sought to locate the source of the values at
play in legal ethics in the personal, moral, or religious beliefs of the
lawyer. To emphasize, "personal" does not mean that the values are
subjective or idiosyncratic, only that they do not derive from the insti-
tutions and practices of lawyering. As the discussion of conventional-
ism above suggests, this strategy is a departure from at least some
jurisprudential theories in which the justification for decisions made
by judges is said to rest on political morality. Perhaps the situation is
different for an account of lawyers' ethics, however, since lawyers are
individual moral agents not explicitly charged with making decisions
for the good of the polity as a whole, as are judges. One might argue
that the primary concern for legal ethics ought to be with the fit be-
tween the lawyer's system of moral values and her professional obliga-
tions. Or, to restate the question that continues to crop up in the
literature: Can a good lawyer be a good person?88 This Section will
argue that personal values cannot serve as the foundational normative
principles in legal ethics, because the legitimacy of the lawyer's role in
87 See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv.
593, 618 (1958) (stating that because German lawyers under the Nazi regime attached
too much importance to a rule being a valid principle of law, they too easily answered
the question, "Ought this rule to be obeyed?" in the affirmative); see also DAVID LYONS,
ETHICS AND THE RuLE OF LAW 68-74 (1984).
88 The question in this form was first asked by Charles Fried in his famous paper,
The Lanyer as Friend. See Fried, infra note 166. It continues to frame discussion in
professional responsibilitiy discourse. See, e.g., Daniel R. Coquillette, Professionalism:
The Deep Theoy, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1271, 1272 (1994); Stephen Gillers, Can a Good Lawyer
Be a Bad Person?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1011 (1986). Indeed, one commentator has re-
ferred to this question as the "Rorschach test" for legal ethics. See Leslie Griffin, The
Lawyer's Dirty Hands, 8 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 219, 233 (1995).
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a constitutional democracy requires that the lawyer make moral deci-
sions with reference to public moral values.89
Admittedly, the drafters of the disciplinary rules seem to contem-
plate a role for personal moral values and give short shrift to any con-
ception of uncodified public values as a constraint on lawyers'
behavior.90 There has also been a long tradition in legal ethics schol-
arship of focusing on the place of personal values in professional deci-
sion making. One form of this inquiry seeks to locate the feature of
the lawyer's role that justifies her in acting in a professional capacity
in a manner that would violate her personal moral beliefs.9 1 The way
this question is sometimes posed implies that the lawyer's role oper-
ates as an excuse from private or "common" moral duties, 92 but I be-
lieve that it is more accurate to understand it as a question of political
morality, pertaining to the justification of the institutions and social
practices of lawyering. 93 When we ask whether a moral agent does
something good or bad by fulfilling the obligations of a professional
role, what we are really asking is whether the social role itself is justi-
fied, and whether the specific action taken by the agent is a necessary
and appropriate action given the requirements of the role. Luban
actually appears to concede as much, for he stipulates that his consid-
eration of the morality of lawyering will be focused on "the duties de-
89 I am grateful to Bill Sage and Michael Dorf for pointing out to me the intrigu-
ing analogy with the countermajoritarian difficulty in constitutional interpretation.
See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTusT (1980). The central challenge for liberal constitution-
alism is locating a principled justification forjudicial review of political acts by electo-
ral majorities. Legal ethics faces a similar legitimacy problem, when it attempts to
justify the priority of any actor's judgment about justice over the client's.
90 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrIY Preamble (1997) ("Each law-
yer must find within his own conscience the touchstone against which to test the ex-
tent to which his actions should rise above minimum standards."); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble 6 (1998) ("[A] lawyer is also guided by personal
conscience and the approbation of professional peers."). Codified statements of the
role of personal conscience arguably date back at least to the 1908 Canons: "[The
lawyer] must obey his own conscience and not that of his client." CANONS OF PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS Canon 15, reprinted in SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILrlY 616, 620 (Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda eds., 1998). However, this
statement from Canon 15, read in context, is concerned more with the lawyer's duty
to obey the law than with the lawyer's conscientious objection to the client's lawful
wishes.
91 See generally ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS 20-33 (1980); LUBAN, supra note 21, at 104-47; Wasserstrom, supra note 20.
92 The analysis of institutional excuses and the term "common" morality are
Luban's. See LUBAN, supra note 21, at 116-27.
93 For a similar suggestion by a noted moral philosopher, see Susan Wolf, Ethics,
Legal Ethics, and the Ethics of Law, in THE GOOD LAWYER 38 (David Luban ed., 1983).
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rived from a functional analysis of the means necessary to a role's
ultimate ends"94-equivalent, it seems, to moral principles derived
from the traditions and practices of the legal profession and from the
profession's assigned social role. Luban's analysis of how a conscien-
tious lawyer ought to reason through her ethical obligations reveals
the orientation toward principles of political morality, not personal
values that apply to moral agents generally: first, a lawyer ought to
justify the institution, defined at the appropriate level of specificity;95
second, a lawyer should justify her role within that institution by ap-
pealing to its structure; third, the lawyer should justify the obligations
of the role by "showing that they are essential to the role;" and finally,
the lawyer should justify the act by showing it is required by the obliga-
tions.96 Note that none of the steps of this "fourfold root of sufficient
reasoning" make any reference to the lawyer's personal values, uncon-
nected to a system of political institutions. Personal values may play a
limited role in professional ethics, insofar as a person may choose not
to become a lawyer, regarding even the morally justified institution of
lawyering as repugnant. Or a lawyer may choose not to undertake a
specific kind of practice because that particular role may impose obli-
gations that the lawyer finds distasteful. (Not everyone is cut out to be
a public defender.) But the fundamental questions of what one ought
to do as a lawyer are resolved with reference to moral principles that
derive from the social function of the lawyer, not from the lawyer's
personal values.
Of course, my claim that the values in legal ethics ought to be
public, not private, cannot rest on the happenstance that a prominent
legal ethicist's model ofjustification makes reference to the social role
of lawyers. However, there are two general objections: First, the moral
94 LUBAN, supra note 21, at 128-29. One of Luban's critics has also understood
him as being primarily concerned with the morality of the practice of lawyering,
rather than with individual lawyers' responses to the demands of their role. See David
Wasserman, Should a Good Lawyer Do the Right Thing? David Luban on the Morality of
Adversary Representation, 49 MD. L. REV. 392 (1990).
95 The definition of the institution can decisively, and sometimes subtly, affect
the obligations that are subsequently derived. It is easy to define the institution too
broadly-for example, by considering "the adversary system of resolving disputes"-
and then to derive norms from one practice within that institution that would be
inappropriate in another context. In legal ethics, this blurring of contextual lines
often occurs when lawyers attempt to justify actions in civil litigation with reference to
norms that are justified only in the criminal defense context. But see William H. Si-
mon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993) (arguing that the
standard arguments for a highly adversarial ethic in the criminal defense arena are
fallacious).
96 See LUBAN, supra note 21, at 131-32.
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values that make claims on lawyers are not exactly the same values that
are encountered in everyday moral life. To put it another way, the
contours of the values differ in important ways.97 Undoubtedly, there
exist analogies to the public values of lawyering in personal moral
life-for example, one ought to be loyal to one's family, friends, and
country, just as a lawyer ought to be loyal to her client. But while the
abstract value of loyalty may be stated at a high level of generality, so
that it seems that the same moral considerations apply in the attorney-
client relationship as in personal friendships, the contexts are actually
so different that there is very little in common between them. (As we
shall see, Charles Fried's well-known paper, The Lawyer as Fiiend, made
this analytical mistake by assuming that the duties and responsibilities
owed by friends to each other could be transposed, mutatis mutandis,
into the lawyer-client context.98)
Ordinary moral life does not provide the resources for dealing
with conflicts in values that are generated by complex political institu-
tions that bear little resemblance to the environment in which non-
lawyers make moral decisions. To return to the Dalkon Shield exam-
ple, it is almost impossible to think of a relevantly similar case that
would arise in everyday moral life, where an agent was duty-bound to
ask embarrassing questions of complete strangers, while the strangers
were absolutely required to answer them, provided that the answers to
the questions would help an acquaintance of the agent in a dispute
over allegedly having caused serious injuries to thousands of people.
To emphasize, I acknowledge that there are roughly instructive cases
that arise in family and friendship relationships, but they differ so ex-
tensively from the actual Dalkon Shield litigation that they cannot
provide the kind of moral guidance that the personal-values ethicists
require. What action does the attorney's duty of loyalty to the com-
pany entail? To answer that question, it is more instructive to ex-
amine the institution of lawyering, and the morally significant details
of the attorney-client relationship, than to inquire into what one
friend owes to another in some social setting. To foreshadow an argu-
ment that will be developed at greater length throughout the pages
that follow, practices generate moral values, and one must be sensitive
to the diverse ends which give these practices their purpose andjustifi-
97 In the terminology of the theory of value, general, highly abstract concepts like
loyalty and justice are "thin" values, while the more fully-specified concepts useful in
legal ethics are "thick" evaluative concepts. "Thick concepts apply to particular do-
mains of action and guide particular feelings.... [T]he application of the thin con-
cepts is largely determined by evaluative standards expressed in terms of thick
concepts." E,,ZAB ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETmics AND EcoNoucs 98 (1993).
98 See infra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
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cation.9 9 Relying on ordinary moral values, therefore, detaches legal
ethics from the situational sensitivity needed to adequately guide deci-
sions in the practical dilemmas facing lawyers.
The second objection is that in a morally diverse society, where
the lawyer and client can be expected to disagree about questions of
right and wrong, lawyers should not be permitted to override their
clients' own value commitments for reasons not shared by the
clients. 10 0 Calling upon the lawyer to assume personal moral responsi-
bility for the representation potentially privileges the lawyer's moral
beliefs over the client's. Unless the morality of the representation
were judged on terms that depended on the lawyer's personal view of
the goodness or evil of the client's ends, the ascription of agency to
the lawyer would be nonsensical. But the insistence upon the lawyer's
moral agency raises the possibility that the lawyer, taking seriously her
personal responsibility, might insist on pursuing objectives different
from her client's because she regarded the client's wishes as unjust.
The legitimacy of the lawyer's role in a democratic society is therefore
threatened by the lawyer's reference to personal moral commitments
in the process of representation. In other words, a social institution in
which the personal moral agency of the actors is central to the justifi-
cation of the institution seems incompatible with the role of lawyers to
represent and speak on behalf of another person with whom that law-
yer might disagree about fundamental moral questions.
Let us consider an illustration. A client wants to draft a will disin-
heriting his child because of the child's persistent opposition to Amer-
ican military action against Iraq.10 1 The client may have an
unqualified legal right to draft his will this way, but has no way of
knowing this information and implementing his design without legal
advice. If the lawyer in this case does not forthrightly acknowledge
the client's right to disinherit his child, then the lawyer, by engaging
in manipulative behavior based on her own beliefs about social justice,
is preventing the client from exercising a right that he otherwise
would possess. If the lawyer decides not to inform her client that he
has the legal right to disinherit his children, then she effectively as-
sumes an arrogant posture of moral superiority, since treating this in-
formation about the legal system as "dangerous knowledge," akin to a
doctor refusing to tell a patient the lethal dose of a medication, as-
99 See infra notes 130-44 and accompanying text.
100 Cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10 (1980) ("No-
body has the right to vindicate political authority by asserting a privileged insight into
the moral universe which is denied to the rest of us.").
101 See Wasserstrom, supra note 20, at 7-8.
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sumes that the lawyer has superior expertise in evaluating the morality
of the child's pacifism and the client's disposition of his assets. 0 2
The lawyer's decision to respect her own conception of justice
may be motivated by the belief that the client's stated intention is not,
in fact, in the client's best interest. This is the related problem of
paternalism. A lawyer acts paternalistically when she acts for what she
takes to be the client's own good, even though the client does not see
matters the same way.103 In the will example, the lawyer may sincerely
believe that refusing to inform the client about the full extent of his
testamentary rights is in her client's best interest because it will pro-
mote harmony in the family and thus better serve the long-term inter-
ests of the client, which the client is temporarily unable to perceive
because of his pique over his son's politics. The lawyer's refusal to
provide this information is unjustifiably paternalistic, however, unless
the lawyer's role justifies her overriding the client's stated intention in
order to accommodate the client's long-term best interests.
In our liberal political tradition, which prizes individual auton-
omy very highly, paternalism is a grave violation of individual rights.
Persons must be free to govern themselves through their own exercise
of understanding, deliberation, and rational choice.'0 4 From this
freedom flows the privilege of the individual to be the sole judge of
the moral legitimacy of her actions. These evaluative judgments may,
of course, be influenced by one's upbringing, religious training, com-
munity mores, and so on, but ultimately it is the autonomous individ-
ual who must exercise choice and accept responsibility for those
choices. "The responsible man is not capricious or anarchic, for he
does acknowledge himself bound by moral constraints. But he insists
that he alone is the judge of those constraints." 05 While in a liberal
society some additional constraints may be placed on the exercise of
individual autonomy in the name of collective good, these political
decisions about social welfare must be justified without reference to
102 Cf Robert C. Post, On Professional Prerogatives, 37 STAN. L. REV. 459 (1985) (not-
ing that the role of a professional invariably creates tension between autonomy and
influence, which is the power a professional has over the client by virtue of expertise).
103 See generally David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REv.
454; Wasserstrom, supra note 20. For a useful overview of the problem of paternalism
in bioethics, see BEAucHAMr & CHILDRESS, supra note 72, at 120-81.
104 Indeed, in political philosophy, anarchy is sometimes presented not as a night-
marish conclusion to a slippery slope argument, but as a challenge to any political
order to justify its claim to authority over autonomous individuals. See, e.g., R.P.
Wolff, The Conflict Between Authority and Autonomy, in AUrHourr 20 (Joseph Raz ed.,
1990).
105 Id. at 26.
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any particular vision of the good life.' 0 6 In other words, political ac-
tors must leave room for individuals to act in accordance with their
own view of the good. If the father in the will example has a concep-
tion of family life that involves strict control over his children, then
political institutions ought not to interfere with his ability to live ac-
cording to those principles.
Lawyers in a liberal system must take care not to frustrate their
clients' pursuit of their own conception of the good life by appealing
to a moral principle that is unique to the lawyer's conception of the
good. Many defenders of the regulatory model rest their objection to
considering moral values in professional responsibility on this
ground. 10 7 Teachers of legal ethics, it is claimed, ought not to presup-
pose the validity of any substantive ethical outlook or conception of
the good. "[I]nstruction in professional responsibility should not be
premised on the correctness of any particular theory." 08
[S] ome judges and academics believe that the conduct of legal pro-
fessionals ought to be governed by an ethical code, but this is not
the general understanding of the profession or teachers of profes-
sional responsibility. Many if not most teachers of professional re-
sponsibility recognize that they are teaching the future lawyers of
America a code of positive law rules enacted by their state legisla-
tures, rather than the Bible, the Koran, or one of the many ethical
systems that have existed from the pre-Socratic through twentieth-
century revival of natural law theory.
10 9
On the surface this argument is self-refuting, since the regulatory
model is itself a moral position. It builds in several contestable nor-
mative assumptions, including the critical condition that following the
rules laid down by bar associations and courts is a sufficient condition
for moral rectitude. On a different reading, however, this argument
does suggest that certain kinds of moral arguments by lawyers may
106 See LIBERAL NEUTRALIT= (Robert E. Goodin & Andrew Reeve eds., 1989) (col-
lecting essays on this topic); ROBERT NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 33 (1974);
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 190 (1993) (explaining that the common theme of
liberal thought has been that the state should not favor any comprehensive doctrine
and any associated conception of the good); Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE MORAITr 113, 127 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978).
107 See, e.g., Ian Johnstone & Mary Patricia Treuthart, Doing the Right Thing: An
Overview of Teaching Professional Responsibility, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75 (1991); Edmund B.
Spaeth, Jr. et al., Teaching Legal Ethics: Exploring the Continuum, 58 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROBS. 153, 161 (1995) (stating that professional responsibility teachers should not
promote any particular conception of the good lawyer).
108 Johnstone & Treuthart, supra note 107, at 83.
109 Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation: Paradigm Misplaced, 88
Nw. U. L. REV. 579, 583-84 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
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potentially be inappropriate, given the demands of the lawyer's role.
The lawyer's job is to acquaint her client with the demands of the law,
counsel her client on conforming to the law, and advocate for her
client's interests within the framework of the law. The emphasis in
this statement on the law reflects the contention that only specifically
legal constraints on the client's activities are legitimate in a liberal
democracy.
It is not clear, however, that a lawyer may counsel the client about
the law without referring to principles of public morality. Consider an
extended example. 110 Lois is a lawyer with a general practice in a
town located in the state of Tradition, near the line with the state of
Progress. Clint comes to her for advice. He recently quit his job in
the big city and bought a small department store in town. He ob-
serves that stores in Tradition remain closed on Sundays, while those
in Progress stay open; thus, he infers that Tradition still enforces "blue
laws," prohibiting stores from opening on Sundays. Clint is losing
money to the discount store across the state line because citizens of
Tradition habitually cross the state line to shop on Sundays in Pro-
gress. Clint asks Lois whether he can open his store on Sundays. Lois,
being a good conventionalist, sets out to discover the utterances by
political officials that would constrain the advice she gives to Clint.
The blue law is clear enough: it provides for a twenty-five dollar fine
for the proprietor of any public marketplace who keeps his store open
on Sunday.11' A case decided by the Supreme Court of Tradition
held that the twenty-five dollar fine was applicable to each violation,
and "violation" was interpreted as each day the store was open for
110 SeeMONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWT'ERS' ETHics 144-46 (1990); see
also ZrrIN & LANGFORD, supra note 5, at 441-42. An excellent discussion of the ethics
of client counseling can be found in Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Laurgers,
68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 26-30 (1988). The form in which I present the counseling options
below is drawn heavily from Gordon's presentation.
111 The relevant portion of the Civil Code of Tradition reads as follows:
Any person... who, being a merchant or shopkeeper, druggist excepted,
keeps open store on Sunday, shall be fined $25.00. Any person who opens,
or causes to be opened, for the purpose of selling or trading, any public
market or place on Sunday, or opens, or causes to be opened, any stall or
shop therein, or connected therewith, or brings anything for sale or barter
to such market or place, or offers the same for sale therein on that day, or
buys or sells therein on that day, including livestock or cattle, shall, on con-
viction, be fined $25.00. Any place where people assemble for the purchase
and sale of goods, wares and merchandise, provisions, cattle or other articles
is a market house or place within the meaning of this section.
Tradition modeled its statute on ALA. CODE § 13A-12-1 to -2 (1975).
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business. Lois then reads the Tradition Rules of Professional Conduct
to discover the legal texts that constrain her own actions:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a law-
yer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of
conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a
good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or appli-
cation of the law.
11 2
In addition, Lois reviews the Tradition criminal code, and discov-
ers a provision which makes liable as a principal anyone who "aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures" the commission of a
crime.1 1 3 The statute does not contain an exemption for lawyers act-
ing as counselors.
Lois considers a range of options for the advice she should give
Clint, taking into account her obligation under the rule and the crimi-
nal statute. She could tell her client, (1) it is illegal to open his store
on Sunday; (2) it is "technically" illegal, but the local D.A. is unlikely
to prosecute him;1 1 4 (3) it is illegal and the D.A. actively enforces the
law, but the fine is insignificant-thus, it would be cost-effective for
him to open on Sundays in light of the revenues he is losing to the
stores in Progress; (4) the blue laws are "on the books," but the
Supreme Court of Tradition may be inclined to strike down the blue
law as a violation of religious liberty;115 (5) the blue laws are an ac-
cepted part of life in Tradition, and although it is cost-effective to
open on Sundays, the local townspeople might perceive Clint as being
hostile to their religious convictions if he opens the store on Sun-
days;1 1 6 (6) concerns about the blue laws are moot because Clint
could increase his revenue by the same amount if he kept the store
112 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.2(d) (1998).
113 This statute was based on 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
114 Cf George Cooper, The Avoidance Dynamic: A Tale of Tax Planning Tax Ethics,
and Tax Reform, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1553, 1577-96 (1980) (explaining the significance
of the "audit lottery" for the ethical deliberations of tax planners).
115 Lois imagines the professional recognition she would receive by arguing the
case in the Supreme Court and wonders whether Clint could be persuaded to subject
himself to prosecution as a test case. In law school Lois wanted to be a constitutional
lawyer, but circumstances intervened and she returned to her hometown and became
a general practitioner.
116 Lois could mention to Clint that many people in town have been grumbling
about "judicial activism" on the Supreme Court, and would likely resent a decision
they would perceive as "against family values." She considers whether her practice
would suffer if she were perceived as being against the blue laws. She does not think
her neighbors are aware of Tradition Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(b), which says,
"A lawyer's representation of a client ... does not constitute an endorsement of the
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open for longer hours during the week; or (7) she will offer to lobby
the legislature to change the law on Clint's behalf, at her customary
hourly rate, of course.
The relevant conventions of the law of professional responsibil-
ity-the disciplinary rule and the criminal statute set forth above-do
not answer Lois's question about what form of advice she should give
to Glint without violating her ethical obligations. The rules them-
selves are too indeterminate to guide Lois's behavior. (Where is the
line between prohibited "assistance" of client crimes and permitted
"discussion" of the legal consequences of actions? Must, or should,
the lawyer assume her client is a Holmesian bad man, who regards
criminal penalties as merely the cost of doing business?117 ) Moreover,
the boundaries of the rules are not stable over time. By her own lawy-
ering efforts, Lois can influence the interpretation or implementation
of legal norms. "[L] awyers, rather than taking the output of legisla-
tures and courts as given, sometimes influence it."1I 8 Thus, in order
to understand what she ought to do in this case, Lois cannot simply
rely on legal texts, but must develop a moral theory, however crude, of
what it means to be a good lawyer.119 Notice that in this example, Lois
does not refer to her personal beliefs about what Clint ought to do;
instead, she is concerned with the political morality of the state of
Tradition and how those principles affect Clint's business proposal.
IV. THREE FuNDAmENTAL PROFEsSIoNAL VALUES.
Dworkin's account of general jurisprudence, which emphasizes
the role of principles of political morality in legal judgments, repre-
sents an alternative approach to the study of moral values in profes-
client's political, economic, social, or moral views or activities." MODEL RuLES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(b) (1998).
117 Does it matter whether Lois can foresee that Clint will use her advice to open
on Sunday in defiance of the law, even though she does not expressly advise him to
do so? Consider the case of a criminal defense lawyer whose client shows up at the
lawyer's office carrying the murder weapon. May she tell the client, "I won't reveal to
the prosecutor that you brought the gun to my office, but if you give it to me, I'm
obligated to turn it over to the police"? Cf. In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va.
1967). The lawyer, of course, knows (or certainly has reason to foresee) that the
client will leave her office and throw the gun in the river after hearing that advice. See
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard
4-4.6(b), reprinted in SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrIY (Thomas
D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda eds., 1998) ("[D]efense counsel should advise the
source of the legal consequences pertaining to possession or destruction of the
item.").
118 SIMON, supra note 21, at 46.
119 See Wolf, supra note 93, at 41-43.
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sional responsibility. This Dworkinian conception maintains that
there is something about the lawyer's role which generates moral du-
ties that would not apply to a similarly situated nonprofessional.
"[W] e make a particular, non-generalizable moral appeal when we re-
mind someone that he or she is an attorney.' 120 These duties are
grounded not in the personal moral or religious beliefs of profession-
als, but in the function performed by the profession in society. The
legal profession mediates between citizens, the state, and other orga-
nizations in society by reposing complex knowledge with specially
trained and public-spirited individuals, who then enable citizens to
conform their actions to social norms.' 2 1 The duties of a lawyer on
this account are shaped by public needs, so professional institutions,
such as schools and self-regulatory mechanisms like disciplinary codes,
should channel professional behavior in socially desirable ways.
122
The goal of a theory of professional responsibility should be to pro-
vide a normatively satisfying story of why the legal profession deserves
120 Jack L. Sammons, The Professionalism Movement: The Problems Defined, 7 NOTRE
DAmEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 269, 272 (1993) (emphasis added). Thus, I disagree
with Patrick Schiltz, who claims that "[being an ethical lawyer is not much different
from being an ethical doctor or mail carrier or gas station attendant." Patrick J.
Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and
Unethical Profession, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 871, 909 (1999). Of course doctors and mail
carriers face similar ethical concerns in their non-work-related lives, which Schiltz
sums up: "You should treat others as you want them to treat you. Be honest and fair.
Show respect and compassion. Keep your promises." Id. at 910. And so on. These
maxims for private moral life, however, do not provide sufficient guidance in profes-
sional ethical dilemmas that involve values not precisely analogous to those encoun-
tered in ordinary life. Consider again the Dalkon Shield case, but suppose this time
that the lawyers did not cross the line into abusive and humiliating questioning. The
lawyers would be morally justified in asking some questions about the plaintiffs' sex-
ual practices, even though these questions would violate the maxim "treat other as
you want them to treat you." I certainly do not want some stranger asking me embar-
rassing questions, and I would not tolerate it in daily life, but it is an acceptable fea-
ture of the morality of lawyering because of the countervailing consideration of
fairness to the defendant.
121 See ABEL, supra note 14, at 34-35;JACK L. SAMMONS, JR., LAWYER PROFEssIONAL-
isM (1988); Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The Profes-
sional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in IDEALS/PRAcTIcES, supra note 14, at 180-81.
The roots of the functional concept of professionalism can be found in Durkheim's
hypothesis that occupational groups filled the normative void left by the breakdown
of religious authority. See EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIL MORALS
(Cornelia Brookfield trans., 1957).
122 See VINCENT Luizzi, A CASE FOR LEGAL ETHICS (1993); Robert L. Nelson &
David M. Trubek, New Problems and New Paradigms in Studies of the Legal Profession, in
IDEALS/PRAcTICES, supra note 14, at 15-16; Wolf, supra note 93, at 44-45.
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our respect.123 The public morality conception of legal ethics is,
therefore, "a story with a complex claim: that present practice can be
organized by and justified in principles sufficiently attractive to pro-
vide an honorable future.'
24
For the public morality conception of legal ethics to function ef-
fectively as an alternative to incorporating personal ethical beliefs into
professional decision making, the moral values that bear on profes-
sional decisions must derive from the social function of lawyers. If
these public normative principles do indeed arise from the role of
lawyers, then they function as a constraint on the personal morality of
individuals acting as professionals, rather than the other way around.
In this Section, therefore, I will consider three principles that have
been defended as the source of norms of professional responsibility:
the principle of undivided loyalty to one's client, the duty to seekjus-
tice, and the ethic of care or mercy which asks lawyers to consider the
effect of their actions on human relationships. These values, alone or
in combination, represent the background social norms that might be
brought to bear on a problem in which legal conventions alone do
not provide an answer, just as justice, fairness, and procedural due
process are the constituents of Dworkin's theory of law as integrity. In
each Subsection, I will review the work of legal ethicists who have
urged each value to be paramount in the normative domain of lawyer-
ing and will also consider why a conception of legal ethics that empha-
sizes only that favored value must inevitably be incomplete. The goal
of the discussion is to establish that a satisfying account of professional
responsibility must allow for plural values and cannot proceed on the
assumption that only one value may be identified which may serve as
the polestar for lawyers in ethical deliberation.
Before proceeding with the discussion of the constituent values of
lawyering, it is necessary to pause momentarily to introduce a proposi-
tion that I take to be fundamental for professional ethics: practical
moral norms take their meaning from the context in which they are
developed. Values do not mean much in the abstract; at least, they do
not provide much guidance for decision makers in real cases. 125 This
123 "Law, as something deserving loyalty, must represent a human achieve-
ment.... If laws, even bad laws, have a claim to our respect, then law must represent
some general direction of human effort that we can understand and describe .... "
Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REV.
630, 632 (1958).
124 DwoPuuN, supra note 52, at 227-28.
125 SeeALASDAIR MACINTRE, WHOSEJUSTCE? WHICH RATIONALIY? 174-75 (1988);
HENRY S. RICHARDSON, PRACrICAL REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS 271-79 (1997); Hugh
LaFollette, The Truth in Ethical Relativism, 22J. Soc. PHIL. 146 (1991); see also George
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is not to deny the role of theory, or of abstracting general concepts of
value from our experience with particular cases. A system of morality
depends on accepting some degree of generality in norms; otherwise
agents would fall into relativism or solipsism. But a norm stated at a
high level of abstraction, such as "lying is wrong," is not self-applying.
For one thing, it does not address the question of exceptions or quali-
fications, such as "lying is wrong, unless the lie is trivial and is told to
spare the feelings of another." We all learned as children to express
excitement and gratitude at receiving socks and underwear from
Grandma for Christmas, even though we would have preferred toys,
and were privately mortified at Grandma's taste in clothes. In that
case, the benefit of the deception-easing the interaction between
generations, preventing the inference of undue hostility, providing
cheer at holiday time, and so on-may be thought to outweigh the
moral stricture against lying. 126 To take a more serious example of a
benevolent lie, some physicians in the past would have approved of
deliberately misleading a patient about his chances for survival after
an operation to remove a malignant tumor.1 27 Similarly, it has been
reported that physicians in developing countries do not tell their HIV-
positive patients about the existence in developed nations of costly
experimental drugs which could extend the patient's life, but which
cost more for a month's supply than the patient's annual salary. Tell-
ing the patient the truth, these physicians argue, would unnecessarily
cause stress and anxiety, diminishing the quality of his last few months
of life with little corresponding benefit. In these cases, the general
norm is qualified by an implied exception for certain categories of
P. Fletcher, The Meaning of Morality, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 805, 809 (1989)
("'[A] bstract propositions do not decide concrete cases in the common law tradition
.... ). Compare what I take to be the misguided preoccupation in moral philosophy
with stating ethical principles that are exceptionless, substantial, and context-free.
See, e.g., J.B. Schneewind, Moral Knowledge and Moral Principles, in REVISIONS 113 (Stan-
ley Hauerwas & Alasdair MacIntyre eds., 1983).
126 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 97, at 62; SIssELA BoK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 57-61 (1978).
127 See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 72, at 398-401 (reporting that the
attitude of physicians toward nondisclosure of the diagnosis of cancer has shifted in
recent years, in response to changing societal attitudes toward cancer, increasing re-
spect by physicians for patients' autonomy, and the fear of malpractice liability); see
also BoK, supra note 126, at 226-38 (explaining that the increasing importance of
informed consent requires physicians to proceed with caution when withholding in-
formation from patients). The fact that the application of an ethical norm has de-
pended on such contingent facts tends to support the claim that an effective system of
practical morality cannot proceed at too high a level of abstraction.
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lies, which must be learned through experience with a variety of situa-
tions in which the lies are judged acceptable or unacceptable.
Exceptions are not the only reason why general norms cannot
guide conduct. The concepts used in abstract moral norms are them-
selves defined with reference to concrete practical situations, and
quite a bit of controversy can arise in the specification of these ab-
stract values. For example, consider the debate surrounding the im-
peachment of President Clinton. Does the norm "lying is wrong" also
encompass evasiveness, hair-splitting, and providing misleading an-
swers to straightforward questions? 28 Putting aside the legal defini-
tion of perjury, the interesting ethical question is whether the
President lied, for the purposes of the general moral strictures against
lying, if he accurately denied having "sex" under the stipulated defini-
tion used in his civil deposition, even though he clearly had sex as that
term is commonly understood by non-lawyers. Other prominent
moral debates, such as whether affirmative action is "discrimination,"
or whether assisted suicide is "murder," also reveal the difficulty inher-
ent in specifying highly abstract norms so that they may be applied in
borderline cases.'
2 9
The specification of moral norms occurs within social practices.
130
A practice is a form of social activity which is carried out for some
purpose, which in turn generates evaluative standards. The practice
128 The practice of carefully crafting one's answers to remain technically correct
but substantially misleading is not limited to lawyers. Bok discusses the much-
maligned "mental reservation" doctrine once accepted by some Roman Catholic theo-
logians, in which a witness would not technically be "lying" if he appended a mental
qualification to the untrue statement which made the statement true. Thus, a defend-
ant accused of adultery might say he had not had illicit sex, mentally adding, "at least
not this week." BoK, supra note 126, at 35-37.
129 Consider some of the interpretive difficulties canvassed in KENT GREENAWALT,
LAW AND OBJEcrrrvn 121-36 (1992). In moral philosophy, this critique is associated
with Hegel and his arguments against the Kantian categorical imperative. See G.W.F.
HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 11 424-26, at 254-56 (ANV. Miller trans., 1977).
Hegel shows how two contradictory maxims can be derived from the same universal
principle; thus, the principle is too vague to provide guidance in actual cases. The
classic example of the indeterminacy of legal rules is the "no vehicles in the park"
ordinance cited by Hart: Does "vehicle" include bicycles? What about an ambulance
rushing to save a heart attack victim? See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126-30
(2d ed. 1994). For a classic caricature of the view thatjurisprudential concepts have a
"pure" form, "freed from all entangling alliances with human life," see Felix S. Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809
(1935).
130 Cf. ANDERSON, supra note 97, at 47-55, 98-103; ALASDAIR MACINTnRE, AFTER
VIRTUE 187-203 (2d ed. 1984); LUDWIG WrTGENSTEIN, PHIOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
§ 201, at 81 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1968).
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of defending a litigant in a civil lawsuit exists for particular reasons:
ensuring an accurate presentation of truthful statements to a tribunal
is undoubtedly important, but so is protecting one's client from har-
assment, unfair invasion of privacy, onerous expenses, and pointless
legal proceedings. The purpose of this practice differs from the prac-
tice of, say, living together with others as a member of a family, in
which truthfulness is of paramount importance. The difference in the
ends accommodated by these social practices partially explains why
many observers of the Clinton scandal would not regard his "legally
accurate but substantially misleading" deposition responses as lies,
although they would roundly condemn the deception he practiced on
his wife. (I am assuming here for the sake of discussion that Clinton
did not tell an out-and-out lie about whether he had "sex" under the
stipulated definition in the PaulaJones litigation, although he did lie
if Monica Lewinsky told the truth about who touched whom and
where.) Truthfulness for a lawyer in a civil deposition, where the ad-
versary is expected to probe answers given by the witness until the
responses are on the record in an artificially precise form, may be
judged by a different set of criteria than truthfulness for a husband,
where an answer that is "legally accurate but substantially misleading"
would be considered an egregious breach of marital trust.131
Some readers may be outraged by the claim that a lawyer's truth
is different from a husband's truth, but any attack on this claim must
be made at the level of the definition of the practice. One might con-
tend that the truth-finding function of the civil deposition in the Clin-
ton case was subverted by Clinton's evasiveness, and that a higher
standard of candor should be imposed on witnesses and their counsel.
I have made this argument elsewhere, 132 and indeed the public furor
over Clinton's parsing of the word "sex" has provided considerable
support for my claim that this kind of gamesmanship in discovery is
unethical behavior for lawyers. The point is that this argument di-
rectly engages with the nature of the practice at issue, whether main-
taining a civil lawsuit, remaining faithful to one's spouse, or serving as
an elected political leader. It is entirely possible, though not neces-
131 In politics this idea was nicely captured by Weber: "But is it true that any ethic
of the world could establish commandments of identical content for erotic, business,
familial, and official relations; for the relations to one's wife, to the greengrocer, the
son, the competitor, the friend, the defendant?" Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in
FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOcIOLOGY 77, 118-19 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills
trans. & eds., 1946). For an extended, contemporary version of this argument, see
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OFJUSTIcE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983).
132 See W. Bradley Wendel, Rediscovering Discovery Ethics, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 895
(1996).
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sary, that each of these practices has generated a different set of crite-
ria for what constitutes a "lie." (In Section JV.B., I have much more to
say about how a social practice generates and applies these criteria
through a process of reasoning by analogy from prior cases in which a
moral norm was specified and elaborated in concrete factual settings.)
In the ethical analysis of lawyers' behavior, too, one must pay
careful attention to the nature and purpose of the practices under
consideration. Criminal defense work, for example, has as one of its
objects the protection of individual rights against government abuse.
These "intrinsic procedural rights"133 include the right not to be re-
quired to testify against oneself, the right not to have one's person,
home, and belongings searched without a warrant, and the protection
against cruel and unusual punishment. The justification of a great
deal of criminal defense lawyers' behavior is therefore grounded in
the purpose of safeguarding individual liberty. As David Luban puts
it, we want to "handicap" the state, even in its ability to secure convic-
tions of the guilty, to ensure that it does not trample upon the rights
of the innocent.13 4 For this reason, criminal defense attorneys arejus-
tified in asserting the illegality of a search and seizure of evidence as a
ground for acquittal, even though the client may be guilty as sin.
They may also be justified (although these cases are much more con-
troversial) in brutally cross-examining a truthful witness for the prose-
cution or presenting perjured testimony. 3 5 It would be a serious
mistake, however, to generalize norms for the behavior of civil de-
fense lawyers, transactional lawyers, or prosecutors from the standards
appropriate to criminal defense attorneys, because the practices in
question are directed at different ends. Despite suggestions to the
contrary in some professional rhetoric, the practicing bar is not a
monolith, and the context of legal practice plays an important role in
the moral evaluation of practitioners.
13 6
Of course, there may be considerable controversy over the end of
a practice. For example, the literature on the ethics of negotiation
reveals a sharp conflict over whether the participants in the practice
understand that the purpose of the activity is to bluff, exaggerate, and
133 SIMON, supra note 21, at 170.
134 David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in TI GOOD LAwYER, supra note 93,
at 83, 92. Simon responds that this argument proves too much: We do not want to
handicap the state in all cases. Instead, we want the state to be effective in convicting
the guilty and ineffective in convicting the innocent. See SIMON, supra note 21, at 175.
135 See FREEDMAN, supra note 110, at 109-32, 161-71.
136 Cf David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Layers After Kaye Scholer,
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1147 (1993) (observing that, contrary to the rhetoric of shared
professional values, the norms of legal practice vary significantly by context).
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conceal one's true intentions, or whether negotiation is a practice de-
manding high standards of candor and fairness, like a judicial
proceeding.
3 7
Pious and generalized assertions that the negotiator must be "hon-
est" or that the lawyer must use "candor" are not helpful. They are
at too high a level of generality, and they fail to appreciate the fact
that truth and truthful behavior at one time in one set of circum-
stances with one set of negotiators may be untruthful in another
circumstance with other negotiators.
138
This position goes too far. It is possible to generalize about hon-
est and dishonest behavior in negotiation, although not at the level of
merely stating that lawyers ought to be "candid." If the end of the
practice of negotiation could be fixed by some degree of professional
consensus, then evaluative standards could be located that are not
particular to each negotiation. Perhaps there is no stable consensus
on the purpose of negotiation; in that case, we would expect consider-
able divergence in the moral evaluation of negotiators. This disagree-
ment does not show that the morality of negotiation is completely
situation-relative. It merely highlights the importance of seeking a
clear understanding of the end of the practice. 13
9
Interestingly, courts have frequently asserted that lawyering is a
social practice which generates specific moral duties. For example,
the Supreme Court has said that the phrase "conduct unbecoming a
member of the bar" must be read in the context of the "lore of the
profession."'140 Although at one point in the opinion the Court
seemed to equate professional lore with the positive disciplinary codes
promulgated by state bar associations,141 the Court also appears to
concede that the competing demands of zealously advocating one's
137 See, e.g., Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L.
REV. 577, 591-92 (1975); Gerald Weflaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IowA
L. REV. 1219, 1220 (1990). The Model Rules recognize that the question of what con-
stitutes lying in negotiation can depend on the contentions of the practice. See
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 cmt. 2 (1998).
138 JamesJ. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926, 929 (footnote omitted).
139 For a useful example of how the thorough exploration of a particular area of
legal practice may shed some light on appropriate professional behavior in that con-
text, see William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REv.
1903 (1993). For a more general argument, that norms are expressed and under-
stood intersubjectively by members of a community, see Robert M. Cover, Supreme
Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nonos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983).
140 In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644-45 (1985).
141 Id. at 645 ("[Gluidance is provided by... 'the lore of the profession' as embod-
ied in codes of professional conduct.") (emphasis added).
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client's cause and advancing the cause ofjustice must be resolved "in
light of the traditional duties imposed on an attorney,"14 2 which are
not neatly captured in the disciplinary codes. In other cases, the
Court has not attempted to anchor a narrowing construction of regu-
latory standards to the state bar codes and rules.
Given the traditions of the legal profession and an attorney's spe-
cialized professional training, there is unquestionably some room
for enforcement of standards that might be impermissibly vague in
other contexts; an attorney in many instances may properly be pun-
ished for conduct which all responsible attorneys would recognize
as improper for a member of the profession. 143
In other words, by belonging to a community and sharing in the
practices of similarly situated professionals, lawyers become ac-
quainted with professional norms that are not reducible to neat disci-
plinary codes.'4
Thomas Shaffer raises an important issue at thisjuncture. Values,
he argues, arise from communities such as families, churches, neigh-
borhoods, and perhaps even regions and distinctive cultures, but not
from national jurisprudence or the norms and practices of the legal
profession. 145 These "mediating institutions" are far richer and more
142 Id. at 645.
143 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 666 (1985) (internal
citations omitted).
144 For courts that have accepted the argument that professional norms are suffi-
ciently clear to provide guidance for lawyers, see, for example, Howell v. State Bar of
Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1988), In reDisciplinary Proceedings of Phelps, 637 F.2d
171, 175 (10th Cir. 1981), In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 324-25 (1st Cir. 1973), In re
Citation of Attorney Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d 764,768 (Iowa 1976), Attorney Grievance Comm'n
v. Alison, 565 A.2d 660, 667 (Md. 1989), and In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 497-98 (N.J.
1982). The Eleventh Circuit appears to take the position that the "lore of the profes-
sion" must be set forth in disciplinary codes governing attorney practices to serve as
grounds for sanctions. In re Finkelstein, 901 F.2d 1560, 1565 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing
In Re Snyder, 472 U.S. at 645). The Eleventh Circuit faulted the district judge for
suspending a lawyer from practice based on violations of a "transcendental code of
conduct... [that] existed only in the subjective opinion of the court." Id. The court
focused on whether the lawyer had notice of the code of conduct which he allegedly
violated and left open the possibility that an uncodified, but suitably clear, profes-
sional norm could form the basis for discipline, even in the Eleventh Circuit, if the
lawyer knew or should have known of its existence. See also United States v. Wunsch,
54 F.3d 579 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g granted, 84 F.3d 358 (9th Cir.), withdrawn, 84 F.3d
1110 (9th Cir. 1996). In Wunsch, the court held that a statute which stated, "It is the
duty of an attorney... Et] o abstain from all offensive personality... unless required
by the justice of the cause with which he or she is charged," was void for vagueness.
Id.
145 See Letter from Thomas L. Shaffer to W. Bradley Wendel (Feb. 26, 1999) (on
file with author); see also Thomas L. Shaffer, Towering Figures, Enigmas, and Responsive
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reliable sources of moral guidance than the legal system. Mediating
institutions are exemplifications of what Aristotle calls a polis.
[A] ny polis which is truly so called, and is not merely one in name,
must devote itself to the end of encouraging goodness. Otherwise,
a political association sinks into a mere alliance, which only differs
in space.., from other forms of alliance where the members live at
a distance from one another.... [A] polis is not an association for
residence on a common site, or for the sake of preventing mutual
injustice and easing exchange.
146
A polis is the opposite of what Dworkin would call a "rulebook
community"-an association in which members agree to a modus
vivendi, including procedures for resolving disputes among them-
selves, but do not share deep value commitments. 147 Shaffer's objec-
tion is that the legal system is a mere rulebook community and not an
institution which is dedicated to defining and encouraging goodness.
Thus, it is misguided to turn to legal practices in hopes that they may
illuminate and inspire us morally.
Even if Shaffer is correct in his claim that legal practice does not
tell us much about being a good human being (and he is probably
right on that score), a further premise remains necessary for his argu-
ment to establish that lawyers ought to look to non-legal practices as a
source of moral guidance. The missing premise is an account of the
political legitimacy of legal ethics, conceived on a foundation of pri-
vate moral norms, elucidated through mediating institutions. The
reason Dworkin tries so hard to show that American jurisprudence
arises from a "community of principle," not a rulebook community, is
bound up with his theory of legitimacy. For Dworkin, the integrity of
a community's moral principles provides the best account of why citi-
zens have a general moral obligation to obey the law. 148 Dworkin ac-
tually seems partially to concede Shaffer's point when he observes that
"responsibilities to family and lovers and friends and union or office
colleagues are the most important, the most consequential obligations
Communities in American Legal Ethics, 51 ME. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 1999); Thomas
L. Shaffer, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession, 41 Loy. L. REv. 387,
394-95 (1995) (book review). Luban makes a similar point in his review of Simon's
book: "In my view, the vaunted 'artificial reason of the law' is no substitute for the
emotional responses that a lifetime of moral education provides us." Luban, supra
note 83, at 876.
146 ARisTOLE, THE POLITIcs, book III, ch. 5, at 1280b (Ernest Barker trans., 1946).
147 See DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 209-10; cf GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note
19, at 57-58 (providing a similar account of a "prudential" political community).
148 See DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 191-92, 216.
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of all."1 4 9 These special obligations arise from a sense of the commu-
nity members' special reciprocal rights and responsibilities in regard
to one another, which are not generalizable to obligations and privi-
leges running between members and nonmembers of the commu-
nity.150 But Dworkin seeks to go beyond Shaffer's reliance on
mediating institutions by arguing that the political community com-
posed of American citizens is a "community of principle," an Aristote-
lian polis, which is governed by commonly shared principles ofjustice,
not merely compromises hammered out between warring factions. 15 1
This is a daring and ambitious claim given Dworkin's admission that
this community is morally pluralistic, but he defends it in part with a
subtle burden-shifting argument: what other model of political legiti-
macy would work as well?15 2 Moral diversity should be accommodated
not by leaving moral questions to a multiplicity of nonpolitical associa-
tions but by charging political institutions with the responsibility of
fashioning principles of justice that speak directly to the normative
concerns of these subcommunities and which seek to discover the
deeper moral commitments that diverse constituencies share. Judg-
ing ought to proceed as if the American polity were a community of
principle, and ought to aim to construct an interpretation of legality
which best harmonizes competing moral perspectives.
153
Although Shaffer is surely right that nonprofessional activities are
a rich source of moral understanding, lawyers who seek to apply
norms developed in those activities to their professional lives must
find a way to connect those norms with their clients' own moral com-
149 Id. at 196.
150 See id. at 198-99.
151 See id. at 211; cf Jeremy Waldron, Kant's Legal Positivism, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1535, 1538-40 (1996) (asserting that disagreement about rights andjustice requires a
community to construct a univocal conception ofjustice which is the basis for the use
of force).
152 See DwoxiuN, supra note 52, at 213-14. Shifting the burden of proof is an
effective, but underappreciated, tactic in non-legal rhetoric. See RICHARD H. GASriNs,
BURDENS OF PROOF IN MODERN DISCOURSE (1992). This work casts the status quo as
merely one of many positions competing for the tile of "truth." By combining bur-
den-shifting arguments with antifoundationalist claims or a general attitude of skepti-
cism toward assertions of truth, critics of existing institutions can make these
arrangements seem radically unstable. See id. at 42-43, 104-06. Dworkin is neither
an antifoundationalist nor a skeptic, but his argument effectively shifts the burden
onto someone like Shaffer to make his own argument for the legitimacy of a model of
jurisprudence which emphasizes the moral authority of private associations.
153 See DWoRmN, supra note 52, at 225 ("[Ilntegrity instructs judges to identify
legal rights and duties, so far as possible, on the assumption that they were all created
by a single author-the community personified-expressing a coherent conception
ofjustice and fairness.").
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mitments. As I will discuss in more detail in subsequent sections, Shaf-
fer and others have sought to accommodate the problem of moral
diversity by urging lawyers to view representation as an opportunity for
moral dialogue with clients. Conversation is one solution to the prob-
lem of constructing a model of legal ethics for a pluralistic society; the
Dworkinian strategy of shifting the locus ofjustification and legitimacy
onto public values is another and, as I hope to show, a more broadly
applicable response.
1 54
With that background in mind, we may proceed to the analysis of
the foundational values of lawyering.
155
A. Loyalty
Authoritative statements of professional norms have long empha-
sized paradigmatic loyalty to one's client as a fundamental principle of
legal ethics:
"A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objec-
tives of representation....
"A lawyer shall not intentionally fail to seek the lawful objectives
of his client through reasonably available means. ...
The regulatory model discussed above, with its strong attachment
to the virtue of loyalty, is almost certainly the dominant conception
154 To be fair to Shaffer, it is not clear that he is looking for a generally applicable
theory of the political legitimacy of the practice of lawyering. His writing has a pro-
nounced radical quality, and he repeatedly emphasizes that the rule of law may be
intrinsically corrupt when viewed from the standpoint of religious truth. See, e.g.,
Thomas L. Shaffer, Faith Tends to Subvert Legal Order, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1089 (1998);
Thomas L. Shaffer, Should a Christian Lawyer Sign Up For Simon's Practice ofJustice? , 51
STAN. L. REV. 903 (1999). Perhaps a lawyer evaluating competing theories like Shaf-
fer's and mine is required first to decide whether to approach questions of profes-
sional responsibility from within the legal order or from without. This is a profound
question of personal faith and morality that is well beyond the scope of the questions
addressed here.
155 These may be thought of as prima facie duties, following Ross's terminology.
See W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1930); see also Robert Audi, Intuitionism,
Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics, in MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND ETHICAL CHARACrER
32 (1997). The three public values I describe are a possible taxonomy of professional
values but are by no means the only ones. Simon, for example, identifies neutrality,
partisanship (both of which I analyze under the category of "loyalty"), procedural
justice, and professionalism as foundational ethical norms for lawyers. SeeWilliam H.
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L.
REv. 29.
156 MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.2(a) (1998).
157 MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIONAL REsPONSIB-rrv DR 7-101 (A) (1) (1997) (internal
punctuation omitted).
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among practicing lawyers. 158 To a considerable extent, the judiciary
has supported the organized bar's position that loyalty to one's client
is the polestar value for lawyers. Justice Stevens, for example, has es-
poused consistently the view that independent lawyers and an adver-
sary system of justice are essential to safeguard individual liberties. 5 9
Justice Powell has taken a similar tack, arguing that the public interest
in justice is best served not by requiring lawyers to serve social justice
directly, but by holding them to the highest standards of loyalty to
their clients' causes.
160
158 See LuBAN, supra note 21, at 293-403 (labeling the regulatory model the "stan-
dard conception"); SIMON, supra note 21, at 7 (calling the regulatory model the "dom-
inant view" in legal ethics); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A
Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 78
(1993) (arguing that ethical norms contrary to loyalty have been so subverted that
loyalty has emerged as the dominant justification for lawyer behavior); Harry I. Subin,
The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 IoWA L. REV.
1091, 1150 (1985) ("With the adoption of the Model Rules the ABA has come peril-
ously close to asserting that confidentiality [entailed by the principle of loyalty] is not
just an important interest of the justice system, but the only one."). Although profes-
sional rhetoric surely emphasizes loyalty, one fascinating empirical study shows that in
practice, lawyers' conduct is frequently modulated by what appears to be self-interest.
SeeJAMiEs S. EISENSTEIN & HERBERTJACOB, FELONYJUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALY-
s5s OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1977). This report shows that criminal defense lawyers are
often less concerned with their clients' welfare than with the interests of other court-
house "regulars" such as court clerks, judges, and prosecutors. Lawyers report that
they will sometimes agree to a plea bargain that is harsher than they could have ob-
tained to preserve a good working relationship with a particular state's attorney. Iron-
ically, such short-run disloyalty may be necessary for defense lawyers to remain
effective as advocates in the long run: the business of dispute resolution may be con-
ducted by "work groups" consisting ofjudges, lawyers, and court personnel, and out-
siders-nonmembers of these work groups-are at a tremendous disadvantage. See
id. at 19-39. Thus, it is difficult to label short-term disloyalty as self-interested behav-
ior by the lawyer since the lawyer's motivation may be to become as effective as possi-
ble on behalf of her clients within the criminal justice system.
159 See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 172 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("This is not the first case in which the Court has demonstrated 'its apparent unaware-
ness of the function of the independent lawyer as a guardian of our freedom.'")
(quoting Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 371 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 468 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (stating that lawyers are to be regarded as protectors of rights in an accu-
satorial system).
160 See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981) ("[A] defense lawyer
best serves the public, not by acting on behalf of the State or in concert with it, but
rather by advancing the undivided interests of his client.") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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1. Justifying the Primacy of Loyalty in Legal Ethics.
When asked to explain why loyalty ought to be the paramount
value for legal ethics, many lawyers tell a story about a powerless indi-
vidual and the heroic lawyer who stands up for him. The image of the
lone lawyer resolutely defending an oppressed client is one of the
most compelling ones in the lore of the profession in the United
States. Geoffrey Hazard recounts noteworthy cases such as John Peter
Zenger's trial, the McCarthy hearings, and the trial of the wrongly ac-
cused defendants in Scottsboro, and identifies the self-congratulatory
story the profession tells about itself:
In the basic narrative the private party is an individual, the proceed-
ing is criminal or quasi-criminal, and the defendant's life or liberty
is at stake. The defending attorney's cause is always just, for the
narrative holds that government is inevitably heavy-handed and mis-
guided. The lawyer is thus an instrument of both liberty and polit-
ical justice.161
This narrative certainly sounds compelling, but it must be evalu-
ated critically and must be limited carefully to its facts. For one thing,
the legal profession has employed rhetoric of loyalty and client service
to justify results that are anything but inspirational. The Scottsboro
case, for example, is the story of several brave lawyers who fought for a
fair trial in a corrupt system. It is also the story, however, of the prose-
cutors who pressed for repeated retrials even after it became clear that
the defendants were innocent of the crimes charged, the judge who
permitted the state to inflame the racial prejudices of the jury, and
the numerous local lawyers who wanted no part of the defense of the
boys.1 62 If anything, the legal profession distinguished itself in the
South during the period between Reconstruction and the civil rights
movement for its unflinching support of the repressive regime of
white domination. 1
63
Arguments for a strong adversarial ethic of loyalty in cases where
an isolated individual is overwhelmed by the power of the state be-
come distorted when they are applied in other contexts. Consider a
161 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1244
(1991); see also Koniak, supra note 23, at 1447-60.
162 For a carefully documented and highly readable account of the legal proceed-
ings as seen through the eyes of the various participants, seeJAMEs GOODMAN, STORIES
OF SCOTrSBORO (1994). Even if the prosecutors did not recognize the defendants'
actual innocence, it should have been clear to the prosecutors that the boys were
innocent given the unreliability of the state's witnesses and the compelling exculpa-
tory evidence available.
163 See LEON F. LrrWAcK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OFJIM
GROW 226-27, 249-60 (1998).
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talk that attorney Simon Rifkind gave to the New York City bar. 16 He
praised lawyers for representing "the outcasts, the rejected ones, the
deviationists," and other unpopular members of society. He then
went on to criticize law students led by Ralph Nader for picketing the
law firm that represented General Motors ("GM"), calling their con-
duct "subversive" of professional norms. The irony of comparing GM
with "a sharecropper in Mississippi" seems entirely to have escaped
Rifkind, but his speech skillfully exploits the rhetorical advantage of
identifying GM's law firm with a lawyer for the downtrodden. These
images of heroic lawyers representing oppressed clients influence the
argument about ethics at an affective level, rather than a cognitive
one. It is easy to imagine Atticus Finch bravely defending an innocent
black man in a racist town as one's archetypical lawyer and to ignore
the host of real-world cases that do not measure up to this ideal.1
65
Rifkind's analogy fails because it is GM, not the state or the plaintiffs
suing GM, that holds power. In other words, the practices of sticking
up for a sharecropper in Mississippi and of working on behalf of a
gigantic, multinational corporation are fundamentally different in
their purpose. This is not an argument that large corporations are
inherently evil; it does show, however, that it is important not to mix
metaphors when applying moral lessons from one context to another.
This problem can be stated as a challenge to those who exalt loy-
alty as the central normative value for legal ethics. Accepting that loy-
alty is a praiseworthy value through which lawyers secure justice for
the victims of oppression, why are lawyers justified in representing and
being loyal toward clients who may be the oppressors? One way to
defend the central position of loyalty is to maintain that it is an intrin-
sic good, valuable regardless of any social disutilities it may produce
incidentally. Several prominent versions of this answer have been
given.
a. Friendship
Charles Fried memorably defended the centrality of loyalty by
analogizing the lawyer-client relationship to one of personal friend-
164 See Simon H. Rifkind, The Lawyer's Role and Responsibility in Modern Society, 30
RECORD 534 (1975), reprinted in GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS
OF LAWYERING 456 (2d ed. 1994), and in ZrFRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 5, at 239.
165 See Abel, supra note 2, at 669 (summarizing studies which report that most
lawyers spend virtually no time challenging abuses of legal authority); cf. Mullenix,
supra note 109, at 581 (criticizing Judge Weinstein for equating "torture-chamber
county jails in some 1950's backwater" with corporate defendants in mass tort cases
and for generalizing ethics rules from one case to the other).
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ship.1 66 Friendship is a good in and of itself, so, by analogy, the law-
yer-client relationship is valuable regardless of the justice of the
outcome sought by the client. The limitations of Fried's analogy are
well known, and I will not rehearse them in detail here. 67 Briefly,
outsiders cannot claim a right to be treated equally alongside friends
and family members because they have not shared the experiences
that bind people into close relationships. Duties of friendship, but
not all duties that derive from the value of loyalty, must be grounded
in an actual history that has transpired between two persons. 168 Inter-
action between a lawyer and her client is likely to be fleeting and is
likely to be focused on the legal problem at hand, not on getting to
know one another as persons. Some clients may not even be humans,
but may be institutions, personified by numerous in-house lawyers or
bureaucrats. At the moment the lawyer and client enter into a rela-
tionship, their status is that of contracting parties, not friends. 169 A
professional relationship is different in kind from a close, personal
relationship, precisely because of the missing element of a shared his-
tory which justifies the feelings of loyalty between friends. (Naturally,
some lawyers and clients may be friends independent of the represen-
tation or may become friends over the course of a protracted profes-
sional relationship. At that stage, however, they are literal, not
metaphorical, friends and thus have no need to justify their behavior
in Fried's terms.)
The further problem with Fried's model of lawyering-as-friend-
ship is that it fails to explain why the good of the lawyer-client relation-
ship should automatically trump other public values. 170 Relationships
of loyalty may be created and preserved for immoral ends, as in the
Sicilian Mafia, where the value of fidelity to one's "family" is exalted
166 See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); see also THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F.
COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MoRAL RESPONSIBILITY 40-54 (1994) (determin-
ing that moral counseling should proceed with the practice of the ethics of
friendship).
167 See generally LUBAN, supra note 21, at 83-85; SIMON, supra note 21, at 19-21;
WOLFRAM, supra note 24, at 76-77; Simon, supra note 155.
168 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LoYALT.- AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATION-
SHIPS 7, 23 (1993);Jack L. Sammons, Rank Strangers to Me: Shaffer and Cochran's Friend-
ship Model of Moral Counseling in the Law Office, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE RoCK LJ. 1, 14-15
(1995).
169 Hence Simon's famous quip that another term for "friend-for-hire" is "prosti-
tute." Simon, supra note 155, at 108.
170 See SIMON, supra note 21, at 19.
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over all others, and appeals to societal values are seen as betrayal. 171 A
horrifying example of the abuse of the principle of loyalty was pro-
vided by the friend of a young man who raped and murdered a little
girl in a casino restroom in Nevada. 172 The friend watched for a few
minutes and left the scene, without trying to stop the crime or sum-
mon help. When asked why he acted in this way, the friend re-
sponded that he did not recognize any moral obligation to the girl.
"I'm not going to get upset over somebody else's life. I just worry
about myself first. I'm not going to lose sleep over somebody else's
problems." Another friend explained that the most important ethical
principle in this case was loyalty to one's buddies. "It's a man thing. If
your friend does something really bad or really wrong, you're not go-
ing to go out and narc on them real quick.' 73 This is an extreme
case, but it does show that in personal matters, one's moral evaluation
of an actor's conduct cannot be limited to whether or not that person
displayed the value of loyalty.
As I have emphasized, however, legal ethics is not simply a matter
of importing principles of personal ethics into the professional realm.
The friendship metaphor does not translate neatly between the pri-
vate and public contexts. Other arguments might be defended, how-
ever, which would establish loyalty as the polestar value for lawyers,
even though such a strong priority for loyalty may not be justified in
nonprofessional settings. The most prominent such argument em-
phasizes the intrinsic value of the client's autonomy.174
b. Autonomy
Lawyers are the only practical means for individuals to gain access
to the social goods secured by a system of law in a complex regulatory
state, because the laws governing all aspects of human affairs are too
numerous and detailed to be known to nonprofessionals. We do not
want to constrain individual choices by channeling legal advice
through lawyers who are free to substitute their own value judgments
171 Cf BEAUCHAMP & CDrnESs, supra note 72, at 24-28 (describing the seven-
teenth-century Pirates' Creed of Ethics, a coherent body of rules and principles con-
stituted for a morally repugnant end).
172 See Nora Zamichow, The Fractured Life ofjeremy Strohmeyer, LA. TIMES, July 19,
1998, at Al.
173 Id.
174 My summary of this argument is based on two important papers by Stephen
Pepper. See Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the
Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995) [hereinafter Pepper,
Counseling]; Stephen L. Pepper, The Lauyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem,
and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. FoUDr. REs.J. 613 [hereinafter Pepper, EthicalRole].
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for their clients. "[W] e worry about anyone, lawyer or not, interpos-
ing her scruples to filter the legally permissible projects of autono-
mous agents. '175 Private lawyers are not supposed to narrow the
range of permissible interpretations of the law against the interests of
their clients; instead, they are supposed to facilitate planning and
compliance with the law. In this context, the law is understood as
primarily coercive; it sets limits on the exercise of one's personal free-
dom. However, the law is the only justifiable limit on liberty. Lawyers'
personal moral beliefs, for example, should not be interposed be-
tween the client and the client's otherwise lawful objectives. Thus,
under the autonomy model, lawyers should present to their clients the
full range of options that are compatible within the framework of the
law, without otherwise limiting their clients' choices. Indeed, the cli-
ent might assert as a moral right her interest in doing anything not
prohibited by law, regardless of whether the act is unjust.176 That
right of the client includes the power to compel the lawyer to accept
the client's resolution of a contested moral issue, and the duty on the
part of the lawyer to put aside her own moral commitments and adopt
the client's as her own.
177
The argument that lawyers ought to defer to their clients' direc-
tion on contestable moral matters is the public-values version of the
argument, considered above, that permitting a lawyer to make ethical
decisions based on her personal moral values invites unjustified pater-
nalism, or even statism. According to the defenders of the value of
loyalty, the lawyer should remain agnostic about questions of morality
and social justice and should defer to her client's resolution of the
moral issues in the representation. This agnosticism is based on polit-
ical liberalism: in a democracy, people have a right to order their af-
fairs as they see fit, provided they do not transgress any legal
prohibitions. Significantly-and this is where the autonomy model di-
verges from Fried's-the agreement in this instance does not arise
from a sentiment of friendship or from the lawyer's personal history;
175 LUBAN, supra note 21, at 167. Luban is untroubled by lawyers filtering their
clients' preferences; instead, he sees this function as essential to the moral and polit-
ical justification of the lawyer's role. See id. at 168. This "filtering" function is repre-
sented in my model by the values ofjustice and care, discussed in subsequent sections.
176 SeeJeremy Waldron, A Right to Do Wrong, 92 ETHics 21 (1981).
177 See Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representation in a Pluralist
Society, 63 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 984, 988 (1995). It is not an overstatement to observe
that the client has the right, entailed by the autonomyjustification for the principle of
loyalty, to demand that the lawyer help her achieve her objective, even if it is immoral,
provided that it is not unlawful. See Andrew L. Kaufman, A Commentary on Pepper's
"The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role," 1986 AM. B. FouND. Rus. J. 651, 652.
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instead, it is a rational recognition of the rule of law in a democratic
society. The lawyer's role, on this account, is instrumental-to pro-
vide expertise that clients lack and in assisting clients in pursuing their
interests. 178 It also functions as a check on government power, by dif-
fusing power away from the state in favor of individuals.179 Thus, un-
like the justification provided by the lawyer-as-friend conception,
under the autonomy model the commitment to one's client follows
not from a personal, affective sense of attachment, but from rational
assent to institutional norms.
It is worth asking, however, whether the pure agency model is
either descriptively accurate' 80 or normatively attractive when applied
to the lawyer-client relationship. Just as one is not justified, solely on
the basis of the value of friendship, in protecting one's friend who has
committed a terrible wrong, a lawyer is notjustified, merely by appeal-
ing to her client's autonomy, in facilitating any nefarious objective the
client may intend to accomplish.' 8 ' The Mafia consigliere enhances the
family's autonomy, but no one would grant the moral worth of the
consigliere's role solely for that reason. The defense of the value of
loyalty on autonomy or rule-of-law grounds must acknowledge that if
the client seeks by her actions to subvert the rule of law, the lawyer
cannot then appeal to the protection of the client's legal rights as a
178 See Anthony T. Kronman, The Fault in Legal Ethics, 100 DICK. L. REV. 489,
494-95 (1996) (identifying republican and contractarian traditions in American legal
ethics).
179 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences: One Value
Among Many or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. CoLo. L. REV. 349, 355 (1981) (stating
that, for a lawyer, loyalty is "the obligation to serve his clients rather than to become
part of the official machinery that judges them"); Stephen L. Pepper, Autonomy, Com-
munity, and Lawyers'Ethics, 19 CAP. U. L. REv. 939, 958 (1990). Pepper overstates his
case in this article by claiming that " [t] his is the currently accepted understanding of
the lawyer's role .... " Id. (emphasis added). For Pepper, the lawyer's obligation to
respect the community's norms entails only a duty to provide access to the law for the
client. But, as the jurisprudential argument above shows, the "law" cannot be made
accessible to clients without an understanding of non-textual, or non-conventional
political principles.
180 See generally Deborah DeMott, The Lanyer as Agent, 67 FoRDHam L. REV. 301
(1998).
181 Joseph Raz makes a similar point about the value of autonomy in political the-
ory. "Autonomy is valuable only if exercised in pursuit of the good. The ideal of
autonomy requires only the availability of morally acceptable options." JOSEPH RAZ,
THE MOlALr OF FREEDOM 381 (1986). Raz's argument has deep implications, for it
calls into question the common assumption of liberal political theory that autonomy
is intrinsically valuable; Raz and others claim that autonomy should be valued only
insofar as it permits people to realize other, more basic, human goods. See id.; see also
ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL (1993).
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justification for facilitating the client's conduct. 8 2 This is why other
mechanisms for protecting clients' rights, like the attorney-client privi-
lege, are qualified by exceptions for cases where the client seeks to
perpetrate a crime or fraud. Even in the absence of specific articu-
lated legal rules, however, other forms of conduct, such as the abusive
questioning of plaintiffs in the Dalkon Shield litigation, can be said to
interfere with the orderly process for adjudicating legal claims on
their merit, and therefore to undermine the functioning of the legal
system of which the lawyer is a part. Thus, some restrictions on law-
yers' activities may be justified, even though they reduce client auton-
omy, on the ground that the restrictions enhance the ability of the
legal system to channel societal disputes into an orderly process of
resolution.
Furthermore, the autonomy justification for the principle of loy-
alty, taken too far, reduces lawyers merely to amoral technicians, who
bring to the lawyer-client relationship nothing more than expertise in
the complex apparatus of the legal system. This conception of the
lawyer's role eliminates valued traits such as prudence and profes-
sional judgment, which are important goods the lawyer brings to a
representation. The moral tradition of the practice of lawyering, as
elaborated through official statements of the organized bar, judicial
decisions, legislation, and academic and public commentary, reveals a
much more nuanced role for lawyers. In particular, lawyers owe du-
ties to nonclients-affected third parties, courts and other tribunals,
and the judicial system or the rule of law-that are not imposed on
nonlawyer agents. These duties, which will be discussed below under
the rubrics of justice and care, require lawyers to contend with con-
flicting obligations that would not be imposed on ordinary agents.
Like the friendship model, the autonomy model fails to explain why
the good of increasing one's client's autonomy should override the
public's interest in preventing unjustified harm to others. 83 In short,
respecting and enhancing one's client's autonomy is certainly a dis-
tinct feature of the morality of the practice of lawyering, but it is far
from the only one. To put the point another way, the autonomy of
clients is not intrinsically valuable. "[P]ursuit of the morally repug-
nant cannot be defended from coercive interference [for example, by
lawyers preventing their clients from making immoral choices] on the
ground that being an autonomous choice endows it with any
value."184
182 See Gordon, supra note 110; Subin, supra note 158, at 1162.
183 See Kaufman, supra note 177, at 653.
184 RAz, supra note 181, at 418.
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2. Loyalty and Client Selection.
A frequently encountered problem in legal ethics literature isjus-
tifying the representation of clients with whom the lawyer disagrees.
This dilemma is often posed in stark form by lawyers who represent
utterly reprehensible clients, such as the Ku Klux Klan, "Ivan the Ter-
rible," or Larry Flynt.'8 5 The representation of abhorrent clients di-
rectly implicates the nature of the lawyer's moral agency. Is the lawyer
an amoral hired gun, in no way morally implicated in her client's evil?
Or, must the lawyer make the moral decision that representing a par-
ticular client is justified?
One strategy for avoiding this debate is to imagine the client not
as a person, but as an abstract principle or right. In this argument,
what matters is not that the particular client be able to assert her
rights, but that the rights themselves be established or defended. The
lawyer thus considers herself the loyal friend or defender of a good
constitutional principle, not an evil client. This argument is often ad-
vanced by civil libertarian lawyers who work for unpopular clients.
The Jewish lawyer who argued in favor of the Nazis' right to march in
Skokie, Illinois was not motivated to increase the Nazis' freedom to
terrorize his people; instead, he located the value of his efforts in the
goal of vindicating important First Amendment values.'86 A decision
prohibiting the Nazis from marching might be used as precedent to
keep a civil rights group from demonstrating in the future. Similarly,
Anthony Griffin, a black lawyer who represented the Ku Klux Klan,
185 See the debate between Michael Tigar and Monroe Freedman over Tigar's rep-
resentation ofJohn Demjanjuk in Monroe H. Freedman, The Lauyer's Moral Obligation
of Justiication, 74 TEx. L. RrV. 111 (1995) [hereinafter Freedman, Moral Obligation],
Michael E. Tigar, Defending, 74 TEx. L. REV. 101 (1995) [hereinafter Tigar, Defend-
ing], Monroe H. Freedman, Must You Be the Devil's Advocate?, LEGAL TiMEs, Aug. 23,
1994, at 19 [hereinafter Freedman, Devil's Advocate], and Michael E. Tigar, Setting the
Record Straight on the Defense ofJohn Demjanjuk, LEGAL TiMEs, Sept. 6, 1993, at 22 [here-
inafter Tigar, Record]. This exchange is particularly noteworthy because the dispu-
tants have both reversed their positions over the years. In 1970, Tigar argued that the
law firm mentioned by Simon Rifkind did have an obligation to ask whether it should
allow its services to be used by General Motors (GM). "I am not criticizing Wilmer,
Cutler & Pickering for going all out on behalf of their clients. I am criticizing them
for the choice of their clients that they choose to go all out on behalf of." Freedman,
Moral Obligation, supra, at 112 (quoting Michael E. Tigar, Debate at George Washing-
ton University Law School 7 (1990) (transcript on file with the Texas Law Review)).
Freedman took Rifkind's point of view, arguing that law students should not criticize
lawyers for zealously advocating GM's cause. The precise words exchanged at the
1970 debate are hotly disputed; I am relying on Freedman's account, which he asserts
is supported by a videotape of the exchange. See id. at 112 n.9.
186 See ARYEH NEiER, DFENDNG MY ENEMY (1979).
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defended his actions in terms of the constitutional principle the Klan
sought to uphold. 187 A state agency had sought to compel the Klan to
disclose its membership list and Griffin, on behalf of the ACLU, re-
sisted this effort. Opponents of civil rights had previously sought dis-
closure of the NAACP's membership lists, a ploy that was rejected by
the Supreme Court.18 8 For Griffin, representing the Klan was a means
to ensure that the right of free association, which had protected the
NAACP in the past, would remain inviolate. These lawyers were not
the full-time advocates and counselors for the Nazis and the Klan-
they stepped in only when an important constitutional principle was
threatened; thus, they were able to claim plausibly that their clients
were not the hateful organizations, but abstract political rights such as
free speech and freedom of association.189
The conception of rights-as-clients is, however, too readily gener-
alized into a reason for undertaking any representation at all. Sub-
stantive rights, like freedom of speech and association, are not the
only rights a lawyer may claim to represent. A lawyer may also con-
ceive of herself as representing the procedural right of every citizen to
have her day in court.190 This conceptual move collapses the civil lib-
ertarian argument into the justification of advocacy as a means of in-
creasing the client's autonomy. However, the putative procedural
right is absolutely insensitive to the substantive claims made upon the
judicial system by the client, and is therefore unable to discriminate
between clients who have varying entitlements to occupy judicial at-
tention with their claims. A client who wishes judicial approval to do
X which is permitted in our society, has an entitlement to court re-
sources, while a client who seeks to do Y, which is not allowed, is not
entitled to waste the court's time on a frivolous claim.191
The conception of loyalty just described requires a safety valve for
conscientious objectors. David Wilkins argues powerfully that a black
lawyer must consider his loyalty to the black community when decid-
ing whether to represent the Klan. If Anthony Griffin had made the
187 See David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer
Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1030 (1995). A description of this
case is also found in RHODE, supra note 38, at 154-55.
188 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
189 See LuBAN, supra note 21, at 161-62.
190 See David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relation-
ship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1008-09 (1990).
191 See SIMON, supra note 21, at 26-52; see also Nathan M. Crystal, Limitations on
Zealous Representation in an Adversarial System, 32 WArE FoREST L. REV. 671 (1997) (ar-
guing that frivolous claims are disallowed in light of the purpose of the adversarial
system of resolving disputes).
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opposite choice, we should respect him for having the integrity to
stand with his community against the Klan.19 2 The right to counsel is
not absolute-the client is not entitled to demand that the lawyer do
something beyond the bounds of permissible advocacy. 193 There are
numerous individuals who act without counsel in legal proceedings,
even in cases where the government seeks to deprive them of some
important benefit. Moreover, no lawyer is compelled to represent a
particular client in a case where the client would be able to secure
alternate representation. 9 4 These considerations show that the law-
yer has discretion to choose not to serve a particular cause. 1 95 As we
192 See Wilkins, supra note 187, at 1040-43, 1059-60.
193 See id. at 1034.
194 The qualification in this sentence is necessary to avoid the "last lawyer in town"
problem, in which the lawyer's decision whether to represent a potential client is
made with knowledge that there are no other lawyers available to provide the desired
legal services. Wilkins concedes that lawyers face different moral questions when de-
ciding whether to represent a client with no other alternative. See id. at 1038, 1040.
For a general description of this problem, see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBiLrr EG 2-29 (1997) ("When a lawyer is appointed by a court or requested by a bar
association to undertake representation of a person unable to obtain counsel... he
should not seek to be excused from undertaking the representation except for com-
pelling reasons."), and Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the CivilAdvocate, in THE GOOD
LAWYER, supra note 93, at 150, 168-69.
195 This discretion may be limited by antidiscrimination laws, as shown by a recent
decision of a Massachusetts civil rights agency, disciplining a lawyer for limiting her
divorce practice only to women. See Steve Berenson, Politics and Plurality in a Lawyer's
Choice of Clients: The Case of Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1998);
Martha Minow, Foreword: Of Legal Ethics, Taxis, and Doing the Right Thing, 20 W. N-v
ENG. L. REV. 5 (1998). The lawyer testified that she sought to "devote her expertise to
eliminating gender bias in the court system." Bruce K. Miller, Lawyers'Identities, Client
Selection and the Antidiscrimination Principle: Thoughts on the Sanctioning ofJudith Nathan-
son, 20 W. Nav ENG. L. REv. 93, 94-95 (1998) (quoting Stropnicky v. Nathanson, No.
91-BPA-0061 (Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination Feb. 25, 1997)). She also
claimed that she was able to function effectively as an advocate only on behalf of those
clients to whose cause she felt a personal commitment. See id. at 95. Ironically, the
Massachusetts agency's decision is ultimately an impediment to the goal of eliminat-
ing discrimination, because it prevents clients from seeking ideologically compatible
lawyers if the clients identify those lawyers by racial or sexual characteristics. How-
ever, the agency's statutory interpretation is reasonable: there is no exemption for
lawyers from the public accommodation statute, and lawyers are generally free to dis-
criminate on other grounds, such as against representing defendants in personal in-
jury cases or working for management in labor disputes, as long as the discrimination
does not impinge upon a statutorily protected class. See id. at 96. For another analysis
of these issues, see Robert T. Begg, Revoking the Lawyers' License to Discriminate in New
York: The Demise of a Traditional Professional Prerogative, 7 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 275
(1993).
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have seen, Simon, Freedman, 196 and Wilkins urge lawyers to exercise
that discretion in a particular way, in favor of clients whose projects
will promote substantive justice. These critics, I think, are correct to
maintain that lawyers are not required to represent causes they find
repugnant. They may decline the representation because of loyalty to
one's community or for impartial considerations of justice.
3. Loyalty in the Lawyer-Client Relationship
Many of the thorniest problems in professional ethics involve law-
yers who have already entered into a representation relationship with
a client. For these lawyers, the ethical issue does not center on
whether to accept the representation, but how one should act on be-
half of one's client. In these cases, loyalty means championing the
client's interest, as the client sees it, in opposition to the interests of
third parties, social justice, and the lawyer's self-interest.1 97 The prin-
ciple of loyalty in the lawyer-client relationship derives from the law of
agency, although it differs from agency precepts in significant re-
spects.198 Generally, courts have held lawyers to the highest standards
of fair dealing in their relationships with clients. 19 9 Judicial state-
196 A separate cite here to Monroe Freedman's work is useful, since he is often
made into a punching bag by critics who insist on a wider role for personal values in
lawyering and claim that Freedman's conception of lawyering is systematically amoral.
See, e.g., Leslie H. Griffin, The Lauyer's Dirty Hands, 8 GEo.J. LEGAL ETHics 219 (1995).
In fact, Freedman has consistently maintained that a lawyer has discretion to make a
moral decision whether or not to represent a particular client. See FREEDMAN, supra
note 110, at 49 ("[A] lawyer should indeed have the freedom to choose clients on any
standard he or she deems appropriate."); Monroe H. Freedman, Ethical Ends and Ethi-
cal Means, 41J. LEGAL EDUC. 55 (1991); Monroe H. Freedman, Personal Responsibility in
a Professional System, 27 GATH. U. L. REV. 191 (1978); see also supra note 185.
197 See MODEL RuLEs OF PRoFEssIoNAL CoNDucr Rule 1.2(a) (1998) (stating that
subject to limited exceptions, "[a] lawyer should abide by a client's decisions concern-
ing the objectives of representation"); RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
L.xwvrYs § 28 cmt. c (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) ("The client, not the lawyer,
determines the goals to be pursued, subject to the lawyer's duty not to do or assist an
unlawful act.").
198 See L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lauyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY LJ.
909 (1980).
199 Bernard Williams suggests that the domain of professional ethics generally is
the protection of clients in sensitive areas of their interests against the self-interest of
the fiduciary. See Bernard Williams, Politics and Moral Character, in PUBLC AND PRI-
VATE MoRAITV 55 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978). These statements by state courts are
typical of the descriptions offered of the lawyer's duty toward her client:
[T] he relationship between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature,
and their dealings with each other are subject to the same scrutiny as a trans-
action between trustee and beneficiary .... Specifically, the relationship
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ments of the lawyer's duty of loyalty owe a great deal to Judge Car-
dozo, who stated the nature of a fiduciary duty in lapidary prose:
Many forms of conduct[,] permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary
ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
2 0 0
From the standpoint of the law of lawyering, the principle of loy-
alty is the foundation of many of the strictest imperatives governing
the behavior of lawyers, including the obligation not to reveal confi-
dential information,2 0 1 the prohibition on representing conflicting in-
terests, 20 2 the obligation not to engage in self-dealing in relationships
with one's client,203 and even the basic duty of providing competent
services.
2 0 4
between attorney and client has been described as one of uberrima fides,
which means, "most abundant good faith," requiring absolute and perfect
candor, openness and honesty, and the absence of any concealment or
deception.
Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex. App. 1991).
An attorney owes to his client the high duty to diligently, faithfully and legiti-
mately perform every act necessary to protect, conserve and advance the in-
terests of his client No deviation from that duty can be permitted. That
principle of conduct is a stern and inflexible rule controlling the relation-
ship of attorney and client so long as the relation exists.
Bank of Mill Creek v. Elk Horn Coal Co., 57 S.E.2d 736, 748 (W. Va. 1950).
200 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). Cardozo goes on to say
that a trusteeship is a relationship "through which preference of self is made
subordinate to loyalty to others." Id. at 548. The influence of Cardozo's language is
noted in H. Jefferson Powell, "Cardozo's Foot: The Chancellor's Conscience and Construc-
tive Trusts, 56 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 7, 16-20 (1993). As Powell observed, judges
hardly ever discuss the facts or holding of this case, leaving Cardozo's words to stand
for ajudicial attitude, rather than a principle of law. For a useful discussion of fiduci-
ary norms within law partnerships, see Allan W. Vestal, Law Partner Expulsions, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1083 (1998).
201 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILITY Canon 4 (1997); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998) .
202 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBrlY EC 5-14, DR 5-105 (1997);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1998).
203 See 2 RONALD E. MALLEN &JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRAarxCE §§ 14.22-.25
(4th ed. 1996).
204 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrIY Canon 6 (1997); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1998). The need for new lawyers to be
prepared to provide competent services is a major theme of the ABA's MacCrate Re-
port on legal education. See SECTION ON LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, AM.
BAR ASS'N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL
CONTINUUM (1992) [hereinafter MAcCRATE REPORT].
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The imperative of loyalty arises in any lawyer-client relationship,
regardless of whether the lawyer is motivated by community loyalty, a
sense of friendship, or some other preexisting common interest with
her client. Once he has agreed to the representation, Anthony Griffin
is under no less obligation to represent the Klan assiduously than he is
to apply the same industry to his work on behalf of the NAACP. He
owes that organization "the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,"
even though it is dedicated to abhorrent purposes. Furthermore, loy-
alty requires that he submerge his own interests to the Klan's, albeit
only in the context of the litigation. On a mundane level, loyalty may
mean staying late at work to respond to a discovery motion, rather
than attending his child's ballet recital or soccer game. On an affec-
tive level, loyalty requires that he "get fired up" for his client, and
throw himself into the case as though the client's interest were his
own. Where the client is the K, these demands naturally will be
excruciating. Nevertheless, the duty to represent one's client zeal-
ously is a recognition that the lawyer's interest and the client's may
diverge significantly, and that the client's interest must prevail, at least
between the lawyer and client.
Unfortunately, the value of loyalty to one's client has been con-
flated by practicing lawyers into a principle of unyielding zeal that has
been used to justify the worst kind of abusive practices. Witness the
words of the lawyer defending Queen Caroline in a prosecution for
adultery, which have become a staple of professional responsibility
texts and commentary:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person
in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by
all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other per-
sons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and
in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments,
the destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the
duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of
the consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve
his country in confusion.
20 5
205 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (1821), quoted in FREEDMAN, supra note 110, at
65-66, in DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYR 189 (1973), and in WoLF-
RAM, supra note 24, at 580; see also Robert L. Haig & Robert S. Getman, Does "Hardball"
Litigation Produce the Best Result for Your Client?, 65 N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 1993, at 24, 26
(quoting Lord Brougham's speech to justify-incorrectly, in my view-the assertion
that "hardball litigation... goes hand in hand With our system"). The Restatement
recognizes that the word "zealous," which is used to refer to the lawyer's obligation of
loyalty, has been misused to justify unwarranted combativeness in representing cli-
ents. "The term [zeal] sets forth a traditional aspiration, but it should not be misun-
derstood to suggest that lawyers are legally required to function with a certain
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Here we have moved beyond "the punctilio of honor" into the
realm of scorched-earth litigation tactics. The difficult question for
legal ethics is how to recognize the principle of loyalty without permit-
ting lawyers to degenerate into "Rambo" advocates. The answer to
this question depends on the justification for the lawyer's role which, I
contend, should be sketched out along rhetorical lines.
Arguments or other speech acts which have the effect of sub-
verting the system of discourse in which they are offered are not al-
lowed under a rhetorical justification of the lawyer's role. In order to
talk about justice in the first place, we need words to describe the
parties and the facts of the case, but more importantly, a language of
right and wrong, responsibilities and duties, and a rich trove of moral
narratives to illustrate the application of these concepts. 20 6 Some of
these rules and principles may stand in opposition to each other, but
the language of the law and the stories told in that language must
have a sufficient degree of overall coherence in order to function as a
background against which debates about the right and the good may
be conducted. "[W]hat we lawyers do is to maintain that language in
a condition in which it can be used for those purposes by ourselves
and others."20 7 The corollary to this maxim is that lawyers may justifi-
ably be criticized in ethical terms for abusive practices, whereby "abu-
sive" one means practices which tend to undermine the ability of legal
language, stories, and rules to facilitate government under the rule of
law. So pandering to the racial prejudices of ajury in a cloging argu-
ment must be condemned, because the race of the parties is pre-
sumed irrelevant to the resolution of questions of guilt, liability, and
rights. The language of law is not spoken where the speakers appeal
to bigotry. Similarly, abusive discovery practices, like producing mil-
lions of pages of irrelevant documents or making speaking objections
emotion or style of litigating, negotiating, or counseling." RESTATEMENT (THID) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 28 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft 1996). The Restate-
ment view is in line with a more nuanced understanding of the Lord Brougham de-
fense, which was never intended as a maxim of legal ethics. Brougham made his
statement in the context of a parliamentary debate, not ajudicial proceeding, and the
speech was intended as a veiled political threat to King George IV. In any event, given
the extraordinary circumstances of the case, it can hardly be argued that the
Brougham speech has any general applicability; it certainly does not describe the pre-
vailing norms of the English Bar in 1820. I am grateful to Tom Shaffer for pointing
out to me the rich history of this speech, which he sets out in his legal ethics course-
book. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMmICAN LEGAL ETHics: TEXT, READINGS, AND DiscuS-
SION TOPICS 204-06 (1985).
206 SeeJames Boyd White, The Ethics ofArgument: Plato's Gorgias and the Modem Law-
yet, 50 U. Gin. L. REv. 849, 880-81 (1983).
207 Id. at 888.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW[
in depositions, cannot be permitted because they interfere with the
parties' representation in legal language of the factual predicates of
their claims to legal entitlements.
James Boyd White and his literary protagonist, Euphemes, make
an important point here, with which I will conclude the discussion of
loyalty and anticipate some of the arguments in the following section
on justice: legal language cannot contain only impersonal justice-talk.
It also requires terms which reflect the selfish, prudential needs of the
parties, for it is only this part of legal discourse which connects the law
to the real world of human motivations.208 What makes lawyers law-
yers, and not philosopher-kings, is that they speak on behalf of real
people who want something concrete from the state, whether or not
their desires are necessarily congruent with what is best for the public
good. Monroe Freedman is fond of quoting Communist-bloc lawyers
to show the dangers of prioritizing collective justice over individual
autonomy. "In a Socialist state there is no division of duty between
the judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel," a Bulgarian lawyer
says. 20 9 "The defense must assist the prosecution to find the objective
truth in a case. '210 The fault of this lawyer is not expressing a concern
for social justice. Instead the Bulgarian lawyer errs by collapsing the
role of lawyer and judge so completely that the lawyer neglects to con-
ceive of the claims of individuals to justice.21 1 Justice is not some
freely floating, Platonic concept. It is a relationship among individu-
als, and between individuals and the state, that must be assessed in
terms of particular disputes in which the parties assert divergent
claims to legal entitlements. The strength of the rhetorical model of
advocacy is that it does not give undue weight to either social justice
or the client's desires, but recognizes that the role of the lawyer is to
mediate between both, in a linguistic process of disputation between
actual persons.
208 See id. at 888-89.
209 MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 2 (1975)
(quoting Communist-bloc lawyers).
210 Id. (quoting Communist-bloc lawyers).
211 This example is somewhat misleading, since the Bulgarian lawyer is working
within a civil-law system in which lawyers do have a duty to assist government bureau-
crats in the search for truth; it is not necessarily the socialist political order, but the
civil law tradition that determines the Bulgarian lawyer's duties. See generally John
Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985) (dis-
cussing the differences between a common-law (United States) and civil-law (West
Germany) lawyering paradigm). (I am indebted to Mark Drumbl for pointing out the
limitation of Freedman's analogy here.) Nevertheless, Freedman's basic argument is
unaffected-lawyers in a common-law system primarily speak on behalf of a party's
claim vis-a-vis the state or private actors, not in terms of the good for society at large.
[VOL- 75:1
1999] PUBLIC VALUES AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 63
B. Justice
1. The Obligation to Seek Justice
One conception of legal ethics holds that a lawyer ought to be
dedicated, above all, to achieving social justice or improving the pub-
lic welfare. 2 12 Naturally, the first task for proponents of this view is to
explain what they mean by securingjustice. A thorough-going version
of the justice conception-"social engineering"-would have the law-
yer striving to implement the political values on which there is general
society-wide agreement.21 3 A less ambitious version would teach law-
yers not to work exclusively for the public good, but simply to ensure
that legal services are available to those who cannot afford them. His-
torically this latter version has been the way ofjustice-oriented concep-
tions of legal ethics. The Ford Foundation jump-started professional
responsibility teaching in the 1960s by awarding grants for clinical
legal education, the purpose of which was to ensure "the distribution
of . . . legal services to all segments of the public including the
poor."214 Interestingly, Ford chose not to emphasize instruction in
professional ethics, which it defined as "the moral norms that regulate
the personal relationships of law practice. '21 5 More recently, the ABA
Professionalism Committee has also chosen to emphasize distribu-
tional concerns, by including a commitment by law firms to pro bono
212 See, e.g., Henry Rose, Law Schools Should Be About Justice Too, 40 CLEv. ST. L. REV.
443, 449 (1992) ("Being a lawyer... should include a commitment to use one's skills
to improve the social order and to remedy injustice."); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique,
Nove, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988). Some critical legal
scholars have called for an overtly political method ofjudging, which would entail a
social-engineering conception of lawyering. "Asked how he would decide a case, for
example, Mark Tushnet said, 'My answer, in brief, is to make an explicitly political
judgment: which result, is in the circumstances now existing, likely to advance the
cause of socialism.'" LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERAUSM 83
(1996). Presumably a lawyer with similar political commitments would evaluate her
ethical obligations in terms of which actions are likely to advance the cause of
socialism.
213 See Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 247, 258 (1978); see also Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, in
BusINEss-A PROFESSION (1914).
214 Robert Condlin, The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education, in THE GOOD LAw-
YER, supra note 93, at 317, 333. For another account of the history of the so-called
CLEPR program, see James E. Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential Education, and
Professional Responsibility, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 71, 92-93 (1996).
215 Condlin, supra note 214, at 333.
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services among its recommendations for increasing the level of profes-
sionalism among practicing lawyers.
216
A weaker, but more generally applicable version of the principle
that a lawyer must seek justice may be located in any one of the well-
known cases in which lawyers placed unwarranted emphasis on their
duty of loyalty, to the detriment of some third party. For example, in
the O.P.M. Leasing scandal, lawyers representing a company that ob-
tained fraudulent loans maintained an attitude of wilful blindness to-
ward their client's activities. 217 When an officer of the company
eventually disclosed the fraud to the law firm, the lawyers promptly
sought out an ethics expert to validate their continuing representa-
tion of O.P.M. Essentially, the expert told the lawyers that they were
not required by the state disciplinary rules to notify third parties that
loan documents prepared by the lawyers may have been fraudulent. 218
This advice was based on the primacy of the lawyers' duty of confiden-
tiality, which is of course a corollary to the principle of loyalty. The
law firm eventually resigned, but not until closing more loans with
fraudulent documents, again without notifying any of the affected par-
ties that it had reason to doubt the veracity of the documents. When
the house of cards finally collapsed and O.P.M. entered bankruptcy,
the lawyers' role was revealed, and the bankruptcy trustee was out-
raged. "No rule of professional ethics can or should exempt lawyers
from the general legal proscription against willful blindness to their
clients' crimes. '219 Or as a federal judge wrote decades before the
O.P.M. case:
In our complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's
opinion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more po-
tent than the chisel or the crowbar.... Congress... could not have
intended that men holding themselves out as members of these an-
216 See SEcrION ON LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, AMERIcAN BAR ASS'N,
TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFEssIONALIsM app. D (1996) [hereinafter PROFES-
SIONALISM].
217 An extensive set of documents from this case is reprinted in THE SocIAL RE-
SPONSIBILITIES OF LAWYERS 184 (Philip B. Heymann & Lance Liebman eds., 1988). For
a general discussion of the case, see Robert N. Treiman, Inter-Lawyer Communication
and the Prevention of Client Fraud: A Look Back at O.P.M., 34 UCLA L. REV. 925 (1987).
218 See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Ethics and the Law: A Case History, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1983,
(Magazine), at 31.
219 In re O.P.M. Leasing Serv., 28 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). In a similar
vein are the often-reported words ofJudge Stanley Sporkin, commenting on the fail-
ure of Lincoln Savings and other savings and loan institutions: "Where were these
professionals... ? Why didn't any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from
the transactions?" Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C.
1990).
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cient professions should be able to escape criminal liability on a
plea of ignorance when they have shut their eyes to what was plainly
to be seen .... 220
We may represent the "general legal proscription" referred to by
the trustee and Judge Friendly as the value of justice. Justice, in legal
ethics, does not require that lawyers seek the greatest good for society;
rather, it serves as a check on the partisan zeal that would otherwise
license the lawyers' conduct in O.P.M. It essentially builds a compo-
nent of public-mindedness into the professional obligations of a law-
yer, so that the lawyer is charged not only with her client's good, but
with the duty to acknowledge and take seriously the good of society as
a whole.221 As stated by Court of Appeals Judge Harry Edwards: "The
ethical lawyer should only advance reasonable interpretations of the
authoritative texts-interpretations that are plausible from a public-
regarding point of view."
222
220 United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964).
221 The American Bar Association's Professionalism Committee defines a "profes-
sional" lawyer as follows: "[An expert in law pursuing a learned art in service to cli-
ents and in the spirit of public service; and engaging those pursuits as part of a common
calling to promote justice and the public good." PRoFESSIoNALISM, supra note 216, at
6 (emphasis added). This definition is borrowed from Roscoe Pound. See RoscoE
POUND, THE LA-YER FROM ANTIQUrlY TO MODERN Tims 5 (1953) (characterizing a
profession as "pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public ser-
vice"). Unfortunately, the ABA's analysis is hopelessly circular, because the key
phrase "in the spirit of public service" is defined by the committee as follows: "A law-
yer representing individual clients and zealously advocating their interests in a profes-
sional manner is engaged in public service." PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 216, at 6 n.22
(emphasis added). Since "professional" or "in a professional manner" was the term
for which we were seeking a definition in the first place, the ABA's report simply begs
the question.
222 Edwards, supra note 7, at 59. Compare this "proposed professional
resolution":
In civil matters it shall be unprofessional conduct for a lawyer to assert any
legal doctrine or rule on behalf of a client unless the lawyer has a good faith
belief that the assertion of the doctrine or rule in the particular case will
further a policy behind the doctrine or rule.
Kenney Hegland, Quibbles, 67 TEx. L. REV. 1491, 1494 (1989). The policy behind a
rule is a principle of political morality that justifies the doctrine as a matter of social
justice. Hegland acknowledges that his colleagues have called his proposal "lunacy,"
but insists that in the long run, judges will adapt legal rules to fit social justice, so
quibbling in the short run is ultimately corrosive of the rule of law. The manifold
judicial exceptions created to restrain unjust procedural gambits by lawyers will ulti-
mately hasten the trend in the legal system away from deciding cases according to
legal rules to makingjudgments according to factual gestalt. See id. at 1495, 1510-12.
Of course, Hegland's proposal merely shifts the decision-according-to-gestalt process
from judges to lawyers. Why should lawyers, not judges, be trusted with this decision
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Note that the principle relied upon by the bankruptcy trustee
and elaborated by Judge Edwards is not a rule of professional disci-
pline promulgated by the organized bar. Indeed, the ABA has taken
precisely the opposite position in Model Rule 1.6, which was drafted
after the O.P.M. scam was revealed. 223 In the wake of the Lincoln
Savings collapse, many representatives of the organized bar argued
that the conduct of Kaye, Scholer in its representation of Lincoln Sav-
ings was appropriate under the bar's conception of professional
norms, despite the contrary conclusion of the Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion.224 These conflicts show that although the traditions and self-un-
derstanding of the legal profession may illustrate the public values of
lawyering, other sources of normative input remain.22 5 Courts and
legislatures are the most obvious institutions whose vision of ethical
legal practice may be at odds with lawyers' conceptions, but other in-
stitutions, such as the press and the public, at large also play a role.
Thus, lawyers are not free simply to define for themselves their own
moral obligations in a vacuum, without taking into account the diver-
gent views of other actors.
William Simon has proposed a similar resolution of the conflict
between a lawyer's duty of loyalty and the obligation to take into ac-
count the interests of third parties or society as a whole: "Lawyers
should take actions that, considering the relevant circumstances of
the particular case, seem likely to promote justice."226 'justice" in this
formulation is emphatically not equivalent to the personal moral be-
liefs about social justice that the lawyer may happen to hold. Instead,
making authority? Hegland is aware of the paradox, but offers no way out of it, ex-
cept to claim the virtue for his proposal that it enhances justice in the short run.
(Simon makes a similar argument in The Practice ofJustice. See SIMON, supra note 21, at
53-76.)
223 See Susan P. Koniak, When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others Frame it to
Their Will, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1098-1101 (1993).
224 See Wilkins, supra note 136, at 1148-49, 1167-68. This tension is reminiscent
of the classic torts case, The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932), in which Judge
Learned Hand held that the general custom among tugboat owners not to equip their
vessels with radios was not conclusive of the question of whether they had breached
their duty of care. Hand wrote, "[T]here are precautions so imperative that even
their universal disregard will not excuse their omission." Id. at 740.
225 See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (stating that "prevailing profes-
sional norms" warranted a lawyer's threat to withdraw if his client committed perjury,
even though there was no specific disciplinary rule requiring withdrawal in that case);
United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 457 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[A] general
duty of candor to the court exists in connection with an attorney's role as an officer of
the court.").
226 SIMON, supra note 21, at 138.
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for Simon justice is equivalent to "legal merit. '227 Simon takes a
Dworkinian view of the concept of legal merit: to determine legal
merit one must look at not only the conventionally-specified legal
texts such as statutes and court decisions, but also to more general
norms of political morality which undergird and lend legitimacy to
the legal system. The paradigm for Simon's model of ethical decision
making is the judge, or perhaps a public prosecutor, who makes en-
forcement decisions based on considerations of legal merit and scarce
resources. 228 Although the lawyer need not reach the same conclu-
sions as she would as a judge or prosecutor, the point is that she
should use the same reasoning process, paying attention to context,
substance, and the broader societal interests affected by the
representation.
An objection immediately suggests itself: lawyers are not judges;
they have a fiduciary obligation to their clients, and in an adversarial,
common-law adjudicatory system are not permitted to adopt the view-
point ofjudges, who do not speak on behalf of a party to a dispute. In
many cases, responds Simon, this argument is simply spurious. In
some circumstances, the lawyers are in a better position than ajudge
to make determinations about justice-perhaps they have access to a
document or another piece of information their adversary lacks, or
perhaps the lawyer knows that ajudge is likely to rule incorrectly on a
motion. Familiar cases like Spaulding v. Zimmenrman2 29 trade on just
such institutional imbalances in information to create ethical dilem-
mas. In Spaulding, because of the plaintiff's doctor's oversight, the
defendant's lawyer and the physician retained by the defense were the
only potential source of information regarding the true severity of the
plaintiff's injury. On the modest assumption that the settlement nego-
tiated by the parties would be substantively just only if it reflected the
true nature of the harm suffered by the plaintiff, the defendant's law-
yer's behavior must be called subversive of a substantively just out-
come in that case. Of course, the lawyer would claim that he was
acting in furtherance of procedural justice; that is, he was justified in
withholding the information because doing substantive justice is
someone else'sjob. If the plaintiffs doctor missed his patient's aortic
aneurysm, and the plaintiff's lawyer was thereby unaware of how badly
227 See id.
228 See Simon, supra note 81, at 1093; cf MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILrlY EC 7-13 (1997) (stating that the responsibility of public prosecutor is to seek
justice, not merely to convict).
229 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962); see also supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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his client had been injured, so be it, but the defense lawyer'sjob is not
to correct other people's mistakes.
The linchpin of Simon's response to this argument is his claim
that the appeal to role is differentially justified, depending on the con-
text of the lawyer's work: "[T]he more reliable the relevant proce-
dures and institutions, the less direct responsibility the lawyer need
assume for the substantive justice of the resolution; the less reliable
the procedures and institutions, the more direct responsibility she
needs to assume for substantive justice."23 0 The critical move here is
to focus tightly on the circumstances of particular cases, rather than to
evaluate lawyers' conduct based on hypothetical situations. In Spauld-
ing, the correct phrasing of the ethical question should be, "given that
the plaintiffs doctor blew the diagnosis, what should the defense law-
yer do?" This contextual framing of the issue stands in contrast to the
usual perspective on litigation ethics, which is to pose the question in
much more general terms, such as "do lawyers have a duty to disclose
information that their adversary could have obtained through the ex-
ercise of reasonable diligence?" Simon correctly observes that a cer-
tain slipperiness with framing pervades legal ethics discourse. As an
example he cites Monroe Freedman, who has prominently argued
that a criminal defense lawyer is entitled to cross-examine a truthful
witness aggressively in order to make that witness's testimony seem
inaccurate and secure an acquittal for the defendant.23 1 The plausi-
bility of Freedman's conclusion depends on the fact that the client is,
in fact, innocent but lacks a convincing alibi witness. From this argu-
ment, Freedman seeks to draw a general conclusion that a criminal
defense lawyer is entitled to seek to impeach all witnesses, whether or
not the client is innocent of the crime charged. But the rightness of
one's moral conviction in the case described may depend on the inno-
cence of the client, and may not extend to a case in which the client is
guilty. Additional steps are required in this argument to establish that
the same considerations that justify the lawyer's vigorous cross-exami-
nation in the case imagined by Freedman, where the client is inno-
cent but lacks a solid alibi, are present in the case where the client is
guilty. A substantial portion of Simon's book, The Practice ofJustice, is
devoted to resisting this kind of argumentative slippage, employed in
the attempt to establish categorical ethical norms for lawyers.
Simon succeeds in demonstrating that lawyers cannot use argu-
ments from just outcomes to excuse conduct which has the effect of
interfering with the apparatus that is in place to bring about the out-
230 SIMON, supra note 21, at 140.
231 See id. at 149-50.
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come. (He also gives a guarded endorsement to certain kinds of fo-
rensic trickery if the lawyer knows that the tactics are likely to
contribute to a fair decision on the merits of the case.28 2) A different
kind of case is more troublesome for a lawyer who seeks to promote
social justice-the familiar situation of a lawyer and client who disa-
gree about the very nature of a just society. Here is where the argu-
ment, "a lawyer is not ajudge," has some bite. For while we can easily
see how a lawyer is just as capable as ajudge of reaching an objective
judgment about the seriousness of the plaintiff's injury in Spaulding, a
very different problem is presented by a case in which the relevant
facts are known to the tribunal, but the decision turns on the resolu-
tion of contested legal, political, or moral issues. The next Section
considers this situation in greater depth.
2. Disagreement with Clients and Deliberation About Justice
In a Panglossian world, a lawyer working for justice would simul-
taneously advance her client's interests, and the demands of justice
and the duty of loyalty would never conflict. In a classic example of
this kind of convergence, then-attorney Louis Brandeis was represent-
ing the owner of a shoe factory in a labor dispute.238 In front of the
union's lawyer, Brandeis told his client that the union was "absolutely
right" in the dispute and explained how the problem could be re-
solved to everyone's mutual satisfaction. As a result, the factory owner
changed his employment practices, the workers were happy, and the
company prospered. (One expects the story to end with the workers
and managers holding hands in a circle, singing "Kumbaya.")
From this story, Gutmann draws the lesson that a lawyer should
be prepared to deliberate with her client about doing what is right,
rather than refusing to do what is wrong, or to manipulating the client
into doing the right thing: "Had Brandeis deceived McElwain or sim-
ply quit as his legal counsel because he deemed McElwain's cause un-
just, the story would illustrate a weakness of the justice conception as
commonly articulated, rather than its potential strength.
'234
Instead, says Gutmann, social justice is something that lawyers can
talk about with their clients. 23 5 The lawyer and client should be pre-
pared to work together to ascertain what justice demands. If the op-
ponent's position is genuinely just, a rational, morally conscientious
232 See id. at 143.
233 See Amy Gutmann, Can Virtue Be Taught to Lauryers?, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1759,
1763-64 (1993).
234 Id. at 1764.
235 See Rubin, supra note 137, at 591-92.
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client presumably should be persuaded to adopt it. Gutmann cau-
tions lawyers not to assume that the first words out of a client's mouth
represent the client's informed preference. For example, a divorcing
spouse may say that he doesn't want to pay his soon-to-be ex-spouse a
single dime; the lawyer, acting on this statement may proceed with
scorched earth litigation to ruin the opposing party financially.236 If
the lawyer had stopped to educate the client about the wrongfulness
or the adverse consequences of a hard-line litigation strategy, the cli-
ent might have changed his mind.2 3 7 Of course, the lawyer should
also be open to possible persuasion that the client's position is just,
even if she is initially inclined to disagree with it. The lawyer's open-
ness to persuasion distinguishes Gutmann's proposal from mere
preaching.
Gutmann is careful to insist that lawyers who work for justice
must never treat their clients merely as means to the end of a just
social order. Lawyers are not social engineers. The imperative to do
justice, for Gutmann, means that the lawyer and client should deliber-
ate conscientiously about the demands of morality. This is a more
attractive option than the suggestion, sometimes encountered in the
literature, that lawyers should either agree with their clients, refuse to
represent them, or swallow hard and admit that they are prostituting
themselves to make a living. However, Gutmann does not have much
to say about the case in which the client is not persuaded by the law-
yer's account of what justice requires. Brandeis in this story is fortu-
nate that his client listened to his moral counseling. If McElwain had
told Brandeis to play hardball, the story would have lacked its utopian
ending, but may have been more typical of lawyers' experiences. So,
too, if Gutmann's hypothetical divorce client sticks to his guns and
says that he really, really means it when he says he wants to ruin his
wife. I have represented clients who have said, in effect, "sure I see
236 See Gutmann, supra note 233, at 1761-62. This example is reminiscent of
Monroe Freedman's "bomber," who seeks only to "strip[ ] the husband of every
penny and piece of property he has, at whatever cost to the personal relations and
children, and anything else." Monroe Freedman, A Gathering of Legal Scholars to Dis-
cuss "Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct," 35 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 639, 652-53 (1981).
237 Note that in cases where a lawyer elects to disclose confidential information in
order to prevent death, serious bodily injury, or substantial financial loss to a third
party, the Restatement requires the lawyer first to attempt to persuade the client to
rectify the situation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAWV GOVERNING LAWYERS
§§ 117A(2), 117B(3) (Proposed Final Draft 1998).
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the other side's point, but I disagree with it, and I want you to fight
this claim with whatever legal means we have available.
'23 8
The "legal means available" will frequently be a procedural gam-
bit, ambiguously worded statute, or a creative, but nonfivolous legal
argument, that would permit the client to achieve its objectives. Si-
mon offers several examples of these devices: structuring a taxicab
company as numerous, nominally independent corporations to mini-
mize exposure of assets to tort liability;239 an agribusiness company
obtaining subsidized water intended for family farmers by holding
land through individual trustees, all under the company's control, of
course;240 and the familiar case in which a debtor is pleading the stat-
ute of limitations to avoid paying a legitimate debt.2 41 In these cases
the disagreement between lawyer and client will be focused on
whether to employ these strategies even though they seem to be at
odds with the purposes for which the legal doctrines were created.
Simon argues that the disagreement between lawyer and client may be
resolved uncontroversially if one of the options is only formally permit-
ted by law while the other option better accords with the background
political principles that undergird the legal system. Most legal
ethicists would insist that unless she is prepared to withdraw, the law-
yer must follow her client's wishes and incorporate the individual taxi-
cabs, acquire land through shadow trustees, or plead the statute of
limitations. Simon's critique asks why the lawyer should have no ethi-
cal obligation to ensure that the law is implemented according to its
purposes.2 42 He proposes that where the purposes of the law are
clear, the lawyer is required to respect the principle by refusing to
238 Cf Lee Modjeska, On Teaching Morality to Law Students, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 71
(1991). This brief article reports on the author's moral advice to a client who had
planned to shut down an office on Christmas Eve, throwing his employees out of
work. According to Modjeska, the client's "stony disapproval, then disregard" of his
attempt at ethical deliberation was entirely proper, given his transgression of the role
of lawyer. Id. at 73. Modjeska even goes so far as to say that his professional ability
could reasonably be questioned because he dared to suggest that the client's reorgan-
ization plan was morally problematic. If the client had questioned Modjeska's at-
tempt at deliberation, the fault lies with the client's inability to recognize that legal
advice is inevitably suffused with moral reasoning, not with Modjeska's actions. See id.
For a suggestion that lawyers be required to consider moral issues and third-party inter-
ests, see Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?": Attorney-Client Deliberation
Regarding NonLegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REv. 213 (1990).
239 See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966); SIMON, supra note 21, at
145.
240 See SIMON, supra note 21, at 4-5.
241 See id. at 29.
242 See id. at 145. The purpose of a legal rule should be understood as one which
does not conflict with fundamental principles of political morality, a la Dworkin. See
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manipulate the form of legal rules to defeat the purpose. 243 Where
ambiguity exists in the background principles, however, the lawyer
may accede to her client's desires that the rules be interpreted
formally.
On this account, disagreement between a lawyer and client is, in
many cases, only apparent disagreement. Suppose the agribusiness
company's lawyer uses the trusteeship arrangement on behalf of her
client in order to obtain inexpensive government-subsidized water.
Her moral justification is that although she and her client disagree
about justice, she should err on the side of her client's resolution of a
disputed moral question, because to do otherwise would violate demo-
cratic process values. As Simon shows, there is an implicit premise
concerning the subjectivity and arbitrariness of legal judgments lurk-
ing in this argument.244 This argument may then be undermined by
showing that lawyers believe in the legitimacy of legal judgments when
uttered byjudges. Even in hard cases (to use Dworkin's term), where
no settled rule determines the outcome, judges make legitimate deci-
sions based on principle.245 Lawyers may regard ajudge's decision as
mistaken, but the very argument that it is mistaken betrays their convic-
tion that there are right and wrong answers to legal questions. No
one would argue that a preference for rum raisin over vanilla ice
cream is a mistake-a quirk, an oddity perhaps, but the language of
error seems inappropriate in connection with genuinely subjective
judgments of taste or preference. Simon then asks why, if lawyers
ascribe the possibility of correctness and error to the reasoning of
judges, they cannot accept the same model of reasoning for them-
selves in the context of legal ethics. If lawyers believe that judges can
discover objectively legitimate legal principles, it follows that they
should have faith in their own capacity to elucidate objectively valid
legal judgments regarding their clients' ends, or when considering the
application of legal norms to themselves. Then, they are in a position
to assert these judgments against their clients without the charge of
violating their clients' autonomy. Lawyer and client may disagree, but
one of them must be wrong. If it is the client who is mistaken, there is
no reason why an ethically conscientious lawyer must lend her support
to a legally unjustified cause, merely because the client wishes the law
id. at 146. Thus, I refer interchangeably to "purposes" and "background principles"
when relating Simon's argument here.
243 See id. at 164-65.
244 See Simon, supra note 81, at 1120-25.
245 See DWORKIN, supra note 59, at 81-130.
[VOL- 75:1
1999] PUBLIC VALUES AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 73
were favorable to her interests; no client has a legal or moral right to
injustice.
24 6
One might ask whether Simon places more weight on the objec-
tivity of legal judgments than is warranted. Indeed, he sounds in
places like Dworkin, who has sometimes argued that all legal ques-
tions have a single right answer.2 47 The rhetoric of objectivity and
subjectivity may be somewhat misleading when applied to legal judg-
ments. The legitimacy of legal decisions issued by a judge or lawyer
does not depend on any higher-order meta-ethical thesis about the
objectivity of values.248 Even if values have some objective basis, we
still disagree about these values, and this disagreement can be traced
to divergent beliefs about values. Two judges who asserted the objectiv-
ity of moral values might still disagree about the right result in a par-
ticular case-their moral realism would not change their
disagreement over what they believe the moral facts of the matter to
be. Similarly, the putatively objective basis for legal judgments would
not resolve a dispute between a lawyer and client about the right thing
to do in a particular case, where they hold different beliefs about the
relevant moral facts.
Whatever one thinks about objectivity and moral realism, the fact
remains that conscientious judges, deliberating in good faith, may dis-
agree about justice in particular cases. Simon offers the taxicab hypo-
thetical as a straightforward example of a legal strategem that is
inconsistent with more broadly conceived principles of the legal sys-
tem. But a reasonable argument can be made that allowing the taxi-
cab companies to set up dozens of small, independent corporations is
at least as efficient, economically speaking, compared with permitting
tort plaintiffs to hold corporate shareholders personally liable for
damages. That was precisely the argument made by the majority of
the court in Walkovsky v. Carlton, the case upon which Simon based his
example. 249 Limited liability is necessary to encourage investment in
246 See SIMON, supra note 21, at 26-52.
247 See Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer2, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30-32 (1978); Ron-
ald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14, 37 (1967). Dworkin has vacil-
lated on whether he believes there is only one right answer to legal questions. See
DWoRKrN, supra note 52, at 85-86, 237-40, 266; Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth:
You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87 (1996).
248 See generallyJEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT ch. 8 (1998); Michael C.
Dorf, Truth, Justice, and the American Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 133, 146-52
(1997) (asserting that Dworkin's right-answers thesis is irrelevant in judicial reasoning
since there is no method for judges to know whether they have correctly discerned
objective truth).
249 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966); see also RICHARD A. PoSNR, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAw 447-48 (5th ed. 1998); SIMON, supra note 231; David W. Leebron, Limited Liabil-
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
risky enterprises, and as long as the corporate entity is not being used
as an alter ego of the individual shareholders, it should not be disre-
garded in favor of an injured plaintiff. Maybe the law and economics
arguments for limited liability for shareholders in these taxicab com-
panies is incorrect, maybe not. The point is, the argument from jus-
tice, and the appeal to fundamental principles of the legal system, cuts
both ways. The legal system undoubtedly contains a principle that in-
jured persons should recover the full measure of their damages, but it
also contains a principle that private economic actors should be per-
mitted to structure their affairs in any way they see fit, with relatively
few restrictions, and perhaps the legal system even contains a princi-
ple that legal rules should exist to channel actors' behavior in eco-
nomically efficient ways. This general form of argument should be
familiar from the critiques of Dworkin originated by members of the
Critical Legal Studies movement. While Dworkin claims that it is pos-
sible to offer one interpretation of the legal system that makes it the
best it can be, his critics assert that this task is impossible, since the
legal system tries to be many things at once. For example, principles
of individualism and altruism exist side by side in the law, and courts
oscillate back and forth between these principles when they try to jus-
tify decisions in particular cases. 250 While I think this argument can
be carried too far, and it is implausible to assert that the coherence of
many well-settled legal doctrines is undermined by the existence of
multiple justificatory principles, it is nevertheless true in a non-trivial
subset of disputed cases that a judicial decision either way could be
justified on principle.
One need not endorse a radical critique of the rule of law to ex-
press doubts about whether Dworkin's model ofjudging (and by anal-
ogy Simon's model of legal ethics) adequately handles the case in
which two legal actors disagree in good faith about the interpretation
of the scheme of justificatory principles underlying the practice of
judging or lawyering. This point was developed forcefully by Gerald
Postema, in a review of Law's Empire.251 Different interpreters can vary
in how they rank the background normative principles that inform a
practice. 252 Consider as an example the controversy over California's
ity, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991); Stephen B. Presser,
Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87
Nw. U. L. REv. 148 (1992).
250 See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv.
L. REv. 1685 (1976).
251 See Gerald J. Postema, "Protestant" Interpretation and Social Practices, 6 LAW &
PHIL. 283 (1987).
252 See id. at 294-95.
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Proposition 209, a ballot initiative that ended affirmative action by
state institutions. 253 The constitutional litigation that arose in the
wake of the initiative posed a question about how to balance two polit-
ical rights which had both been recognized by the Supreme Court: (1)
The right of "discrete and insular minorities" not to have decisions
affecting them removed from their control by restructuring the polit-
ical process;2 54 and (2) the right of members of the majority not to be
disadvantaged on the grounds of race in government decision mak-
ing, absent specific evidence of past discrimination by the government
body that now seeks to use affirmative action.2 55 Naturally, people dis-
agreed about how those two political rights should be weighed. But
what is more, the procedural principles that might help ajudge recon-
cile the competing political rights were themselves inconsistent. Civil
rights advocates believed that the correct interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause was as follows: the right
of people of color to lobby local governments for beneficial legislation
outweighs the right of members of the majority to legislatively repeal,
at the state level, existing and future local affirmative action programs.
The proponents of Proposition 209, on the other hand, argued that
the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional presumption
against affirmative action programs, and this presumption should be
read in conjunction with a political principle that favors majoritarian
political decision making. Of course, both sides of the case suggest
principles of political morality-the necessity for race-conscious reme-
dial action to amelioriate deeply entrenched racism and the ideal of
color-blindness, respectively-to supply the principled foundation for
the outcome they desire. 25 6 In this example, the parties not only disa-
253 See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
254 SeeWashington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Hunter v. Erick-
son, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). These cases are arguably supported by Romerv. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996), although Romer is an extremely difficult case to get a handle upon.
255 SeeShawv. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995);
Adarand Constr., Inc., v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993); Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); cf.Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-
Blind Court, 45 AM. U. L. Rrv. 791 (1996).
256 For a small sampling of the political arguments on both sides of this issue, see
STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECrIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACMION BABY (1991), DWORKIN,
supra note 59, at 227-29, ALAN H. GoLDMAN, JusTIcE AND REvERSE DISCauMIATION
(1979),John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality ofReverse RacialDiscrimination, 41 U. CH. L.
REv. 723 (1974), Benjamin L. Hooks, Affirmative Action: A Needed Remedy, 21 GA. L.
REV. 1043 (1987), Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in
LegalAcademia, in CrcAL RACE THEORY THE KEY WRIINGs THAT FoRm)n THE MOVE-
MENT 159 (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995), William Bradford Reynolds, An Equal
Opportunity Scorecard, 21 GA. L. REv. 1007 (1987), Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Rich-
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gree about what social justice requires, and can both cite fundamental
normative principles of the legal system which support their argu-
ment, but they can also appeal to procedural due process values which
lend support to their substantive arguments. How is Dworkin's Judge
Hercules to elucidate a coherent account of the deep moral principles
of the community that justify the community's legal practice when not
only those moral principles, but also procedural principles of priority
or ranking, stand in irreconcilable conflict?
257
Simon grants that legal actors disagree about what justice re-
quires in particular cases, but argues that the bare fact of disagree-
ment should not preclude the use of "promoting justice" as a standard
of evaluation. He draws an analogy with the law of negligence, in
which the standard of reasonable care is elaborated with reference to
specific disputes by courts, who consider the broad array of circum-
stances applicable in that case.25 8 Lawyers may disagree about
whether liability is warranted in a particular case, but they do not con-
clude on that basis that "reasonable care" is an inappropriate evalua-
tive norm. Consensus is not necessary in order for a judgment of
reasonableness to be legitimate.
When someone says [Simon's model of legal ethics] is unworkable
because the judgments it encourages are controversial .... the ob-
jection [sometimes] refers to controversy about which of competing
reasonable judgments is best in terms of the relevant values of the
legal system. This would be preclusive for [the model] only if it
were exclusively preoccupied with liability, but it should not be.259
Simon explains that the maxim, "promote justice," should not
form the basis for judgments of criminal liability or professional disci-
pline where there is intraprofessional disagreement on whether a law-
yer's actions fell below a certain threshold, but the maxim may
nevertheless function as the grounding for ethical criticism of lawyers,
akin to censure or reprimand. But I think this elaboration of the
maxim confuses two distinct issues: first, whether a lawyer ought to be
sanctioned by some tribunal for failing to respect justice, and second,
whether a lawyer ought to seek to advance her client's goals if the
lawyer believes that the client is not advancingjustice. In the Proposi-
tion 209 example above, no one would claim that a lawyer should be
mond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 1729 (1989), and Cass R. Sunstein, Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the
Supreme Court, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1179 (1996).
257 See DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 122-23.
258 See SIMON, supra note 21, at 197-203.
259 Id. at 201.
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subject to disciplinary sanctions for working on behalf of the conserva-
tive advocacy groups who supported the ballot initiative. But the main
thrust of the argument in his book suggests that the conservative law-
yers could be criticized in moral terms for attempting to abolish race-
conscious remedial legislation that promotes social justice for minor-
ity groups. In the example of the agribusiness companies, as a matter
of legal ethics, a lawyer ought to conclude that "the transactions
should not proceed because they are inconsistent with the statutory
purpose,"260 even though they are formally permitted under the stat-
ute. Should, therefore, a lawyer refuse to argue that Proposition 209
does not violate the U.S. Constitution? More to the point, is a lawyer
for one of the conservative organizations acting unethically?
To me, the answer seems clearly to be "no," for reasons I have
alluded to in the previous Section. In cases in which the lawyer and
client disagree about what justice requires, the balance between loy-
alty to one's client and the imperative to seek justice should be under-
stood rhetorically, as a contribution to a social conversation of sorts
about justice.
2 61
[I] t is the function of the lawyer, like the rhetorician, to persuade
about the just and the unjust, about the expedient and the inex-
pedient, and to do so not among people generally (or in the univer-
sity), but among those who have power - in the courts, legislatures,
and assemblies. Moreover, the lawyer always speaks in the service of
someone else whose interests he [or she] represents and he accord-
ingly says not what he believes to be true or right about an issue he
addresses, but whatever will persuade his audience to act in further-
ance of those interests.
262
On this account, the lawyer representing a client, even a client
with whom she disagrees, is affirming that she will seek to advance the
client's moral principles, even though they are not her own, because
260 Id. at 165.
261 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 19; see also Tanina Rostain, The Company
We Keep: Kronman's The Lost Lawyer and the Development of Moral Imagination in the Prac-
tice of Law, 21 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 1017, 1033 (1996) (stating that legal practice is "a
form of collaborative storytelling in which the lawyer's role is 'that of a translator who
serves to shape her client's experiences into claims, arguments, and remedies that
both the client and the judge can understand'") (quoting Lucie E. White, Mobilization
on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 REv. L. & Soc. CHANCE
535, 544 (1987-88));Jack L. Sammons, A Sixth Semester Conversation, 100 Dicy. L. REV.
625 (1996) (claiming that since the essence of law is rhetoric, the role of lawyers is to
speak persuasively for others); Jack L. Sammons, The Radical Ethics of Legal Rhetori-
cians, 32 VA.. U. L. REv. 93, 99 (1997) ("The game of lawyering is a particular conver-
sation about certain social disputes.").
262 White, supra note 206, at 872.
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conducting public discussions about justice is the only way for citizens
with widely divergent conceptions of the good to live together in
peace.
Moral issues in the United States are frequently cashed out in the
form of legal disputes, and with the growing complexity of the regula-
tory state, it has become inevitable that lawyers are practically neces-
sary to facilitate deliberation about justice. Without lawyers, our
society would lack a "culture of argument"-the "language of descrip-
tion, value, and reason" necessary to represent claims about justice
and social goods.263 The lawyer's role is not solely to represent an
abstract principle, like the First Amendment, but to represent the cli-
ent, as a participant in a democratic conversation aboutjustice, and to
maintain the rules of the conversation so that it can continue to flour-
ish in our pluralistic culture. The goal of this conversation is not to
establish the client's rights, or to vindicate the client's autonomy, but
to create an environment in which it is possible to move closer toward
social agreement on contested issues. The ethical question, then, is
not about justice per se, but about the moral status of talk aboutjus-
tice, which is more closely bound up with the lawyer's role of speaking
on behalf of her client.
264
Deliberation about justice, through the medium of the legal sys-
tem, is premised on the principle of reciprocity, according to which
citizens "offer reasons that can be accepted by others who are similarly
motivated to find reasons that can be accepted by others."265 Thus,
the lawyer's role is justified to the extent that the lawyer's participa-
tion in the conversation enables the principal conversants to offer
public reasons-that is, reasons that are general enough to make
moral claims on other similarly situated citizens. Here, the lawyer acts
as a mediator between public and private values, or between imper-
sonal and personal perspectives. The principle of loyalty requires the
lawyer to speak on behalf of some particular person, not merely to
deliberate aboutjustice generally. At the same time, however, the law-
yer's mandate to serve as an officer of the court, to respect the pull of
public norms, requires the lawyer to offer only arguments which are
263 Id. at 880.
264 See id. at 855; see also Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARv. L. REV.
1765 (1994) (book review).
265 GUTMANN& & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 53; see a/SOJORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITI-
MATION CRISIS 108 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975) ("[A] rgumentation is expected to
test the generaliz ability of interests, instead of being resigned to an impenetrable plu-
ralism of apparently ultimate value orientations."); Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1008
("Public values appeal to conceptions of justice and the common good, not to the
desires of just one person or group.").
[VOL. 75:1
1999] PUBLIC VALUES AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 79
impartial enough to apply to persons other than the client.266 The
fundamental ethical justification of the practice of lawyering is the
maintenance of a form of community which sustains the social conver-
sation about justice in a pluralistic society.2 67 A community of this
nature requires not blind loyalty to clients, but a carefully modulated
form of partisanship, in which the lawyer speaks on behalf of another,
but does so with a view toward maintaining processes of dialogue and
conversation.
The rhetorical conception does not assume the truth of the law-
yer's beliefs about justice-indeed, it takes moral pluralism and disa-
greement as givens. It therefore differs from Simon's account, which
places too much weight on the truth of the lawyer's moral beliefs.
The rhetorical model ofjustice does, however, share with Simon's the
insistence that lawyers be motivated by reaching the resolution of dis-
putes on the merits-that is, on grounds of principles of political mo-
rality that can be generalized. This means that the only type of
lawyering activity that is allowable is that which could, in principle, be
justified on grounds shared by other lawyers who are similarly moti-
vated to actjustly, and by the opposing clients with the similar motiva-
tion.268 Thus, a lawyer may justifiably argue in good faith the merits
of a case with which she disagrees, or which she believes is incompati-
ble with social justice, provided that the argument on the merits is
justified by some plausible moral view. By "plausible" I mean, follow-
ing Gutmann and Thompson, a view that is compatible with life in a
pluralist democratic society committed to protecting the basic liber-
ties and opportunities of all citizens through a constitutional regime
of laws.2 69 For example, in the Dalkon Shield case mentioned earlier,
a defense lawyer would be justified in questioning plaintiffs about con-
duct that may have contributed to their injuries, since a plausible view
of corrective justice and the tort system is that a defendant should be
responsible only for the portions of a claimant's injuries that were
caused by the defendant's wrongful conduct. The lawyer would not
be justified in questioning the women about their sexual histories in
that case, however, since there was no evidence linking their injuries
to any of the activities that the lawyers sought to explore in deposi-
tions. No plausible moral ground for a law-governed dispute resolu-
266 Cf Lon L. Fuller &John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Con-
ference of the ABA and the AALS, 44 A.BA.J. 1159 (1958) (stating that a lawyer's repre-
sentation of a client must not involve conduct that is inconsistent with the public
purposes of the law).
267 Cf MAcIN''u=, supra note 130, at 244.
268 See Gu~uNN & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 55-57.
269 See id. at 65-68.
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tion procedure would permit questioning into medically irrelevant,
but highly embarrassing private activities, for this questioning would
tend to interfere with the plaintiffs' basic liberty interests, without any
possible warrant in considerations of corrective justice between the
parties. No plausible moral justification of the tort system would vary
the amount a plaintiff is entitled to recover according to whether the
plaintiff participated in sexual activities unrelated to the cause of her
injury. On the other hand, many of the practices for which lawyers
are criticized in the mass media are eminently justifiable under the
rhetoricaljustice conception. Arguing to suppress inculpatory evi-
dence that was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, while
popularly decried as "getting a bad guy off on a technicality," is justi-
fied by the constitutional values of privacy and liberty protected by the
Fourth Amendment. (But the same argument does notjustify brutally
cross-examining a truthful witness, and certainly does not warrant
presenting perjured testimony.)
Naturally, there are closer cases. In the client-counseling hypo-
thetical that closed Section 111,270 the advice the lawyer would be per-
mitted to give her client would depend on which of the client's
options would be justifiable to other citizens of Tradition who seek to
achieve a principled basis for living together harmoniously in society.
One way to approach this question is to see which of the client's op-
tions manifest respect for other citizens-"a favorable attitude toward,
and constructive interaction with, the persons with whom one dis-
agrees." 271 The client's option of disobeying the Sunday closing regu-
lations and either hoping he won't get caught by an overburdened
local prosecutor or paying the fines out of the proceeds of his in-
creased sales shows disrespect for other citizens' moral views, by treat-
ing a statute that embodies those views as a mere inconvenience or
impediment to the making of more money.272 Better to openly chal-
lenge the prohibition on constitutional grounds, invoking a counter-
vailing moral principle of religious liberty and government neutrality,
270 See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
271 GUrMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 79.
272 The fact that other citizens do not seem to place much value on refraining
from shopping on Sundays may or may not be relevant. The citizens who cross state
lines to shop may be a minority of the local population, in which case many other
residents still take the ordinance quite seriously. Alternatively, the law may have
fallen into a condition of general desuetude, in which case the moral arguments for
obeying it do not have the same force. See generally Linda Rodgers & William Rodgers,
Desuetude as a Defense, 52 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1966), reprinted in 2 NOPRMAN J. SINGER,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 624 (5th ed. 1993), and in Pepper, Counsel-
ing, supra note 174, at 1554-58.
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lobby for a change in the law, or seek to accomodate the client's inter-
est with the interests of his fellow citizens by staying open longer dur-
ing the week. These actions by the lawyer communicate
understanding, the recognition that the opposing views are based on
moral grounds about which reasonable disagreement exists, 273 while
covert disobedience implicitly slights the moral basis of the majority's
laws.
C. Care: Avoiding Harm to Third Parties
1. Relational Norms
Feminist critics, inspired by the work of psychologist Carol Gilli-
gan, have argued that the domain of ethics must be understood to
include not only individualist, impersonal concepts like rules, obliga-
tions, and principles, but must also encompass norms in which inter-
personal relationships are central. Some of these critics have applied
this argument directly to legal ethics, arguing that traditional accounts
of professional responsibility are impoverished by exclusion of rela-
tional norms.274 From the point of view of relational ethicists, keep-
ing human connections open and flourishing is a moral imperative,
just as is the principle that one must not interfere with the rights of
others. Thus, actors must recognize norms such as avoidance of
harm, the maintenance of relationships, and responsibility to
others.27 5 The proper resolution of disputes, in a care-based system,
does not depend on the assignment of rights and the interpretation of
rules against non-interference. Rather, disputes should be resolved
with an eye toward keeping relationships healthy over the life of the
273 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 82-85.
274 See RAND JACK & DANA CROCWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECI-
SIONS (1989), in Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an EthicforLaers, 81 GEo. L.J.
2665 (1993), in Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring Building an Ethic of Care into
Professional Responsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1175 (1992), Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia
Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, in LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL
PRAanE: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 25 (Stephen Parker and Charles Sampford eds.,
1995), and in Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles, 63 FoRDHAM L. REV. 39
(1994). Some of the major legal ethics casebooks now include a brief introductory
section on the ethic of care. See, e.g., HAZARD ET AL., supra note 164, at 31-35;
THOMAS D. MORGAN AND RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 21 (6th ed. 1995). Throughout this Article, I am using the
terms "care," "mercy," and "relational norms" to represent the obligation to avoid
harm to third parties, whose interests are directly affected by the lawyer's work on
behalf of a client. Interests of society generally are handled under the rubric of "jus-
tice," above.
275 SeeJAcK & JACK, supra note 274, at 9.
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community. In a legal system, the ideal of care is not retribution or
restitution; instead, care requires legal actors to work toward a mutu-
ally advantageous solution to a dispute, in which the harmony of the
community is the desideratum. 276 Correspondingly, in legal ethics, a
lawyer should work toward resolutions of problems by "strategies that
maintain connection and relationship."
277
A now famous story which illustrates the differential application
of the ethics of care and rights is told by Gilligan.278 She was studying
the moral development of girls, using hypotheticals devised by the psy-
chologist Lawrence Kohlberg. In one problem, a man named Heinz
wonders whether or not to steal a drug to save his wife's life. The
pharmacist had refused to discount the drug, and Heinz could not
afford the charged price. The boy in Gilligan's study, Jake, analyzes
the question in terms of casuistical categories-life is worth more than
the drug, therefore it's right to steal the drug. Jake sees the problem
as analogous to a mathematical calculation, what students at my un-
dergraduate university used to call a "plug 'n' chug" problem-just
plug in the values, chug through the calculation, and the right answer
pops out at the end. Amy, who is the same age asJake, sees the prob-
lem very differently. For Amy, the hypothetical does not present con-
ceptual categories, but a web of human relationships that must be
maintained over time. It would be a bad thing if Heinz's wife dies, not
just for her, but for the people who love her. For Amy, the fault for
the breakdowns in the relationships lies with the pharmacist, who
does not see how he is damaging these ongoing connections. The
pharmacist's judgment is deficient because he cannot imagine a solu-
tion that would be beneficial to everyone, such as giving Heinz the
drug and allowing him to pay it back over time. Amy's solution, like
Brandeis's solution to the labor dispute at his client's shoe factory, is
deliberation. "[I]f Heinz and the druggist had talked it out long
enough, they could reach something besides stealing. '279 This delib-
eration would enable the pharmacist to acknowledge his responsibility
276 See id. at 17-19.
277 Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 HAsTINGs L.J. 1039, 1047 (1992). Using
principles of care, legal practice would involve, for example, increased use of media-
tion and negotiation, rather than litigation, for dispute resolution; greater apprecia-
tion for the opposing party's point of view; and less confrontational trial tactics. See
id. at 1048-49; see also Robert J. Levine, Medical Ethics and Personal Doctors: Conflicts
Between What We Teach and What We Want, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 351 (1987) (explaining
that qualities like caring, relationship-building, and mutual trust tend to be discour-
aged by rule-based ethics).
278 See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VoicE 25-32 (1982).
279 Id. at 29.
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to Heinz's wife. Notice that Amy's reasoning cannot be reduced to
plug 'n' chug. It is inherently contextual, sensitive to the character of
the individuals, their history, and the history of the community. Amy
seems to be saying that there is no mathematical algorithm which ade-
quately captures all the variables presented by a real human dispute.
The work of relational ethicists has shown that moral reasoning is
richer than previously believed. Kohlberg thought that arguments
about relationships and feelings represented a lower rung on the lad-
der of moral development. In his theory, the aim of a mature moral
agent was to use impartial, universalized principles that made no ref-
erence to the context of the relationship. Feminist critics have argued
persuasively that women's ethical decision making is not the result of
stunted psychological growth, but a different way of reasoning
through dilemmas.
A strong version of the ethic of care, which holds that care-based
reasoning is exclusively or primarily the province of women, has been
criticized as essentialist or for perpetuating gender stereotypes.
280
One study of lawyers and law students, which included an evaluation
of moral decision making styles, did find a slightly greater orientation
toward relational norms in women respondents.281 All the statistically
significant differences between men and women were in the direction
of women's preference for contextual reasoning, but the study's au-
thors concluded that their data provide only limited support for Gilli-
gan's hypothesis. This study certainly does not suggest that men do
not, or cannot resolve ethical problems by using considerations of car-
ing or connectedness. However, it does not matter for the purpose of
this argument whether the observed tendencies of some women to
orient ethical decision making toward human relationships is socially
conditioned or innate, as long as it is possible for men also to use
concepts of interconnectedness in moral reasoning.2
82
Although feminist scholars have been at the vanguard of reviving
the idea of care as a moral consideration, the ethic of care is also
280 See, e.g., MINow, supra note 15, at 230-31; Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in
THE PoLrIcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 453, 458-59 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed.
1990); Deborah L. Rhode, The "Woman's Point of View," 38J. LEGAL EDUC. 39 (1988);
Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE LJ. 1373,
1380-81 (1986).
281 SeeJanet Taber et al., Gender, Legal Education and the Legal Profession: An Empiri-
cal Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1209, 1249-51 (1988).
282 See Cahn, supra note 277, at 1040 ("Ultimately, however, the question whether
gender-based styles of lawyering exist is not as important as examining the different
methods by which we practice law and the implications of seemingly different ethics
of lawyering for ourselves as lawyers, for our clients, and for transforming legal
practice.").
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expressed in other intellectual traditions, for example as the value of
mercy in tempering the imperatives ofjustice. One of the most strik-
ing examples in literature of the opposition between justice and
mercy is Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice. Although Portia, the
character who argued for mercy, was a woman, she was disguised as a
man while making this argument. None of the audience in the court-
room found it odd that a masculine voice was pleading for mercy.
George Fletcher's account of loyalty, with its emphasis on personal
history and human relationships, is also based on religious and moral
principles not uniquely identified with feminism. 28 3 Some psychoana-
lytic accounts of legal reasoning suggest that the reported malaise of
contemporary legal culture results from an inattention to interper-
sonal relationships. 284 Martin Buber's religious thought breaks down
the difference between subject and object, so that the relationship be-
tween two beings is prior to either one of them as an individual.
2 85
Finally, Christian theology requires believers to give support and com-
fort to their enemies as well as to their friends. 286 Indeed, the reli-
gious obligation to treat strangers as brothers and sisters is an
exquisitely demanding moral duty: "When I deal with the lawyer for
the other side... I deal.., with the noblest work of God, as much as
when I deal with my own client.... I also deal with the noblest work
of God when I deal with my client's enemy."
287
Significantly, some prominent normative work on the legal ethics
of care has explicitly been addressed to men as well as women law-
yers.288 Thomas Shaffer writes powerfully about the cramped reason-
ing of traditional legal ethics when confronted not with individuals,
but with existing relationships of care, loyalty, and affection. 289 In one
283 See FLETCHER, supra note 168, at 162-65.
284 See BENJAMIN SELLS, THE SOUL OF THE LAW (1994).
285 See MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (Ronald Smith trans., 1942).
286 See THOMAS L. SI-IAFR & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND
MORAL REsPONSIBILnY 72-81 (1994) (reviewing theological basis for ethic of care);
Joseph Allegretti, Christ and the Code: The Dilemma of the Christian Attorney, 34 CATH.
LAW. 131 (1991).
287 Thomas L. Shaffer, On Lying for Clients, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 195, 208
(1996). For a secular variation on this argument, see LUBAN, supra note 21, at 157.
Luban argues that the Kantian injunction to treat persons as ends in themselves,
which is universally applicable regardless of an agent's status as a lawyer, requires
lawyers to avoid inflicting morally unjustifiable harm on others.
288 See Ellmann, supra note 274; Luban, supra note 21, at 452 ("I join with many
contemporary feminist writers in insisting that the primary moral experience is that of
responding to, or sympathizing with, the situation of particular other people.");
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 274.
289 See Shaffer, supra note 25.
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experiment, Shaffer presented practitioners with a hypothetical case
in which a lawyer drafts parallel wills for a husband and wife, only to
learn in a subsequent conversation with the wife that she wants to
change her bequest without consulting her husband. The response of
most lawyers to the problem was some variation of, "Oops!"-the con-
versation with the wife alone had placed the lawyer in a conflict be-
tween the wife's interest and the husband's, so that the lawyer was now
the keeper of the wife's confidence, forbidden to use this information
to the husband's advantage but required to zealously represent both
husband and wife. Shaffer argues that the traditional way of answer-
ing the question is erroneous because it misdescribes the problem.
The lawyer's client was the family, not the wife or the husband individ-
ually.29 0 The lawyer's role is not to gain the maximum advantage for
an individual client. Rather, it is to uncover the complex relationships
that constitute the family. "The lawyer's skill includes the moral art of
seeing,"29' and seeing properly requires that the lawyer be attuned to
human connectedness. The problem is misdescribed because con-
cepts of care have been shorn from the moral vocabulary of lawyers,
who have become habituated to talking exclusively in terms of legalis-
tic and impersonal rights, entitlements, and duties. (As Carrie
Menkel-Meadow argues, this deficiency begins with legal education,
which neglects relational ethics: "The values that we attend to in the
classroom are apt to be individualism and autonomy, which we pres-
ent as the basis for the adversary system, the Bill of Rights, and the
standard of proof in criminal cases. We fail to teach our students that
lawyering involves responsibility to and for others."292)
It is not a large step to generalize from Shaffer's family example
to disputes involving ongoing relationships which may be destroyed by
litigation. Commercial litigation may involve, for example, a business
relationship between a manufacturer and a supplier of raw materials
who will probably have occasion to deal with one another in the fu-
ture. The participants in a criminal case may live in close proximity
and the subsequent course of their lives may be shaped by what occurs
290 See id. at 969-70; see also THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN
LAWRFs AND THEm CoMMuNIrrms: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 15 (1991) (argu-
ing that most legal ethicists use the language of rights and are focused on individual
autonomy, not communities); Eric J. Cassell, Do Justice, Love Mercy: The Inappropriate-
ness of the Concept ofJustice Applied to Bedside Decisions, inJusTicE AND HEALTH CARE 75
(Earl E. Shelp ed., 1981).
291 Shaffer, supra note 25, at 978.
292 CarrieJ. Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics?, 41 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 3, 7 (1991).
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during the trial of the case. 293 Many lawyers, even if they do not un-
derstand themselves as employing a distinctive set of care-concepts,
recognize the potential harm to relationships that may result from
overzealous litigation, and accordingly serve as a restraint on their cli-
ents' shortsighted desire to ruin the opposing parties. The lawyer,
who has almost certainly seen more legal disputes than the client, is
probably in a better position to appreciate the destructiveness of un-
tempered aggression in litigation, and the value in a more conciliatory
approach.
For these reasons, I will assume that lawyers of either sex can use
the insights of care theorists in ethical decision making. Lawyers
should be attentive to the varieties of moral reasoning, and should be
willing to employ considerations of care in evaluating ethical choice
situations. To a very great extent, this suggestion may sound like
preaching to the choir, since many lawyering theorists have already
adopted many of the suggestions put forward by proponents of care
and relational ethics. For example, Naomi Cahn suggests that lawyers
cultivate "more appreciation of the other party's perspective-more
understanding and recognition of that party's interests." 294 But of
course that is precisely what good trial lawyers have always learned to
do. Only by anticipating her opponent's strategy and theory of the
case can a lawyer understand the strengths and weaknesses of her own
case well enough to shore it up against attacks and persuade a judge
orjury.295 New lawyers quickly learn the danger of overestimating the
strength of their case because of a failure to imagine sympathetically
the other side's point of view. Another of Cahn's suggestions-in-
creasing emphasis on alternative dispute resolution 296-has been em-
braced wholeheartedly by the profession. Judges, either individually
or through local court rules, now routinely require the parties to sub-
mit to mediation before trial,297 and courts generally uphold contrac-
293 See, e.g., SEYMOUR WISHMAN, CONFESSIONS OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER 3-18 (1981)
(relating defense lawyer's realization of the harm he had inflicted on a witness in a
rape case).
294 Cahn, supra note 277, at 1049.
295 See, e.g., THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 369-414 (3d
ed. 1992); RIHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRrrIG: STRUC-
TURE, STRATEGY, AND STYLE 387 (3d ed. 1998) (advising advocates to "[m]ake a ruth-
less list of every weakness in your case and every question that you would be tempted
to ask if you were ajudge"); SIMON, supra note 21, at 69 (quotingJohn W. Davis, The
Argument of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A. J. 895, 896 (1940)) (arguing that the cardinal rule of
advocacy is, "Change places (in your imagination of course) with the Court").
296 See Cahn, supra note 277, at 1048.
297 See, e.g., W.D. Wash. C.R. 39.1(c) (1) ("The court may designate any civil case
for mediation under this rule."). For one judge's enthusiastic endorsement of ADR,
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tual provisions mandating binding arbitration of claims, even where
those agreements are arguably adhesion contracts. 29 8 Finally, Cahn
and others may be correct to suggest that care theorists would recom-
mend altruistic measures like pro bono work, but there has been an
active movement for decades in the profession to increase lawyers'
commitment to pro bono.
29 9
2. Some Reservations
Despite the prevalence of care concepts in some recent writings,
there remain a couple of problems in applying relational norms in
legal ethics. First, proponents of care are not always clear on whether
they understand caring to be a distinctive kind of reasoning, incom-
patible with traditional moral deliberation. Some principles that are
urged as relational may only be restatements of moral reasons that
already have a secure home in ethical deliberation. Put another way,
urging someone to care about someone else may be understood as
nothing more than persuading that person that the Categorical Im-
perative, rights, utility, God's will, or some other moral principle re-
quires the "caring" action. It may be the case, on the other hand, that
the "caring" action requires partiality to a particular person, rather
than concern for humanity as a whole. (A common critique of utilita-
rianism is that it leaves no room for personal attachments and thereby
denigrates the value of particular relationships.) If care is taken to
demand that the interests of a concrete person be given priority over
the claims of society as a whole, then the proponent of care mustjus-
see GERBER, supra note 7, at 86-87 (stating that ADR is a "cleansing antithesis" to
litigation which "offers more accessible justice than most courts offer"). For a some-
what more sober appraisal, which recognizes the potential for the abuse of ADR pro-
cedures, see CHIEFJusncEs' REPORT, supra note 35, at 27.
298 See, e.g., First Liberty Inv. Group v. Nicholsberg, 145 F.3d 647 (3d Cir. 1998);
McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1998); Miller v. Public Storage
Mgt., Inc., 121 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 1997). But see Paladino v. Avnet Computer Tech.,
Inc., 134 F.3d 1054 (11th Cir. 1998) (refusing, correctly, to compel arbitration where
language of agreement did not adequately inform employee that statutory discrimina-
tion claims were subject to arbitration); Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119
F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Any bargain to waive the right to ajudicial forum for
civil rights claims.., must be explicitly presented to the employee and the employee
must explicitly agree to waive the specific right in question."). See generally StephenJ.
Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntay Consent, 25 HorsTRA L. REv. 83, 146 (1996).
299 For contributions to the debate over mandatory pro bono work by lawyers, see
Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer to the Right
Question, 49 MD. L. REv. 78 (1990), Michael Millemann, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil
Cases: A Partial Answer to the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REv. 18 (1990), and Suzanne
Bretz, Note, Why Mandatory Pro Bono Is a Bad Idea, 3 CEo.J. LEGAL ETHICS 623 (1990).
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tify the priority of care over impersonal considerations like justice or
utility.
My second concern is potentially more troubling for legal prac-
tice: caring is inherently based on interpersonal relationships that the
agent has reason to value. For this reason, it seems inapplicable to
many cases in legal ethics, where many strangers make moral claims
on the lawyer. The rule of law is premised, to a large extent, on the
eradication of certain differences among people. If it is wrong for a
person to lie under oath in a civil proceeding, then it is wrong for Bill
Clinton to lie under oath, notwithstanding that he occupies an impor-
tant office, and presumably has better things to do than justify his
private life to the electorate. If this rule-of-law reasoning is applied to
legal ethics, then a caring lawyer must explain why she is entitled to
prefer one similarly situated party over another. This objection to re-
lational ethics may be separated into two related problems: whether
norms of caring should apply where the parties are strangers to one
another, and whether lawyers should necessarily experience a rela-
tionship of care toward their clients.
a. Should the Parties Care About Each Other?
The ethic of care is best suited, if not limited, to situations in
which there is some ongoing personal relationship between the par-
ties whose preservation would be valuable. It isn't clear from Gilli-
gan's description of the problem, but it appears that Heinz and the
pharmacist live in a relatively small community, or perhaps a neigh-
borhood within a larger city, where the pharmacist could be expected
to feel some sense of personal obligation toward Heinz and his wife.
This feeling of obligation on the part of the pharmacist must be per-
sonal for it to count as a duty of care, and not another kind of moral
obligation. A utilitarian calculation-taking into account the pharma-
cist's need to make a living, the drug company's justifiable expecta-
tion of being paid for its product, the precedential effect of handing
out free drugs in cases like this one, and the harm that would result
from not providing the drug to Heinz-might reveal that the pharma-
cist has an obligation to give the drug to Heinz's wife. In that case,
though, the obligation would not arise out of a sense of personal con-
nectedness between Heinz, his wife, and the pharmacist. A brand-new
pharmacist, just transferred from another city, could go through the
same consequentialist reasoning, but could not be expected to feel
the pull of human relationships in the same way as the old pharmacist
who has passed Heinz and his wife in the street for years. The whole
point of the ethic of care, as it is imagined by relational ethicists, is
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that it is not a universal obligation. It is a reaction to Kant, Mill, and
other philosophers who see moral problems in terms of categories
that are binding on all similarly-situated rational agents. By demand-
ing that legalistic reasoning yield to personal, contextualized analysis,
proponents of care usefully open up the range of moral considera-
tions to the interpersonal dimensions of action. At the same time,
however, they sacrifice some of the pull that morality exerts on
strangers.3
00
If the duty of care is limited to interpersonal relationships which
the client has some reason to value, it cannot be universally binding.
Here the diversity of practice settings makes it impossible to genera-
lize about care as an ethic for lawyers. 30 1 A small-town dispute may
disturb a complex web of relationships, to which the lawyer should be
sensitive. Even in larger communities, certain types of practices, such
as domestic relations, inevitably implicate an ethic of care. The di-
vorcing parents of minor children will have contact with each other,
and the children, for years after the lawyer's work is done. In a large
city corporate practice, however, the number of ongoing personal
connections that the lawyer must take into account in any given trans-
action may be much diminished.3 0 2 There may be some circum-
stances, like a company's decision to downsize hundreds or thousands
of loyal employees out of the jobs, in which more compassion and
attention to the human dimension of the legal question is critical.
The company may have the right to throw people out of work, but it
300 A much stronger version of the ethic of care is represented by the parable of
the Good Samaritan, in which the political enemy of an injured man, not the victim's
co-religionists, proved to be the man's neighbor for the purposes of the command-
ment to love one's neighbor as oneself. See Luke 10:29-37. This story has consistently
been interpreted as a universal injunction to show mercy, even to those for whom one
would ordinarily not feel an affective sense of compassion or love. "[O]ne can define
only the subject of love, not the object." RAmoN E. BROWN, AN INTRODUCTION TO
TrE NEsv TaTrm"NT 245 (1997). Although the target of my critique in this section is
the secular ethic of care, particularly as developed by feminist theorists, it is worth
bearing in mind the more demanding Christian obligation to care for everyone, not
merely for those close to us. Thanks to Kent Greenawalt for emphasizing the need for
qualification on this point.
301 See generally JoHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWvYERS: THE
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982).
302 Compare Weber's account of the conflict between the religiously grounded
obligation of caring and the rationalizing force of the market. "Money is the most
abstract and 'impersonal' element that exists in human life. The more the world of
the modem capitalist economy follows its own immanent laws, the less accessible it is
to any imaginable relationship with a religious ethic of brotherliness." Max Weber,
Religious Rejections of the World and TheirDirections, in FROM MAX WEBa 323, 331 (H.H.
Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans. & eds., 1946).
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might benefit from an analysis offered by a lawyer reasoning like Amy
in Gilligan's study. Isn't there some way to cut costs or improve pro-
ductivity without eliminating jobs? But even here the duty of care is
founded on the long-standing relationship between the company and
its employees. Would the same duty apply to strangers? What if the
downsizing resulted from a hostile takeover of a company, with whose
employees the acquiring corporation had no preexisting relationship?
Any duty on the part of the acquiring company must be founded in
universal moral obligations, because it had no preexisting relationship
with the target company's employees. Universal obligations are char-
acteristic ofJake-style reasoning, not relational considerations. To use
another example, a large chain store can't have a duty of care toward
the small merchants it displaces when it enters a new market. The
large stores obviously have legal duties, for example not to set prices
artificially low, but these duties apply whether or not it is good for the
relationships between the mom and pop stores and their customers.
Again, it seems that Jake has the more compelling argument in that
case.
The hypothetical heartless corporation also illustrates a point
about the response of caring to power. It is easy to criticize the adver-
sary system for fostering Rambo litigation tactics, driving up the costs
of dispute resolution, and exacerbating, rather than healing, divisions
between the parties. It is tempting further to proclaim the unsuitabil-
ity of adversarial litigation to a postmodem, pluralistic society.30 3 In
some cases, however, the only way to budge a powerful adversary
would be to put relational ethics aside in favor of the traditional dis-
course of liberal rights. Grant Gilmore neatly captures this insight in
a famous aphorism: "The better the society, the less law there will be.
In Heaven there will be no law, and the lion will lie down with the
lamb.... In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will
be meticulously observed. °30
4
We would naturally prefer to live in heaven, but until we encoun-
ter more reports of lions and lambs lying down together, it would be
wise not to abandon the observation of due process. Defenders of the
adversary system remind us that many minority groups, political dissi-
dents, and other unpopular clients are not exactly in a position of
strength in the legal system, and may have their rights vindicated only
303 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MAR L. REv. 5 (1996).
304 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977).
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by a lawyer who can push the recalcitrant party against the wall.305
Caring is a conservative virtue-it tends to maintain existing relation-
ships, including those marked by dominance and oppression. If the
extant pattern of relationships is not one which tends to respect one
of the parties' claims to be treated with care, then reciprocal care is
probably the wrong moral emotion for the marginalized party to
adopt. In that case, the depersonalized rhetoric of individual rights
may be the only way to place the out-of-power party in a position
where she can compel the other person to take her interests seriously.
Furthermore, relationships of care may be stable only in case there is a
framework of legal rights and obligations that enable the parties to
handle breakdowns in affectionate relationships in a peaceable man-
ner.30 6 As Waldron recognizes, rights give people power to change
existing relationships, form new affective bonds, and enter into trans-
actions with strangers.30 7 These formal legal guarantees do not enter
into the daily structure of a healthy affectionate relationship, but are
nevertheless available to give the parties confidence that their expec-
tations will be honored in the event of the relationship's
deterioration.
To put the point another way, caring requires the parties to treat
one another as persons, but lawyers are often brought into relation-
ships only when the parties are no longer able to conceive of one an-
other in that way. "The client comes to a lawyer to be aided when he
feels he is being treated, or wishes to treat someone else, not as a
whole other person, but (at least in part) as a threat or hindrance to
the client's satisfaction in life. °3 0 8 This acerbic quip is meant to illus-
trate the difference between lawyers on the one hand, and members
of the clergy, counselors, and therapists on the other: lawyers are
trained to deal with the impersonal side of human relationships, not
the personal aspect. Few students arrive at law school with extensive
training in clinical psychology, social work, or any other body of heal-
ing knowledge, and law professors are, for the most part, ill-equipped
305 See Monroe Freedman, The Trouble with Postmodern Zea, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV.
63, 69 (1996).
306 SeeJeremy Waldron, WhenJustice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, 11 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 625 (1988).
307 See id. at 631, 641-42; see aso Judith Leonie Miller, Making Change: Women and
Ethics in the Practice ofLaw, 2 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 453, 464 (1990) (book review) ("[I]t
is possible to think of law, and perhaps even of rights, as a way of caring for, and
among, larger groups of people.").
308 Dauer & Leff, supra note 3, at 581; cf Morgan & Tuttle, supra note 177, at 997
("Most acts for which people hire lawyers are inconsistent with the interests of some
other people.").
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to enrich their students' capacity for empathy. This objection is some-
times greatly overstated. No one expects lawyers to become therapists,
but it is surely not too much to ask lawyers to exercise the same degree
of solicitude in human relationships that we would expect from any
other person.
The relational ethicists' proposals seem almost revolutionary
where they touch on the value of loyalty to one's client. Much of the
practicing bar would balk at any suggestion that lawyers ought to de-
cline to seek a benefit for their clients whenever the clients' interests
can be promoted only at the expense of some relationship among
third parties, or between the client and someone else. Think of the
terms of approbation that are often used to describe litigators: "street
fighters," "tenacious," 'Junkyard dogs," and other epithets describe
the kind of guy you'd like to have in your corner when the chips are
down (to mix some metaphors). The reason we praise these lawyers is
that they are dedicated to their clients' welfare, no matter what the
effect on other relationships. And, how many of us would look for
such a lawyer if someone like Kenneth Starr subpoenaed us to testify
before a grand jury? Although it is clear that extolling junkyard dogs
has the harmful consequence of obscuring other essential qualities of
lawyering, such as compassion and empathy, it also apparent that care
and mercy cannot be taught as the hallmarks of lawyering, either. A
fully realized theory of professional responsibility will need to explain
when empathy is appropriate and when a lawyer should fight for her
client without concern for the collateral damage caused.
b. Must Lawyers Care About Their Clients?
The previous objection was concerned with the nature of the rela-
tionships among the parties to a transaction or dispute. It is also pos-
sible to ask about the objects of the lawyer's concern, the client. In
general, the problem with applying relational reasoning to lawyer-cli-
ent relationships is that it is psychologically impossible for ordinary
humans, as opposed to saints, to care for all people equally. We tend
to care more about our family members and friends than we do about
strangers. There is nothing wrong with this priority-there would be
no recognizable institution of the family if we did not reserve a special
area of concern for those close to us. But the psychological priority of
concern does make it difficult to expect lawyers to treat all of those
who may come to them for legal services with the same degree of care.
Stephen Ellmann, an advocate of a strong legal ethic of care,
would generally approve only of a representation which somehow fur-
thers a cause that promoted connectedness, community, and responsi-
[VOL- 75:1
1999] PUBLIC VALUES AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 93
bility.3 0 9 A caring lawyer, according to Ellmann, should respond to
three factors: (1) the extent of the client's need; (2) the lawyer's sub-
jective feeling of empathy for the potential client; and (3) the caring
or uncaring quality of the client. The difficulty with Ellmann's criteria
is that they would disqualify a tremendous number of lawyer-client
relationships that we as a society wish to encourage. It seems impossi-
ble to care about truly reprehensible clients, although some lawyers
seem to manage by imagining that the individual client is a family
member who has gotten into trouble.3 1 0 A black civil rights lawyer
would be unable to justify his representation of the Ku Klux Klan to
Ellmann, since he plainly feels nothing but revulsion for the organiza-
tion, which itself is notably lacking in qualities of caring and empathy.
Of course, that is precisely the point of Ellmann's argument-organi-
zations like the Klan aren't worthy of a lawyer's time and attention-
but the danger remains that the impersonal value of freedom of
speech may be sacrificed in favor of personal values if a lawyer refuses
to represent abhorrent clients. There is a danger in emphasizing care
to the exclusion of other public values. Care is not necessarily corre-
lated with socialjustice. A proponent of the ethic of care must justify
the priority of personal over impersonal values in a case like the Klan's
First Amendment litigation.
To take a less dramatic example, entity clients, even those that
aren't engaged in anything particularly untoward, do not fit neatly
within Ellmann's criteria for deserving a caring lawyer. Any large in-
stitutional client probably does not need the services of any individual
lawyer. The "last lawyer in town" problem hardly ever arises for a
wealthy client that can offer repeat business to a law firm. Some insti-
tutional clients do not tend to engender feelings of empathy,
although this problem could potentially be alleviated by allowing the
lawyer to consider her feelings of empathy toward individuals who
work for the corporate client, instead of for the client itself. Finally,
the caring nature of many institutional clients may in some cases be
limited by their social role. Corporations, for example, must be re-
sponsive to shareholders, or their officers and directors risk being
sued for breaching their fiduciary duties. Some corporations never-
309 See Ellmann, supra note 274, at 2685. This principle of client selection is remi-
niscent of Simon's analogy between a private lawyer and a public prosecutor, except
that Ellmann advises choosing clients on the basis of care, and Simon's criterion of
selection is social justice. See Simon, supra note 81, at 1093.
310 See, e.g., JACK & JACK, supra note 274, at 138 (relating how a defense lawyer
imagined her client, a man accused of raping and murdering an elderly woman, as
her brother).
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theless do attempt to act in a caring manner.311 Other kinds of enti-
ties, such as labor unions and advocacy groups, tend to take the same
position repeatedly on contested social issues, so that a lawyer of the
same ideological bent can develop something like a feeling of care
toward that kind of institutional client.31 2 Entity clients also raise the
suspicion that, as a general matter, allowing caring lawyers to work
only for caring clients seems like medicine that is too strong.
Furthermore, in many cases caring too much for one's client may
be an impediment to providing effective legal services. In Confessions
of a Criminal Lawyer, a former defense attorney relates a story of repre-
senting a Puerto Rican man who had been stopped by police officers
and severely beaten; predictably, he was charged with assaulting the
cops. 3 13 While waiting for his client's case to be called, the narrator
watches a young defense attorney cross-examining a police officer.
Losing his temper, the junior lawyer begins shouting at the witness:
"And isn't it a fact that you lied in your direct testimony?"
314
Wishman, the narrator, thinks to himself what a disservice this lawyer
is doing his client: "I had little patience with people who lost control
and became incompetent. One thing was clear: cops rarely lost con-
trol and they rarely admitted they were lying, even when young law-
yers were yelling at them."31 5 But when Wishman's turn comes for the
preliminary hearing in his client's case, he finds himself thinking
about the cruelty of the officer, who beat this innocent man so se-
verely that his eye was swollen shut and he could no longer move his
fingers. He, too, loses his cool and screams at the witness. At the end
of the hearing, the judge calls him aside for some friendly advice:
Seymour, you need a vacation. You're overwrought. You've lost all
sense of proportion. I know what went on here and I'm going to
throw this case out.... But what I'm more concerned about is you,
Seymour. You looked like you wanted to kill that cop.... [D]on't
you see that your lack of restraint made it harder for you to get
control over him?3 1
6
311 A few courts and legislatures have attempted to alleviate this problem by per-
mitting corporate directors to take account of the interests of employees, creditors,
and the communities in which the corporation operates. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1715(a) (1) (West 1995); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
955 (Del. 1985).
312 See Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41J. LEGAL EDUC. 11, 14-15
(1991).
313 WISHMAN, supra note 293, at 126-46.
314 Id. at 135.
315 Id. at 136.
316 Id. at 142.
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Thus, "getting personal," the natural result of caring too much
for one's client, can paradoxically be worse for the client than a
greater sense of neutrality and detachment.
3 17
Finally, Ellmann's argument is addressed only to those lawyers
who wish to be guided by the ethic of care-for the rest of you, the
ordinary morality of the marketplace will have to do, he seems to say.
"[T] he caring lawyer should choose in light of the considerations of
care," he says.3 18 The syntax of that sentence suggests that the uncar-
ing lawyer is not bound to choose in light of the considerations of
care. The uncaring lawyer is thrown back into the interminable de-
bate in legal ethics over the extent to which considerations of social
justice should play a role in professional representation. This objec-
tion is certainly not fatal; ethical arguments must be sensitive to the
character of the person to whom they are addressed,.3 19 I do fear,
however, that urging only a subset of the profession to use relational
reasoning would lead to a Gresham's law effect, where the worst cli-
ents would be paired with the worst lawyers, and the caring lawyers
would be driven out of business. There may be more worth than
Ellmann acknowledges in caring lawyers trying their best to represent
uncaring clients.
IV. PLURAL VALUEs AND ETHIcAL REASONING
The arguments of the preceding section show that each of the
constituent professional values cannot function by itself as a founda-
tion for a theory of professional responsibility. Thus, lawyers must
consider the possibility that their professional obligations are guided
by a multiplicity of values, and that these values may from time to time
conflict. The possibility of conflict among professional values may be
alarming to lawyers who had hoped for neat solutions to ethical dilem-
mas. These lawyers are in good company-many philosophers have
317 Wishman seemed to learn his lesson, as he subsequently advised a young law-
yer, "Bad practice for a lawyer to get too involved. That's why it's supposed to be
easier to represent someone you hate.... [Y]ou and your client are both better off if
you don't like him too much." Id. at 162. Weber provided similar advice for aspiring
politicians-passionate devotion to a cause must be tempered by a "cool sense of
proportion" or distance. See Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER,
supra note 302, at 77, 115.
318 Ellmann, supra note 274, at 2689 (emphasis added).
319 Cf Alasdair Maclntyre, Egoism and Altruism, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILnos-
oPhY 462, 466 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) (arguing that people who want a life with
relationships of trust, friendship, and cooperation need not be concerned about ques-
tions of altruism or benevolence as such, since other-regarding reasons and self-serv-
ing reasons will coincide).
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thought that practical reasoning should strive to eliminate insoluble
conflicts between values, so that only one of the choices presented
would represent the correct resolution of an ethical problem. Indeed,
some have gone so far as to describe as "the central tradition of west-
ern political thought" the claim that there is, in principle, only one
correct answer to any question of ethics, which can be discovered by
the correct procedure and acted upon without violating any other de-
mands that reason makes simultaneously on the agent.3 20 This view
dates at least from the time of Socrates: "From the time of the
Euthyphro onwards, a dominant tradition in moral philosophy has
agreed on one central point: these cases of conflict display an incon-
sistency which is an offense to practical logic and ought to be elimi-
nated."321  One strand of ancient thought equated practical
deliberation with a kind of measurement or algorithm: in any serious
ethical conflict, the agent merely had to calculate how much of The
Good was presented by each option, and choose the path which re-
sulted in a greater quantity.32 2 In the Protagoras, for example, Socrates
argued for an ethical science of measurement, in which The Good was
hedonic pleasure. 323 On this account, ethical deliberation is a species
of technical reasoning, akin to finding the eternal truths of astronomy
or mathematics.
3 24
Official statements on the professional responsibilities of lawyers,
promulgated by the organized bar, follow the traditional Platonic ap-
proach, resisting the notion that the duties incumbent upon lawyers
can conflict. For example, the Model Rules suggest that conflicts be-
tween values should be quite rare:
A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of
the legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus,
when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zeal-
ous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that
justice is being done.
325
320 Isaiah Berlin, The Decline of Utopian Ideas in the West, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF
HuMANITy 20, 24-25 (Henry Hardy ed., 1990). For a noteworthy exception to this
tradition, see W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1930).
321 MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE FRACILITY OF GOODNESS 30 (1986).
322 See id. at 108-09.
323 See Plato, Protagoras (W.K.C. Guthrie trans.), in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES
308, 341-52 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).
324 SeeJEAN-FRANCOIs LYOTARD, THE POSTMiODERN CONDITION 8 (Geoff Bennington
& Brian Massumi trans., 1984) ("[T]here is a strict interlinkage between the kind of
language called science and the kind called ethics and politics.").
325 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCt Preamble cmt. 7 (1997).
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Courts also hesitate to admit that the conflicting duties they impose
on advocates could possibly be irreconcilable. Consider this quote
from a case allowing a lawyer to sue for being wrongfully discharged
after blowing the whistle on client misconduct:
In contrast, plaintiffs performance of professional services for the
firm's clients as a duly admitted member of the Bar was at the very
core and, indeed, the only purpose of his association with defend-
ants. Associates are, to be sure, employees of the firm but they re-
main independent officers of the court responsible in a broader
public sense for their professional obligations.
3 2 6
The court correctly recognized that the lawyer had a duty to the
public as well as to his client, but then left the matter at that, without
attempting to give other lawyers any guidance as to how they should
resolve similar dilemmas that may arise in the future.
Other discussions of legal ethics do admit that basic professional
values can and do conflict, but argue that one value must always
trump the others. One writer extracts this "central" principle from
reported cases, disciplinary rules, and stories of the legal profession:
"[T]he lawyer's obligation to the client is subordinate to the lawyer's
primary obligation to the law."'327 This principle can be traced back in
legal ethics at least as far as the lectures of Sharswood, who advocated
a measure of priority for social justice that is practically unthinkable in
today's legal system:
It is to be observed, then, that such a contract changes entirely the
relation of counsel, to the cause. It reduces him from his high posi-
tion of an officer of the court and a minister ofjustice, to that of a
party litigating his own claim. Having now, a deep personal interest
in the event of the controversy, he will cease to consider himself
subject to the ordinary rules of professional conduct. He is tempted
to make success, at all hazards and by all means, the sole end of his
exertions. He becomes blind to the merits of the case, and would
find it difficult to persuade himself, no matter what state of facts
might be developed in the progress of the proceedings, as to the
true character of the transaction, that it was his duty to retire from
it.32 8
326 Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 108 (N.Y. 1992).
327 Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of Laryering, 19 HoFsTRA L. REV.
311, 317 (1991).
328 GEORGE SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL ETHics 89-90 (1854). Stephen Kalish cau-
tions that Sharswood is often misinterpreted as being a strong proponent of the value
of progressive social justice in legal ethics, when in fact he was quite a conservative
jurist, emphasizing the protection of private property and the maintenance of the
status quo.
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Here Sharswood is inveighing specifically against contingency fee
contracts, but the evil he identifies in these arrangements is that they
create an undue identification of the lawyer with the client's cause,
preventing the lawyer from cultivating a spirit of detachment from the
client, and sympathy with the cause of social justice. Sharswood's dia-
tribe leaves no room for the sentiment of loyalty felt by a lawyer to-
ward her client. (His suspicion, presumably, is that this loyalty is
merely bought, like the affections of a prostitute.)
Contemporary lawyers have a more nuanced view of contingency
fee contracts. They admit that these arrangements may produce con-
flicting loyalties-for example, the lawyer may wish her client to pro-
ceed to trial in hopes of obtaining a larger verdict, rather than
accepting an early settlement. Consider a situation in which the de-
fendant, knowing that the plaintiff is in dire financial straits, has of-
fered a modest amount in settlement, say $25,000, for a tort case that
will probably be worth ten times that amount at trial.329 The plain-
tiff's lawyer sincerely believes that the defendant's conduct was repre-
hensible, and that a substantial verdict at trial would deter future
misconduct by the defendant. However, the plaintiff insists that she
needs the money immediately, and refuses to consent to the lawyer
taking the case to trial. Even in a simple example like this one, law-
yers recognize numerous competing considerations: respect for the
client's decision making autonomy; the desire to see justice done at
trial; care-based considerations such as ending the client's ordeal of
litigation; and finally the lawyer's own needs to make a living. No one
today would accept Sharswood's contention that it is a simple matter
of identifying the lawyer's sole duty as that of an officer of the court,
and invalidate a contingency fee arrangement on that basis.330
Although we accept the plurality of professional values, this con-
dition is troublesome because it undermines the attempt tojustify eth-
ical decisions from the top down-that is, by a process of deductive
reasoning from a set of general principles of universal applicability,
which are accepted as given for the purposes of the practical in-
329 See Videotape: Who's in Charge? The Lawyer as Counselor: Process and Ethi-
cal Dimensions (University of Pennsylvania Law School, Center for Professionalism
1989) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania law library).
330 Recent efforts to codify lawyers' professional obligations exhibit increasing so-
phistication regarding value conflicts. For example, the American Law Institute's po-
sition on the lawyer's duty to prevent client frauds recognizes the opposition between
the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client and the duty to protect the interest of society
and third persons. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERs § 117B
cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft 1998).
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quiry3 3 l If our moral reasoning is not deductive, a skeptical critic
might claim that ethics must be without foundation. We are so condi-
tioned to regard scientific reasoning as the paradigm of objective
truth that any rational process that does not resemble science is auto-
matically suspect. Alternatively, we may acknowledge plural values
and ethical dilemmas, but despair of being able to resolve them.
33 2
This section's task is to rescue professional ethics from the skepti-
cism, relativism, or even nihilism that might be thought to attend to
the problem of value pluralism.33 3 My ambition is not to tear down
legal ethics, but to point the way to a more satisfying account of how
ethically conscientious lawyers can work within a domain of plural val-
ues, by understanding traditions of practical reasoning that empha-
size the interrelated values of sound judgment, character, and virtue
over calculation. Aristotle criticized Plato for seeking scientific cer-
tainty in ethical inquiry, instead of recognizing the domain of practi-
cal reasoning for what it is-the messy, imprecise field of human
affairs. It is illogical, argued Aristotle, to expect the same degree of
exactitude in all disciplines:
Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the
subject matter admits of; for precision is not to be sought for alike
331 SeeALBERT R.JoNSEN & STEPHEN TouLMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY A HISTORY
OF MORAL REASONING 28-36, 293-94 (1988); RICHARDSON, supra note 125, at 276-77.
Richardson in particular emphasizes that this insistence on a quasi-scientific method
of practical reasoning has caused many philosophers, such as Kuhn and Feyerabend,
to believe that disagreement is intractable.
332 The MacCrate Report stresses the role of legal education in training future
lawyers to recognize ethical dilemmas, but it has little to say about how a lawyer
should proceed to resolve the dilemma, except that the lawyer should be aware of any
positive legal rules that may be applicable. See MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 204,
Skill § 10, at 203-07. The only suggestion given in the report for teaching decision
principles for ethical deliberation is that law students should learn how to "[i]dentify
a solution that satisfies the applicable ethical rules and principles while at the same
time accommodating any competing interests of a client." See id. Skill § 10.3(c) (iii),
at 206. This paragraph merely restates the problem, and so tells legal educators noth-
ing at all about how they should instruct lawyers-to-be in resolving these conflicts.
333 Some have observed that law does not offer determinate, or "objective," an-
swers to all disputes and have inferred from that fairly unremarkable fact that legal
judgments in general must be illegitimate, representing merely naked aggression or
abuse of power. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE
LJ. 743 (1987); Glare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
LJ. 997 (1985); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in
Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1984). In the context of professional ethics, see
R. George Wright, Whose Phronesis? Which PhronimoiK: A Response to Dean Kronman on
Law SchoolEducation, 26 Cum. L. REv. 817, 839-40 (1995-96). For an incisive analysis
of indeterminacy arguments, see Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Criti-
quing Critical Dogma, 54 U. Cmn. L. REv. 462 (1987).
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in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts....
[I]t is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each
class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits: it is
evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a math-
ematician and to demand from a rhetorician demonstrative
proofs.
3 3 4
In practical disciplines like ethics, we cannot expect to construct
a system of principles deductively related to a limited set of universally
applicable axioms. Instead, we are looking for a kind of non-scientific
deliberation, to use Martha Nussbaum's phrase,33 5 that is suited to the
complexity of human goods and the potential for conflict presented
by plural values. A number of suitable modes of ethical reasoning
have been defended by philosophers working in practical disciplines,
such as medical, political, and legal ethics. It is these proposals to
which I will turn now.
A. Professional Judgment
It has been suggested that the plurality of professional values may
be accommodated by constructing an account ofjudgment, or practi-
cal wisdom, as an alternative process of making ethical decisions. Pro-
fessional judgment is sometimes invoked in the legal ethics literature
where a factual situation presents a seemingly insoluble dilemma.
"Here is a place for practical reason and nuanced judgment," wrote
one commentator in his discussion of the problem of cross-examining
the truthful witness.3 3 6 The Model Rules reluctantly recognize rare
cases of conflicts between plural values, and in those rare cases, the
drafters believe that such conflicts may be resolved "through the exer-
cise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic
principles underlying the rules.1
3 3 7
334 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, bk. I, ch. 3, 1094b (W.D. Ross & J.O. Urmson
trans.), in A NEW ARIsToTLE READER 364 (J.L. Ackrill ed., 1987).
335 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 321, at 290-317; see also RicHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BE-
YOND OBJECTrVISM AND RELATIVISM 41 (1983) ("[D]eliberation and choosing are ra-
tional activities, but not the sort of rational activity that has been characterized as
deductive proof or empirical verification or falsification.").
336 Robert P. Lawry, Cross-Examining the Truthful Witness: The Ideal Within the Central
Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 100 DIcK. L. REV. 563, 565 (1996); see also Thomas Nagel,
The Fragmentation of Value, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 128, 135 (1979); Postema, supra
note 20, at 68; cf. Ross, supra note 155, at 42 (arguing that where prima facie duties
conflict, "[t]he decision rests with perception").
337 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble cmt. 8 (1997).
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Anthony Kronman's book, The Lost Lawyer, is an elegant, philo-
sophically sophisticated defense of the virtue of practical wisdom.
338
Where political questions pertain merely to the means for reaching
some preestablished goal, resolution of the issue is nothing more than
a matter of calculation. 33 9 When the dispute pertains to the goals that
should be chosen by the polity, however, rational deliberation is ham-
pered by "the participants' own belief that the alternatives involved
appeal to incommensurable values. '3 40 Kronman offers examples like
the snail darter case (beloved of Ronald Dworkin as well), in which
one of two irreconcilable alternatives like environmental preservation
and the provision of cheap electricity must be chosen. In such a case,
where policy decisions are made against a background of plural val-
ues, the decision may appear groundless and arbitrary, since it cannot
be justified deductively from generally accepted moral and political
principles.3 4' Thus, Kronman argues that decisions about which ends
to pursue must be justified by some other reasoning process-in his
view, thatjustification is that the alternative was chosen by a person of
practical wisdom.
Practical wisdom is, of course, an Aristotelian concept, and
Kronman's "lawyer-statesman ideal" is considerably indebted to Aris-
totle's account of phronesis in the Nicomachean Ethics. For Kronman
and Aristotle, practical wisdom is a matter of the moral agent's charac-
ter. A prudent person (Kronman uses the terms "prudence" and
"practical wisdom" interchangeably) is set apart by a cluster of disposi-
tions which mark him or her as a person of sound practical judg-
ment.3 42 Good judgment is not simply an intellectual discipline that
can be represented as an algorithm or formula; rather, it is a complex
set of interacting character traits, including sobriety, fair-mindedness,
honesty, and the paired capacities for sympathy and detachment.
3 43
Kronman follows Aristotle in maintaining that some people are better
than others at discerning the common good, and that this excellence
is due to the agent's superior character that has been cultivated care-
fully over time. 344 He also endorses the Aristotelian epistemological
338 ANHoNY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993).
339 See id. at 54-55.
340 Id. at 56.
341 See id. at 59.
342 See id. at 24.
343 See id. at 43.
344 See id. at 35, 41.
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assumption that learning practical wisdom is a matter of doing some-
thing, not merely reading about it in books.
345
Kronman also makes a startling and original claim. He argues
that lawyers, at least historically, have been uniquely well suited to ex-
ercising the virtue of practical wisdom. Because lawyers must make
decisions among alternatives that conflict and cannot be reduced to
some common unit of value, they must learn to see disputes through
the eyes of all the participants, viewing the conflict imaginatively from
the internal perspective of each person; at the same time, they must
remain detached from the particularity of the individuals' perspec-
tives and keep in mind the needs of the community as a whole.
Kronman refers to these paired standpoints as sympathy and detach-
ment.3 46 It is difficult to remain both sympathetic and detached, and
not everyone is as good at maintaining this unstable neutral stand-
point between competing perspectives. But lawyers, says Kronman,
develop the capacity for this "bifocal" deliberative attitude through
their training-first in law school,3 47 and later in practice.348 Thus,
they are professionally disposed toward being prudent, or practically
wise. The ideal lawyer of superior practical wisdom is given the sobri-
quet "lawyer-statesman" by Kronman, and exemplified by historical
figures like Robert Jackson, Alexander Hamilton, and Abraham Lin-
345 Id.; cf Robert Condlin, The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education, in THE
GoOD LAWYER, supra note 93, at 317, 323 (noting that the foundation for the claimed
superiority of clinical instruction in professional responsibility is that "only someone
who has had the experience of acting in a certain way is capable of knowing the
principle embodied in that way of acting").
346 KRoNMAN, supra note 8, at 66-74.
347 Kronman argues that the case method of instruction helps develop students'
capacity of sympathetic detachment by requiring them to imagine themselves with the
particular interests of a wide range of participants in a social controversy-the plain-
tiff, a third party, and so on-and advocating on that person's behalf, while simulta-
neously retaining the ability to see things from the judge's point of view. See id. at
113-16. One of his critics points out, however, that the case method tends to sup-
press some of the participants' characteristics, particularly those which have been
deemed "irrelevant" by dominant groups. See David B. Wilkins, Practical Wisdom for
Practicing Lauyers: Separating Ideals from Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108 HARv. L. REV. 458,
466 (1994).
348 See KRONMAN, supra note 8, at 128-34. It is perhaps difficult to see how law
practice could develop one's practical wisdom; many would cynically say that contem-
porary law practice develops, at best, one's stamina, tolerance for stultifying work, and
waistline. But Kronman insists that large-firm practice in the 1980s and 1990s bears
little resemblance to the heyday of corporate practice in which firms represented cli-
ents on a long-term basis, rather than piecemeal on individual cases and "deals," and
had an opportunity to help their clients think about strategic decisions, instead of
serving as technicians who merely implement the clients' wishes. See id. at 283-300.
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coin. To the question, "what ought a lawyer to do in" this situation?"
Kronman offers a series of moral exemplars, who present ideals for
emulation by aspiring wise lawyers. While Kronman's lawyer-states-
man ideal has an uncomfortable air of WASP-ish male elitism,3 49 and
his claim that lawyers are superior practical reasoners is empirically
questionable, his basic insight is sound. Choosing the good in a case
where ethical values conflict is a matter of character and virtue, which
develops through experience and the guidance of exemplary practi-
tioners of the tradition. It is not necessary to accept Kronman's story
about the rise and fall of the legal profession in order to make use of
his insights into practical reasoning.
3 5 0
It is tempting to derive anti-theoretical, anti-rational, or even mys-
tical conclusions from Kronman's call for a renewed appreciation of
practical wisdom. To put the question simply: What does practical wis-
dom consist of, if not theoretical reasoning?351 And is there any non-
circular way to tell good judgment from bad? Kronman's appeal to
the tradition of legal practice appears to beg important questions-
the good lawyer is the one who does what good lawyers do, his claim
seems to be. Skeptics claim that the theory of some social practice,
349 See Cramton & Koniak, supra note 2, at 184. Practical wisdom need not neces-
sarily be elitist. As Bernstein shows, discussing Gadamer's hermeneutics, an authentic
conception of practical wisdom requires the agent as interpreter to approach another
(whether a text, a work of art, or a participant in conversation) with respect, openness
to risk, and willingness to be changed by the encounter. See BERNSTEIN, supra note
335, at 162-65. Kronman's application of practical wisdom to lawyers builds in the
requirement that the lawyer maintain an attitude of sympathy and detachment; here,
sympathy requires the lawyer to be aware of her own historical situation of privilege
and power, with respect to (at least some) clients. It seems that Kronman does not
take this requirement seriously, however, given that he identifies as moral exemplars
powerful lawyers working on behalf of commercial interests, who occasionally assume
high government positions. One may surely ask of Kronman why skillful and coura-
geous lawyers for outsiders, like Clarence Darrow, Thurgood Marshall, or Michael
Tigar, do not count as virtuous. See SIMON, supra note 21, at 23-24. Or, as another
reviewer puts it, Kronman seems not to appreciate the irony that any tradition, includ-
ing that of the lawyer-statesman, suppresses other traditions which could serve as van-
tage points from which to question the status quo. See Peter Margulies, Progressive
Lawuering and Lost Traditions, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1139 (1995).
350 For a critique of Kronman's assertion that the legal profession has fallen from
a previous state of grace, see Marc Galanter, Lauyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of Legal
Nostalgia 100 DIcK. L. REv. 549 (1996). According to Thomas and Mary Shaffer,
moral exemplars exist even in the degenerate modem legal profession, at least if
popular culture portrayals are to be believed. On television shows like L.A. Law, ethi-
cal dilemmas are resolved by "the wise elder who is skilled in professional craftsman-
ship"-someone like Kronman's lawyer-statesman. See SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supra note
290, at 31.
351 See CHARLES E. LARMoRE, PATrERNS OF MORAL CoMPLErx 14-21 (1987).
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like lawyering or baseball pitching, can do nothing other than tell
someone to do whatever it is that participants in that practice do.3
5 2 It
is a small matter to take the next inferential step and argue that rea-
soning about a practice is pointless, since all that can be done is to
proceed without worrying about constructing some theoretical ac-
count to explain the actions of participants in the practice.
While it is true that ethical judgments do not proceed on the
basis of an explicit rule that the agent has internalized 353 and consults
when making the judgment, it is an overstatement to say that theories
have no place in explaining ethical decision making. As Rawls recog-
nizes, people tend to oscillate between pre-theoretical judgments or
hunches and fully theorized ethical principles that explain their intu-
itions in particular cases. 35 4 People may revise their considered judg-
ments if these intuitions do not accord with acceptable theories, but
they also test their ethical theories for "fit" with their considered judg-
ments about what is right in particular cases and may revise theories to
accord more closely with particularjudgments. This method of reach-
352 See Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE LJ. 1773 (1987).
Fish's anti-theory has intellectual roots in some interpretations of Wittgenstein's rule-
following argument:
This was our paradox: no course of action would be determined by a rule,
because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule....
What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an
interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and
"going against it" in actual cases .... And hence also "obeying a rule" is a
practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule.
WITrGENSTEIN, supra note 130, § 201. This is certainly not the place to attempt a
critical analysis of this argument, but it is important to note that the interpretation of
these passages of the Investigations is highly controversial, and the extent to which
they undermine theoretical reasoning is not settled. See, e.g., SAUL A. KRIUPKE,
WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982); Warren Goldfarb, Kripke on
Wittgenstein on Rules, 82 J. PHIL. 471 (1985); Scott Landers, Wittgenstein, Realism, and
CLS: Undermining Rule Scepticism, 9 LAW & PHIL. 177 (1990); Thomas Morawetz, The
Epistemology of Judging Wittgenstein and Deliberative Practices, 3 CAN. J.L. & JuRus. 35
(1990); Christian Zapf & Eben Moglen, Linguistic Indeterminacy and the Rule of Law: On
the Perils of Misunderstanding Wittgenstein, 84 GEO. LJ. 485 (1996).
353 See WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 98 (1985).
354 SeeJoHN RAwLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 48-50 (1971); RAWLS, supra note 106, at
28, 45; cf BERNSTEIN, supra note 335, at 146 ("Phronesis is a form of reasoning and
knowledge that involves a distinctive mediation between the universal and the particu-
lar."); Ross, supra note 155, at 40 ("[W] hat we are apt to describe as 'what we think'
about moral questions contains a considerable amount that we do not think but
know, and that this forms the standard by reference to which the truth of any moral
theory has to be tested, instead of having itself to be tested by reference to any the-
ory."); Norman Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics, 76 J.
PHIL. 256 (1979).
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ing "reflective equilibrium" shows that theories do constrain practical
judgments, but not in the way that a priori axioms constrain proofs in
geometry. Rather, theories may show when practical judgments may
have unacceptable consequences if applied more generally.3 55 Or,
they may point out additional considerations that actors should take
into account in practical reasoning. Even though theories do not re-
place practical judgment, they nevertheless retain a significant role in
ethical deliberation.
Reflective equilibrium between intuition and theory is not the
only source of constraint for prudential decision makers, however. In
law, the tradition of legal practice channels the discretion ofjudges in
deciding cases, as well as the latitude of lawyers in choosing one op-
don among many as an ethically permissible course of action. Not
every interpretation of precedent passes the "straight-face test" for
judges.356 So, too, with the range of plausible options in the realm of
professional conduct-an experienced lawyer will recognize an action
as ethically troublesome, in light of the traditions of legal practice,
even though the action may not run afoul of any prohibition in the
disciplinary rules or other applicable law. Essential to the constraint
of tradition is the experience of the decision maker, for it is not by
abstract reasoning alone that one can appreciate the force of custom-
ary norms. Instead, one who fully appreciates tradition possesses what
Llewellyn termed "horse-sense," which is the proper balance of theo-
retical abstraction and attention to the particulars of a case under con-
sideration.3 57 This faculty is something which cannot be captured by
theory and which accordingly has no place in a Platonic moral system.
Because "horse-sense" is some kind of intuitive balance between
theory and practice (or between universals and particulars), it is itself
an exceedingly difficult term to get a handle on. Llewellyn himself
was fond of disclaiming any pretense of professional philosophy, call-
ing his theories "pre-scientific" or nothing more than "fighting faiths"
or "readily workable" generalizations.3 58 For a reader acquainted with
355 See Ronald Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, 111 HARv. L. REv. 1718, 1722-24
(1998).
356 See KRoNMAN, supra note 8, at 215 (citing KARL N. L.EwELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADmoN: DECIDING APPEALS (1960)); Frank I. Michelman, Politics as Medicine:
On Misdiagnosing Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1224, 1227 (1981) (discussing Wittgen-
stein's rule-following argument, but observing that "judgments of error, mistake, and
incompetency in the use of rules are nonetheless possible within a practice, a lan-
guage-game, or a form of life").
357 See KARL N. LLaWELLYN, THE COMMON LA-W TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 201
(1960).
358 See WL AM TwnINING, KARL LLEwELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMNT 173
(1973); cf Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J.
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analytic jurisprudence, Llewellyn's definition of the term is striking
for both its imprecision and its tone: "Horse-sense is the kind of highly
informed, distinctly uncommon, better-than-common, expert but not
scientifically demonstrable know-what and know-how which a David
Harum had about horses and other horse-traders."3 59 A judge with
horse-sense is recognizable by other experienced judges, even though
the judge's craft cannot be reduced to an algorithm that even a rookie
judge could follow. Rookies lack the discernment that permits their
experienced colleagues to judge the excellence of practitioners of the
craft.3 60 Even though this sense of discernment is impossible to pin
down theoretically, it is recognizable to others "skilled in the art," in
the language of patent lawyers. For Llewellyn, excellence in judging
may be recognized by members of the relevant community; similarly,
experienced lawyers may recognize their colleagues who are best able
to decide ethical questions that touch on incomparable values.3
61
Tradition, horse-sense, and the Wittgensteinian notion of a social
practice point to the intersubjective nature of ethical reasoning. All
plausible responses to the plurality and conflict of values in profes-
sional ethics must take account of the dialectic nature of the inquiry.
One's ethical decisions are not constrained a priori by logical relation-
ships, but a posteriori by the acceptability of the decision by the rele-
vant community. The next section discusses an ancient tradition,
casuistry, which is being revived in some practical disciplines as a po-
tential means of making ethical judgments in settings in which com-
peting values cannot be compared quasi-scientifically. Casuistry can
be seen as a living example of horse-sense, for it emphasizes to a
greater degree than the tradition of prudential reasoning the role of
the community in validating evaluative judgments.
1567, 1570, 1588 (1985) (citing ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 64
(1962)) (stating that practical reasoning in politics involves "muddling through," not
theory or ideology).
359 See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Horse-Sense Theory of the Institution of Law (unpub-
lished course materials 1950), reprinted in TWINING, supra note 358, at 503. Llewellyn's
horse-sense resembles Wittgenstein's conclusion that rules cannot completely deter-
mine the outcome of reasoning, so reasoners should not worry so much about rules
and say, "This is simply what I do." WrrTGENSTEIN, supra note 130, § 217.
360 Cf HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JusTIcE 231-40 (1972).
361 For this reason, some legal educators have praised mentoring systems, such as
the one used to train British lawyers, as more effective means to inculcate professional
norms. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers and Virtues, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
707, 726-27 (1996) (book review). But seeAtkinson, supra note 16, at 341-42 (agree-
ing that an ideal mentoring program would be an excellent way to teach professional
values but arguing that most efforts at mentoring probably "begin and end in awk-
ward lunches with courteous strangers").
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B. Case Ethics
1. The Method of Casuistry
The tradition of case-by-case reasoning-casuistry-embraces
pluralism and situational complexity as the essence of ethical delibera-
tion 62 The method of casuistical moral deliberation can be defined
as follows:
[It is] the analysis of moral issues, using procedures of reasoning
based on paradigms and analogies, leading to the formulation of
expert opinions about the existence and stringency of particular
moral obligations, framed in terms of rules or maxims that are gen-
eral but not universal or invariable, since they hold good with cer-
tainty only in the typical conditions of the agent and circumstances
of action.3
63
This procedure of reasoning proceeds "from the bottom up,"
starting with a substantial number of analyzed precedent cases, which
serve as analogies for decisions in new cases. Analysis of the prece-
dent cases shows the connection between the factual circumstances of
the case and a general moral principle, and reveals how the combina-
tion of the general principle and the particular facts of the situation
mandates the practical judgment in that case.364 But the resolution of
practical problems is not accomplished geometrically, by deductive
proof from general principles. Instead, the resolution of concrete
cases, on the one hand, and general ethical rules or maxims, on the
other, play off against each other and produce the judgment about
right and wrong in a particular instance. The reasoning process is
dialectical, reminiscent of the Rawlsian process of reflective equilib-
rium or the henneneutic circle of Gadamer 3 6
5
Just as the holding of common-law cases cannot reliably be pre-
dicted without knowing something about the policies that inform the
362 SeeJONSEN & TouMn, supra note 331; GAss R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING
AND PoLmcAL Cot'_.acr (1996). The Indiana LawJournal published a symposium on
"Emerging Paradigms in Bioethics" in 1994, in which several contributors noted the
resurgence of casuistry in biomedical ethics. See Symposium, Emerging Paradigms in
Bioethics, 69 IND. LJ. 945 (1994);John D. Arras, Principles and Particularity: The Role of
Cases in Bioethics, 69 IND. LJ. 983 (1994). For a brief recommendation that legal
ethicists consider the methods of casuistry, see Paul R. Tremblay, The Role of Casuistry
in Legal Ethics: A Tentative Inquiry, 1 CLINICAL L. REv. 493, 496 (1994).
363 JoNsEN & ToULMiN, supra note 331, at 257.
364 Id. at 252.
365 See HANs-GEoRG GADAmER, TRUTH AND METHOD 261 (2d rev. ed. 1989);
LARmoRE, supra note 351, at 4-8; RAwLS, supra note 354.
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law, 3 6 6 casuistic reasoning makes reference to highly abstract ethical
principles like consequences, duties, justice, care, and so on. Classi-
cally, casuists explicated their decisions with reference to moral first
principles as found in the Bible or in the work of speculative theolo-
gians.367 But policies or ethical first principles alone do not justify
judgments in particular cases. Rather, the decision maker accepts the
authority of precedential cases, which embody and instantiate general
principles, but only insofar as the principles and the facts considered
together produce the judgment. In the common law, the authority of
precedent is needed to protect settled expectations and to ensure the
stability of private ordering.3 68 Respect for precedent also ensures
that unelected judges stay within their institutional boundaries, leav-
ing many contested issues of policy to legislatures, administrative
agencies, or other appropriate public bodies.3 69 In casuistical moral
reasoning, due attention to past decisions gives the decision maker
access to the accumulated wisdom of previous thinkers who have con-
fronted similar issues.3 70 Since precedent is essential to the reasoning
process, ethical judgments can never be abstracted completely from
their factual settings.
Casuistry was traditionally explained and taught in a manner that
would be familiar to any first-year law student in a common-law juris-
diction. Treatises on casuistry featured "type cases," or paradigms, in
which the application of a moral principle to a set of facts was un-
problematic. 37 1 The commentary to the case then varied the facts of
the type case, moving away from the clear resolution of the type case,
and showing how additional facts or different motives of the agent
made the resolution of the problem less certain. For example, a type
case might present an agent who willfully killed an innocent person
with no excuse. Those facts, in conjunction with the scriptural com-
mandment, "thou shalt not kill," produced the judgment that the kill-
ing was wrongful. But then the casuists introduced complications: the
agent was enraged or in the heat of passion; the killer was a revolu-
366 See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 357, at 75 ("Nor, until you see this double as-
pect of the doctrine-in-action, do you appreciate how little, in detail, you can predict
out of the rules alone; how much you must turn, for purposes of prediction, to the
reactions of the judges to the facts and to the life around them.").
367 See BoK, supra note 126, at 55 ("[C] ases of conscience cannot be examined in a
vacuum. Traditionally, they have been discussed in a specific religious, moral, or legal
framework."); Arras, supra note 362, at 1002.
368 See DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 117-20; SUNSTEIN, supra note 362, at 76.
369 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 362, at 195.
370 See id. at 76-77.
371 See generallyJoNsEN & TOULMIN, supra note 331, at 149-51, 251-57.
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tionary and the victim was a tyrannical ruler; the killer was an execu-
tioner and the victim had been duly convicted of a crime and
sentenced to death; the agent was defending his family against assault;
and so on. This movement from clear type cases to contested penum-
bral cases was typical of casuistical pedagogy, and developed in stu-
dents of casuistry an extraordinary sensitivity to factual nuance and
the morally relevant differences between cases. Indeed, the Roman
rhetoricians whose work forms part of the intellectual history of casu-
istry stressed to their students that persuasion about the right and the
good depends on the orator's grasp of the attributes of the persons
and things involved: "for persons, their names, natures, manners of
life, fortunes, characters, feelings, interests, purposes, achievements,
accidents, speeches; and for an action, its nature and purpose, place,
time, occasion, manner, and consequences.
'3 72
Fully specified factual descriptions are essential to the method of
casuistry, because only relevant precedents constrain future decisions.
Casuistical reasoning is not irrational or anti-theoretical, since not
every analogy with a precedent case is a legitimate ground for bring-
ing a new case under the decision principle of the case. The applica-
tion of precedent cases to new cases, "though it is a contentious and
ethically fraught matter, is constrained by rational criteria of what is
and what is not an adequate similarity to the core cases.13 73 Casuistry
is certainly not equivalent to existentialism, where the existence of op-
posing ethical principles is said to leave the agent radically free to
create her own system of morality.3 74 Past decisions, along with the
general principles that underpin those decisions, are always the start-
ing point for the exercise of practical reason. The justification of
present decisions depends on their analogical relationship with past
decisions. If the present case and a past case are relevantly similar,
then a decision maker is justified in treating the present case in the
same manner as a prior decision maker treated the precedent case.3 7 5
The theoretical problem, of course, is working out the logic of analo-
gies, so that not every case can be subsumed under the same
precedent.
372 Id. at 85.
373 WiLLumMs, supra note 353, at 96; see also SUNsmmn, supra note 362, at 71
("[0] ne cannot characterize any holding absolutely any way at all, and the constraints
on characterization are enough to undergird the enterprise of analogy.").
374 SeeJoNSEN & ToULMIN, supra note 331, at 272 (contrasting casuistry with "situa-
tion ethics").
375 See generally EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949);
Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARv. L. REV. 741 (1993).
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"A claim of relevant similarity requires a judgment of princi-
ple. '3 76 Type cases are not self-applying. They do not contain within
themselves specifications of all the future cases in which they will con-
trol the outcome. In bioethics, for example, it is not immediately
clear whether the relevant type case for physician-assisted suicide is
one of murder (and the Hypocratic injunction to "do no harm") or a
case in which patient autonomy is paramount. 77 It is only by studying
a body of past cases, considered as a coherent system and taking into
account the higher-order principles that undergird the decided cases,
that a decision maker can ascertain whether a new case is relevantly
similar to a past case. Casuistical reasoning depends on "principled"
distinctions and analogies between cases. What makes a distinction
principled or not depends on the practices of the relevant commu-
nity.378 In the practice of professional self-regulation, the community
is composed of lawyers, judges, legislators, legal academics, journalists,
interested members of the public, and all others who make normative
claims about what lawyers ought to do in the course of representing
clients. It is, in Dworkin's term, a "community of principle," in that it
is committed to a coherent scheme of principles of professional
morality.
3 79
The community I propose as the source of interpretive discipline
is broader than "the organized bar," "all lawyers," or other communi-
ties that might be proposed. In a democratic society, however, lawyers
cannot be sole arbiters of the legitimacy of their conduct.380 We
speak of professional self-regulation, but in practice, the self-imposed
norms of the profession are constantly being checked from without,
376 SUNSTEIN, supra note 362, at 91; see also LaFollette, supra note 125 ("[S]ituation
sensitive rules will be effective only if we know in advance which features are morally
relevant."); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 597 (1987).
377 See BEAUCHAMp & CHILDRESS, supra note 72, at 28-32.
378 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 335, at 219 ("Judgment is communal and intersub-
jective; it always implicitly appeals to and requires testing against the opinions of
other judging persons."); SUNSTEIN, supra note 362, at 69-74; see also DENNIS PATTER-
SON, LAW AND TRUTH 169-79 (1996).
379 See DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 211-15.
380 Cf David Cole, Against Literalism, 40 STAN. L. REV. 545, 548 (1988) (book re-
view) (criticizing James Boyd White's rhetorical/poetical theory of legal analysis for
limiting the participants in legal argument to lawyers, judges, and legal scholars).
This delimitation of community is also not identical with "the state," as Stephen Pep-
per has suggested. See Pepper, supra note 179, at 958. Instead, the interested commu-
nity must consist of all persons who are potentially affected by the activity of lawyers.
See Wolf, supra note 93, at 43.
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by judicial decisions,38 1 journalistic criticism (as in Watergate, the O.J.
Simpson criminal trial,38 2 and the savings and loan collapse), the pub-
lication of longer narratives which highlight unethical behavior for
the public (as in A Civil Action), the portrayal of fictional lawyers in
popular culture,383 legislation (as in recent attempts to limit contin-
gency-fee agreements and class action litigation), debate in the public
arena, and even a mechanism as prosaic as lawyer jokes.3 8 4 Although
it may seem counterintuitive to link the normative structure of a pro-
fession to extra-professional sources of criticism, this idea is not at all
radical in the realm ofjudging. Courts have long recognized that the
source of their legitimacy lies partly in the acquiescence of the public
in their judgments. For example, the Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged that it is influenced by the perceived legitimacy of its decisions:
The Court's power lies.., in its legitimacy, a product of substance
and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the
Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means and to
declare what it demands.
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow
people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for
them, as grounded truly in principle .... 38-5
This passage from the Court's unusual joint opinion in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey illustrates the extent to which extrajudicial criti-
cism and attacks on its legitimacy operate as one part of a feedback
381 See, e.g., Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858
P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1993). In this case, a law firm claimed that its conduct of discovery
in a civil case was consistent with prevailing professional norms, and obtained numer-
ous affidavits of local lawyers and ethics experts to support its claim. The Washington
Supreme Court, however, essentially responded, "If those are your norms, they're the
wrong ones-this is how you should conduct discovery," and imposed heavy sanctions
on the firm. The court in this case asserted its control over the nomos of lawyering,
refusing to allow the practicing bar to maintain its normative hegemony. Cf. Koniak,
supra note 23.
382 See Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Public Perception, Justice, and the
"Search for Truth" in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1267, 1270 (1996) ("We believe
the public's response is the most important legacy of the O.J. Simpson trial.").
383 See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 21, at 93-94 (arguing that depictions of lawyers in
films suggest public approval of lawyers who favor broader notions ofjustice to nar-
row positivistic notions of legality); see also Anthony Chase, Lauyers and Popular Cul-
ture: A Review of Mass Media Portrayals of American Attorneys, 1986 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J.
281.
384 See Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion,
Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CrN. L. REv. 805 (1998).
385 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).
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loop, bringing the values of the American public within the purview of
the Court's deliberation, even though the justices are otherwise not
subject to democratic process controls.3 8 6 Similarly, I have been con-
cerned throughout this analysis with establishing the legitimacy of law-
yers' ethical decisions, particularly in cases where these judgments
would have the effect of limiting the exercise of clients' power. Law-
yers, like judges, interpret legal texts against a background of princi-
ples of public morality that justify the applicable legal rules. Since
lawyers are even more isolated than judges from control through ordi-
nary political processes, they must be at least as concerned as the
Court about respecting normative judgments made by the public.
Moreover, as members of a closed profession, lawyers have powerful
economic and social incentives not to report wrongdoing by one an-
other,3 8 7 leading to an impoverishment of intra-professional critical
precedent. In short, lawyers are not free to constitute themselves as a
sovereign nomic community entirely isolated from social control.
388
By broadening the relevant interpretive community to include in-
formed members of the citizenry, lawyers can ensure that their inter-
pretive decisions are informed by the appropriate background moral
principles.
2. The Appeal of Casuistry
Several features of casuistry make it particularly apt as a model of
ethical decision making by an agent confronted with multiple, con-
386 For a related point, see Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983). After observing that many citizens interpret Roe v. Wade and
the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence as officially sanctioning murder,
Cover argues that the public criticism of these decisions becomes part of the interpre-
tive narrative that is constituent of the political community:
Even if the horror and resentment felt by such persons fails to manifest itself
in the pattern of court decisions and their enforcement, the meaning of the
normative world changes with these events. Both for opponents of abortion
and for opponents of capital punishment the principle that 'no person shall
be deprived of life without due process of law' has assumed an ironic cast.
Id. at 7.
387 See Richard L. Abel, Speaking Law to Power, in CAUSE LAWYERING 69, 82-83 (Aus-
tin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
388 Cf Michael C. Dorf, God and Man in the Yale Dormitories, 84 VA. L. REV. 843, 867
(1998). I am not endorsing the position, associated with Lord Devlin, that a commu-
nity is entitled to enforce its moral standards regardless of whether those morals are
true or false. See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965). The dialec-
tic interplay of public criticism and the bar's efforts to define its own moral code is
essential to assure that the community's norms do, in fact, represent true moral
beliefs.
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flicting obligations. First, casuistical moraljudgments are more or less
tentative, and even the most certain conclusion is open to revision in
light of later-discovered circumstances. The principal benefit of casu-
istry for our purposes, however, is its suitability for grounding ethical
decisions against a background of plural, sometimes conflicting val-
ues.389 Some of the early founders of the tradition realized that there
may be a genuine conflict of principles of moral obligation, so that
there is no "faultless" way to resolve a practical dilemma.390 By aban-
doning the false hope of moral innocence, casuists created a decision
procedure that was well suited to value pluralism.
Casuistry has deep roots in antiquity, but it achieved dominance
as a method of reasoning during times of great religious strife, when
previously certain bases for morality were called into question. For
example, Christian casuists were called upon to resolve conflicts of
duty between secular institutions and the Church.3 9 1 After the Refor-
mation, Catholic casuists had to resolve questions of conflicting obli-
gations brought about by the schism between faiths:3 92 May a Catholic
serve as a judge in a Protestant kingdom? Can Catholics and Protes-
tants enter into commercial contracts with each other? Do Catholics
owe an obligation of obedience to Protestant rulers? Rather than re-
garding conflicting obligations as pathological cases to be explained
away, casuistry took them as typical and evolved a decision procedure
tailored to these conflicts.
Casuistry is useful for making ethical choices among plural values
because it regards conflicting values not as rivals, but as complemen-
tary theories for resolving practical problems.3 9 3 Just as a lawyer might
decide to build a case on a tort or contract theory, depending on
which would be the most persuasive to its audience, an ethical deci-
sion maker might choose to emphasize consequences, duties, or
bonds of loyalty, depending on the circumstances of the case.394 Law-
yers do not pick theories of cases at random, of course. They can
assess the likely persuasive value of a contract or tort theory only in
light of their knowledge of how particular contract and tort cases have
been resolved in the past, by adjudicators working within the same
system of precedent. But no lawyer would seriously argue that it is
theoretically impossible for a lawsuit to be brought under tort and
389 See ALAN H. GoLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
15-16 (1980).
390 SeeJONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 331, at 78, 96.
391 See id. at 114-16.
392 See id. at 144.
393 See id. at 293-303; see also SuNSTEIN, supra note 362, at 98-99.
394 SeeJONSEN & TouuN, supra note 331, at 297-98.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW[O
contract theories simultaneously. Moreover, no lawyer would spend
much time trying to construct a meta-theory to determine a hierarchi-
cal ranking of contract and tort principles in individual cases. Simi-
larly, a problem in legal ethics might raise issues of loyalty, justice, and
care, but it seems odd to seek a theoretical foundation that would
enthrone only one of these ethical considerations as the master princi-
ple for resolving practical dilemmas.
In Sunstein's words, casuistical judgments are "incompletely theo-
rized"-the resolution of a particular case is judged to be correct in
light of past decisions, but there may nevertheless be deep disagree-
ment about the higher-order theoretical justification for the deci-
sion.3 95 For example, if a previous case held that the Ku Klux Klan
can meet and burn crosses, as long as there is no "clear and present
danger" of imminent violence, then a judge considering an applica-
tion for an injunction by the American Nazi Party, which wants to con-
duct a march in Skokie, Illinois, can conclude that the Nazis must be
allowed to march, without working out a fully theorized account of
the role of speech in a democratic society.
3 9 6
Casuistical judgments make use of the Rawlsian concept of an
overlapping consensus.3 97 An overlapping consensus exists if two par-
ties agree on normative principles to resolve a dispute, and these prin-
ciples are justified in terms of more deeply held or fundamental
principles. Significantly, these more fundamental principles may di-
verge, permitting agreement between parties who would otherwise be
at odds. The locus of certainty is the particular case, not the moral
first principles. In the free speech cases, it is not necessary to resolve
the deep disagreement between Nazis and their liberal neighbors on
most political issues; all that is required is that the disputing parties
agree on the moral principles that should govern disputes over speech
activities. For Sunstein, this is a great virtue of casuistry, since he takes
as a given that there will be profound disagreement in a pluralistic
society over foundational questions of justice.
Finally, some have claimed that this reasoning process, in which
type cases are described and used as points of departure for the analy-
sis of new cases, exemplifies the way in which practitioners actually
make ethical choices. Doctors, for example, might report: "This is a
Cruzan-type case, except here, instead of a feeding tube, the issue is
395 SUNSTEIN, supra note 362, at 37; see also WILIAMs, supra note 353, at 117;
Larmore, supra note 351, at 29.
396 See RICHARDSON, supra note 125, at 277; SUNSTEIN, supra note 362, at 66-69.
397 See RAWLS, supra note 106, at 144-50.
[VOL. 75:1
19991 PUBLIC VALUES AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 115
antibiotics. '398 It is certainly conceivable that practicing lawyers might
wrestle with a disclosure case by reasoning, "This case resembles
Spaulding, only the injury isn't life-threatening and the plaintiff is
scheduled to see his own specialist, who might discover the injury."3 99
The source of moral certainty in this type of reasoning is the resem-
blance or distance between the present case and type cases, where the
goodness or evil of the conduct in the type case is not subject to dis-
pute. In bioethics, for example, doctors can regard the Nazi medical
experiments as clear examples of how not to treat human research
subjects, find another example in which the morality of the human
research is more doubtful, although closer to the Nazi cases, and con-
tinue, via a process of "moral triangulation," until sufficient light has
been shed on the present case. 400 The complexity of judgments of
this nature may explain why anti-theories such as Llewellyn's horse-
sense are difficult to describe. If literally dozens of type cases and
their outcomes are germane to ethical reasoning, only very exper-
ienced practitioners might be expected to grasp the range of relevant
precedent and understand the application of these past cases to the
present situation. Furthermore, if the precedent cases exemplify con-
flicting values, then they can do no more than suggest considerations
to factor into practical deliberation-they cannot determine the case
in advance of an experienced practitioner.
3. Some Objections and Responses
The very term "casuistry" comes laden with considerable bag-
gage-it is generally used pejoratively by contemporary writers as a
synonym for "sophistry" or "a quibbling, evasive way of dealing with
difficult cases of duty."40 1 Casuistry, it is charged, creates moral skepti-
398 Arras, supra note 362, at 1001; see also ROBERT JACEALL, MORAL MAZES: THE
WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 5 (1988) (reporting the development in business
ethics of settled moral judgments with reference to type cases).
399 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
400 Arras, supra note 362, at 1000.
401 JONSEN & TouLMNI, supra note 331, at 238; see also AlmucAN HERITAGE Dic-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 246 (2d ed. 1985) (listing an alternate definition
as "[a] subtle but misleading or false application of ethical principles"). I wrote some
of this portion of this Article during the Clinton-Lewinsky-Starr affair and noticed that
journalists frequently referred to President Clinton's legalistic denials of a sexual rela-
tionship with the former White House intern as "casuistical," implying that his state-
ments were not technically untrue, but were substantively misleading. See, e.g., Laura
Cumming, Wat a Man Those Texans are Saddled With, Tim HERALD (Glasgow),Jan. 27,
1998, at 19 ("[Former presidential advisor Dick] Morris, in the bizarre doublethink of
the Oval Office, thought that it was more moral to pay for adultery than get it free like
his ruddy-faced boss. It is alleged that Clinton makes an equally casuistic distinction
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cism, relativism, and laxity; it is a "mere farrago of excuses, loopholes,
and evasions."402 Certainly bad casuistry can degenerate into nothing
more than an enterprise of offering excuses for self-serving behavior,
as occurred with religious casuistry in the sixteenth century. But there
is no more reason to tar the practice of casuistry with the corrupt prac-
tices of the sixteenth-century church than there is to use the Dred Scott
decision as a model of constitutional interpretation. Most systems of
practical reasoning of any complexity can be manipulated by a person
acting in bad faith: "Uncertainty and imprecision beset hard moral
choices. The more the intervening steps are multiplied and the more
we are told that one thing can be explained in terms of another or
derived from another, the more room is left for bias, self-deception,
even sleight of hand.
'403
Casuistry is nothing more than a rhetorical process of resolving
moral dilemmas with reference to previously decided cases, paying
due attention to analogies, distinctions, family resemblances, and
other features of the factual settings of the cases, while remaining at-
tentive to the more abstract theoretical principles that justify the prof-
fered analogies and distinctions. Casuistry must be criticized in the
same way one would criticize the common law: to show the process to
be inherently susceptible to moral laxity, an opponent must do more
than point to institutional malfunctions in which casuistry or com-
mon-law reasoning was used to legitimate abhorrent results. The com-
mon law justified appalling incidents, like the internment ofJapanese-
Americans during World War II, but it also enabled the Supreme
Court to decide Brown v. Board of Education.
Bernard Williams criticizes casuistry for being too closely tied to
local circumstances and, thus, encouraging ethical relativism.40 4 This
objection echoes the legitimacy problem we have encountered
throughout this article-if case-by-case ethics proceeds in a kind of
oscillation between particular judgments based on individual cases
and higher-order principles, one is entitled to ask whose higher-order
between oral sex and an actual affair."); William Hartston, Wat the Papers Said: Wil-
liam Hartston Reviews the Week's Press, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 9, 1998, at 23
("Clinton's adventures with Lewinsky could not, in his eyes, be seen as an affair, or
even as sexual relations. If this be the case, then his declaration 'I have never had
sexual relations with that woman' has the ring of truth as well as casuistry.").
402 JONSEN c TOULMIN, supra note 331, at 242; cf. Richard H. Weisberg, Law and
Rhetoric, 85 MICH. L. REV. 920, 929 (1987) (book review) ("[T]here are few situations,
however morally intolerable, that a lawyer could not rationalize and even promote
through rhetoric.").
403 BOK, supra note 126, at 57.
404 See WILLIAMS, supra note 353, at 96-97.
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principles serve as the arbiter of the correctness of particularized judg-
ments.40 5 Certainly the organized bar, if left to its own devices, might
promulgate a set of "ethical" norms which does no more than pander
to lawyers' self-interest. (Richard Abel and others have developed this
criticism forcefully. 406) The definition of community proposed above,
however, makes clear that it is not merely the lawyer's subjective judg-
ment that constrains the practice of casuistry. A lawyer deliberating
about the application a prior case should take into account not only
what she and her fellow lawyers believe about that case, but also
(wherever possible) what informed citizens have said about the praise-
worthiness or blameworthiness of the conduct of the lawyers in the
prior case.
Some high-profile cases are practically meaningless without un-
derstanding the public reaction to them. The O.J. Simpson criminal
and civil defense cases, the Lincoln Savings debacle, the toxic-tort liti-
gation described in A Civil Action, and the defense of President Clin-
ton in the impeachment proceedings are important for what they
show us about the public response to actions taken by lawyers, particu-
larly where the public reaction differs from that of the organized Bar.
Those cases have generated substantial discussion by nonlawyers, both
on the level of higher-order ethical principles and particularized prac-
tical judgments. Thus, lawyers seeking to determine whether their
ethical jfidgments are legitimate in similar cases should pay close at-
tention to arguments made in newspaper op-ed pieces, on television
and radio talk shows, and in stump speeches and other public state-
ments by politicians.
40 7
Williams and others argue further that, by failing to provide for a
method of challenging current cultural traditions, casuistry tends to
be a conservative method of reasoning.40 8 James Boyd White has his
405 Cf BERNSTEIN, supra note 335, at 158.
406 See ABEL, supra note 14.
407 Obviously, not all public criticism of lawyers is entitled to the same weight. See,
e.g., Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENY. U.
L. REv. 77 (1993). Lawyers are an easy target for politicians seeking to create an aura
of populism. Rhetorical tropes, like the McDonald's coffee case, quickly take on a life
of their own, seemingly unconnected to reality.
408 See WI=mus, supra note 353, at 96-97; see also SuNsTEiN, supra note 362, at 94
(noting that analogical reasoning has been criticized as unduly bound up with tradi-
tion in the Burkean sense); Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation,
112 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1998); Karen Hanson, Are Principles Ever Properly Ignored? A Reply
to Beauchamp on Bioethical Paradigms, 69 IND. LJ. 975 (1994) (observing that horrors
such as the Tuskegee experiments were justified with reference to existing social tra-
ditions in medicine); Michael A. Livingston, Postmodernism Meets Practical Reason, 107
YAI.E L.J. 1125, 1129, 1147 (1998) (book review) (arguing that practice-based theories
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imaginary Socrates argue against the proponent of an antifoundation-
alist, rhetorical ethics of lawyering:
Where the conventions of the art are not beautiful but ugly, will the
work of the artist not be ugly too? And where do the standards by
which he establishes his ideal come from? Are they not also formed
by the musical or legal culture itself, with all of its defects? Either as
a lawyer or musician, then, how can you have any confidence that
the changes you make are true improvements, that the ideal to
which you assimilate yourself is a proper one? The questions of
beauty and justice are in the end the most important ones, and for
them rhetoric is plainly useless: only dialectic will suffice. 40 9
These arguments ignore the internal constraints built into the
process of reasoning from past cases. The method of casuistry con-
tains within itself mechanisms for criticizing tradition.410 This kind of
reasoning does not focus myopically on cases, but it constantly checks
the outcomes of particular factual disputes against higher-order prin-
ciples or maxims. If the rule derived from a previous case seems to
mandate a result contrary to a higher-order theory, the previous rule
can be rejected or modified. It should be emphasized that casuistical
reasoning-like the common law tradition, Rawls's reflective equilib-
rium, or Dworkin's theory of adjudication-is dialectical. The appro-
priateness of an analogy in a normative argument depends not only
on the fit between the facts of present and past cases, but it also de-
pends on the consonance of the outcome of the present case with
more general principles of morality.411 To avoid falling into the trap
of monism, however, casuistical theories must remain anchored firmly
to tradition at the same time. The point is that there is nothing inher-
ently conservative about tradition-it provides the intellectual and
of legal reasoning fail to allow for radical critique or change). Similar criticisms can,
and have been, leveled at virtue or tradition-centered theories of ethics. See, e.g., Eliz-
abeth Frazer & Nicola Lacey, Maclntyre, Feminism and the Concept of Practice, in AFrER
MAcI'rYRE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE WORK OF ALASDAIR MAcINTYRE 265 (John
Horton & Susan Mendus eds., 1994).
409 White, supra note 206, at 885.
410 SUNSTEIN, supra note 362, at 94-96; cf. GADAMER, supra note 365, at 250-51
(stating that just as reason must be located within tradition, and can never transcend
tradition, tradition cannot place itself outside reason); KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE
CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 29-30 (1995) (explaining that it may be possible to
show that shared social understandings have been produced by structural injustice,
but this argument need not assume an Archimedian point outside the social tradition;
instead, a critic may appeal to deeper values of the culture that have gone unex-
pressed in majority understandings).
411 See DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 243-49; DWORKIN, supra note 59, at 67-68.
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My ambition is not to crown one tradition of practical reasoning
as the canonical method for lawyers to use in ethical deliberation.
Each of the traditions has something to offer, and a fully worked-out
theory of professional responsibility may draw from both strands at
once. The revival of practical wisdom championed by Kronman use-
fully reminds us that the character of individual practitioners is as im-
portant as the rules, principles, consequences, rights, and duties
ordinarily emphasized in philosophical inquiry. It also encourages
fledgling lawyers to seek out the guidance of more experienced practi-
tioners, whose character and judgment have developed over a long
course of dealing with the realities of practical decision making.
Casuistry recalls the role of particular judgments, upon which
there may be considerable agreement, and demands attention to the
full factual setting of ethical dilemmas. In legal ethics education, the
lessons of casuistry have already been learned through the numerous
teachers who use role-playing scenarios, videotapes, and possibly live-
client clinics to expose students to a richness of detail that could never
be conveyed by appellate cases and hypothetical questions. The stu-
dents can test their intuitive responses to these realistic scenarios
against higher-order theoretical considerations, rather than trying to
apply highly abstract principles from the top down. Casuistry also
highlights the importance of the community in practical reasoning. It
is the integrity of the community's normative understanding that
serves as an important criterion for the validity of ethical judgments.
Both casuistry and Kronman's prudentialism require the lawyer
as a moral agent to deliberate about public values, that is, the norma-
tive principles that justify the practice of lawyering in a democratic
society. Focusing on public values in this way offers an alternative to
the endless debate over the extent to which a lawyer's personal value
commitments ought to influence her actions in the professional
arena. As should be clear from this discussion, I do not mean to fore-
close allreliance on personal values in legal ethics. Just as civil disobe-
412 See ANDERSON, supra note 97, at 101-12; JAMES BOYD WHrrE, HERACLES' Bow:
ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 241 (1985) (stating that the lan-
guage of law "in principle is open to challenge at every point .... [I]t is made by
those who represent the interests of others; and [it] . . . has elements that enact a
politics that can be seen as radically individualistic and indeed subversive of the claims
of ideology and power").
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dience may be justified in the face of a law that a person perceives as
unjust, lawyers may also engage in civilly disobedient behavior in cases
of stark conflict between public and personal values.413 For most law-
yers, civil disobedience does not confront them on a daily basis. Thus,
a potentially more robust role for personal values in professional eth-
ics is suggested by the persistence of conflict among plural values. In
many cases of value conflict, the methods of practical wisdom and cas-
uistry will produce a result that is mandatory, given the norms of the
professional community. The lawyer who failed to disclose the
aneurysm in Spaulding and the defense lawyers who badgered women
about their sexual practices in the Dalkon Shield litigation did some-
thing indefensible in light of the proper balance of the public values
at issue. There are other cases, however, in which two or more
choices may be equally defensible, given the professional norms of
loyalty, justice, and care. In those situations, the lawyer will have some
leeway to define her own professional self, based in part on the law-
yer's personal value commitments. For now, this case is beyond the
scope of the argument in this article. I hope to have more to say on
the subject soon.
It is worth reiterating that this analysis is not intended to supplant
entirely the law of lawyering. The public-values framework I have de-
fended here is, rather, a basis for the moral assessment of lawyers and
of lawyering activities. Its relevance to legal practice can be summa-
rized as follows:
(1) The scheme of principles underlying the positive law of lawy-
ering is necessary for interpreting given legal texts. Thus, if a rule or
statute does not facially determine a lawyer's obligation, then a court,
disciplinary body, or other authoritative tribunal may, tacitly or ex-
pressly, refer to the normative foundations of the practice of lawyering
in order to elucidate the lawyer's ethical duty. The Minnesota
Supreme Court's decision in Spaulding implicitly relies on public val-
ues in this way.
(2) If there is no legal text which speaks to the problem at hand,
then the public values of lawyering provide some basis for a lawyer to
reason through her ethical obligations. If the defense lawyers in the
Dalkon Shield litigation had referred to these values, they would have
observed a conflict between their duty to seek a favorable result for
413 See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 21, at 92-95;Judith A. McMorrow, Civil Disobedience
and the Lawyer's Obligation to the Law, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 139 (1991); Morgan &
Tuttle, supra note 177, at 1027-29; David B. Wilkins, In Defense of Law and Morality:
Why Lawyers Should Have a Prima Facie Duty to Obey the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269
(1996); Wolf, supra note 93, at 51.
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their client and their duty not to inflict undue emotional harm on
third party witnesses. When outside observers criticized the Robins
lawyers in that case, they were tacitly relying on these public values,
arguing that the lawyers should have given more weight to the value of
care and the avoidance of harm.
(3) The public values of lawyering may serve as a basis for criticiz-
ing existing legal rules and advocating reform. The debate surround-
ing a lawyer's disclosure obligations, which occurred during the
drafting of the Model Rules, illustrates how the moral values of lawyer-
ing may serve as standpoints for criticism of existing legal rules. The
older Model Code permitted the lawyer to disclose any future crime, no
matter how minor.414 The Model Rules version is significantly more
protective of client confidences, not permitting disclosure unless the
crime is one that may result in serious personal injury.415 Critics ar-
gue back and forth, in moral terms, about whether this rule change
was desirable. Simon claims that the almost complete prohibition on
whistleblowing in the Model Rules "cements the lawyer's subordination
to wealthy clients by depriving her of the only effective leverage she
has to curb unjust conduct by the client .... ,,416 On the other hand,
the American Trial Lawyers Association, which is composed primarily
of plaintiffs' personal-injury lawyers, sought a rule with limited provi-
sions for mandatory disclosure because of its vehement opposition to
a scheme of rules that would make "lawyers servants of the system,
rather than the bulwark between organized power and the individ-
ual. '4 17 Whether the Model Code or Model Rules correctly struck the
balance between protecting third parties and serving one's client, this
dialogue shows that the constituent public values of lawyering play a
central role in law reform.
41 8
414 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (C) (1997) ("A lawyer
may reveal... [t]he intention of his client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime.") (footnotes omitted). z.
415 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1997).
416 Simon, supra note 2, at 68.
417 Theodore Schneyer, Professionalism as Politics: The Making of a Modem Legal Eth-
ics Code, in IDEALs/PRACTICES, supra note 14, at 122.
418 Some cases that look like ethical dilemmas may be institutional malfunctions
that can be ameliorated by substantive or procedural reforms. See Weinstein, supra
note 2, at 453; see alsoJEROME FRANK, CoURTs ON TRIAL: MytH AND REALmrr IN AmERI-
CAN JUSTICE 85 (1949) ("[D]o not blame trial lawyers for using the techniques I have
described. If there is to be criticism, it should be directed at the system that virtually
compels their use .... "). Lawyers, like any other rational actors, respond to incen-
tives, and if it is easy to cheat and get away with it, some percentage of lawyers can be
predicted to try. United States District Judge Jack B. Weinstein, who has written ex-
tensively about ethical problems in mass tort litigation, has suggested a menu of ethi-
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(4) Finally, and somewhat paradoxically, the public values of
lawyering may serve as a basis for criticizing a lawyer's conduct, even
though that conduct is permissible under law and there are good rea-
sons not to change the applicable law. Consider the Abner Louima
case in New York City, in which a police officer dragged an arrestee,
Louima, down to the basement of a Brooklyn precinct house and vio-
lently sodomized him with a broken plunger handle. During the trial
of the officer, the officer's lawyer suggested in his opening argument
that the severe injuries to Louima's rectum and bladder were caused
not by the officer's attack, but by consensual sexual activity earlier that
evening. Most observers were outraged at the lawyer's argument, but
some criminal defense lawyers insisted that he was not only permitted
to make the argument, but would be constitutionally required to do so
if it were a promising avenue of attacking the prosecution's case.419
(The claim that the lawyer's consensual-sex theory was constitutionally
required assumes something that should not be taken for granted-
namely, the efficacy of that theory of defense. In this case, the argu-
ment probably inflamed the jury and made the officer's case look
even weaker. For prudential reasons alone, the lawyer should not
have used this line of defense.) I think it is possible to criticize the
lawyer's arguments in the strongest possible terms, without thereby
implying that he should be subject to any kind of disciplinary sanc-
tions. The lawyer took a high-stakes gamble that one of the jurors
might be sufficiently homophobic that he or she would vote to acquit,
if the lawyer could plant the suggestion that Louima's injuries were
the result of homosexual sex. That makes the lawyer a real jerk, but
here it must be sufficient to call the lawyer a jerk, without seeking
legal sanctions against him. The constitutional principles that a de-
fendant is presumed innocent, that an accused is entitled to the assist-
ance of counsel, and that the state must prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt are of such overriding importance that criminal de-
fense lawyers enjoy a great deal of latitude to misbehave. Sometimes,
cal reforms for mass disaster cases. SeeJAcK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUALJUsTICE IN MASS
TORT LITIGATION 49, 54-88 (1995). Judge Weinstein's insight is that gigantic tort
cases like asbestos, DES, and Agent Orange strain the traditional model of the lawyer-
client relationship just as much as they do traditional tort, contract, and procedural
law. This dysfunction is not a sign of lawyers' inadequate moral reasoning so much as
it is a clash of historically rooted legal categories with modem technology's capacity to
injure a multitude of people. By reforming ethical rules in mass tort litigation, the
profession can adapt its self-regulation to the demands of a changing practice
environment.
419 SeeJoseph P. Fried, An Insinuation Revisited During the Louima Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
May 31, 1999, at B4; Laura Mansnerus, 1Wen the Job Requires a Walk on the Ethical Line,
N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1999, at WK 10.
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unethical behavior ought to go unpunished in deference to other in-
stitutional values.
It should be clear that "returning values to legal ethics" is not a
simple matter, but there are reasons to expect that lawyers and law
teachers will prove well suited to the task. For the public values of
lawyering are kindred to the policies underlying other legal rules,
which we are accustomed to discovering, criticizing, deploying in ar-
guments, and conveying to our students. A values-centered approach
to professional responsibility does not require lawyers to become theo-
logians or moral philosophers; instead, it asks merely that they be law-
yers. The public values that underlie the practice of law are plural,
and often conflicting, but this situation is no different from any other
area of human activity that is regulated by the law. We expect courts
to resolve disputes in a 'just, speedy, and inexpensive"420 manner. We
seek a tort system that is efficient but also fair, and a constitutional
order that appropriately balances democratic self-government and the
rule of law. Nothwithstanding Dworkin's occasional optimism on this
front, there are seldom unambiguously right answers to vexing ques-
tions of political morality in any area of law, so we should not be con-
ditioned to expect perfect clarity in legal ethics. But Dworkin has
shown the way to a satisfying process for deliberating about right an-
swers, a process that seeks a basis for resolving legal disputes accord-
ing to the community's moral principles. What is the best light in
which this community may be seen, given its multifarious moral com-
mitments? By keeping this question in mind, we may better under-
stand the ethical basis for the practice of lawyering.
420 FED. R- Cyv. P. 1.
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